Western media continue to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in an agreed ceasefire in Ukraine, despite Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military action suggesting otherwise. "Reuters" reported on May 24 that, according to four Russian sources who work or have worked with Putin, he is willing to negotiate a ceasefire. This acknowledges the current front lines and that Putin is willing to present the current size of occupied Ukrainian territory as a Russian military victory to the public.
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Western media reported similar interest on Putin's part in a negotiated ceasefire or agreement based on statements from unidentified Russian sources with alleged ties to Putin or the Kremlin in December 2023 and January and February 2024.
Western media cited a limited number of unspecified U.S. and international officials as confirmation, although other Western media reported that U.S. sources denied there had been any official Russian contact with the U.S. on the matter.
The Kremlin has routinely feigned interest in meaningful negotiations as part of a long-running information operation aimed at persuading the West to make concessions on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is unclear whether the unspecified Russian sources are promoting these efforts or accurately portraying Putin's interests and views.
ISW cannot determine the veracity of the claims, which contrast sharply with Russia's official public rhetoric and actions. Putin and the Kremlin have significantly stepped up their expansionist rhetoric on Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly indicated that Russia is committed to the complete destruction of Ukrainian statehood and identity.
Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations in recent months that aim to make significant operational progress and collapse the front line, opening a new front in Kharkiv Oblast (which Russia does not claim through illegal annexation). They sought to inflict long-term damage on Ukraine's combat capabilities and economic potential with regular large-scale missile and drone strikes.
These military operations suggest that the Kremlin is more interested in achieving its long-term goal of a maximalist victory in Ukraine than in any settlement that would immediately freeze the front line where it currently stands.
Russian sources who spoke to Western media also offered mutually contradictory characterizations of Putin's position on the talks.
Russian sources also told Reuters that Putin believes the West will not give Ukraine enough weapons, but understands that carrying out some "dramatic" Russia's progress will require another Russian national mobilization.
The slowdown in Western security aid has severely limited Ukraine's defense capacity in recent months, and if Putin believes there are limits to Western support for Ukraine, then he would logically conclude that such limits could re-emerge in the medium term and allow Russian forces with their current capabilities to achieve "dramatic" profits without making a wider mobilization of labor or the Russian economy.
A Russian source said Putin was concerned that a longer war would generate more disgruntled veterans with poor job prospects and economic situations that could fuel internal tensions. Although this assessment is at odds with Russia's ongoing chronic labor shortage and the Kremlin's efforts to prepare Russian society for a long military effort.
These contradictions cast further doubt on the accuracy with which these Russian sources reflect Putin's actual thinking.
These Russian sources in particular emphasize territorial concessions as part of the supposed ceasefire, but rarely address the broader strategic goals of Putin's war in Ukraine. "Reuters" reported that its Russian sources said Putin viewed Russia retaining control of currently occupied Ukrainian territory as a non-negotiable basis for negotiations, and previous Western reports of Putin's openness to talks have similarly highlighted Russian territorial desires . Bloomberg reported in January that two unspecified sources close to the Kremlin said Putin had signaled to senior US officials that he might be willing to drop demands for a "neutral status" of Ukraine and may even eventually drop its opposition to Ukraine joining NATO.
Russian demands for Ukrainian "neutrality" and a moratorium on NATO expansion have always been and continue to be one of Putin's primary justifications for his invasion of Ukraine, and any hypothetical concession on these demands would represent a major strategic and rhetorical concession on Putin's behalf that Putin is extremely unlikely to currently under consideration.
Putin also launched the operation in Ukraine to replace the Ukrainian government with one he deemed suitable and to "demilitarize" the Ukrainian military so that Russia can unilaterally impose its will on Ukraine in the future without facing significant Ukrainian resistance.
A ceasefire that cedes currently occupied territory would cement the idea that Ukrainian territorial integrity is up for negotiation, a precedent the Kremlin is sure to revisit to press for further territorial concessions and challenge the idea of Ukrainian statehood altogether.
The ceasefire does not prevent Russia from resuming its offensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia would use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensive operations in Ukraine. Russia's military intervention in Crimea and Donbass in 2014 violated many of Russia's international commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Including Russia's recognition of Ukraine as an independent state in 1991 and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia expressly committed not to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Russia could use a cease-fire to prepare a force better suited to conduct a subsequent series of offensive operations in pursuit of regime change, demilitarization, and the conquest of Ukraine. A cease-fire would provide Ukraine with its own capabilities to address force generation and defense industrial capacity, of course. But the Kremlin may not unreasonably expect that a frozen frontline will make support for Ukraine less urgent and meaningful to the West and allow Russia to preempt Ukraine's preparations for renewed hostilities.
Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin is likely to view anything short of a Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to wage such a war.
Russian military leaders planning a war against NATO would have to accept that Ukraine could enter such a war on behalf of NATO, regardless of Ukraine's membership status.
A front with NATO along Russia's entire western border with Europe presents the Russian military with serious challenges, as ISW has previously assessed, while a Ukrainian defeat would give Russia the opportunity to deploy its forces along Europe's entire eastern flank from Black sea to Finland.
A Russian victory in Ukraine would not only remove the threat of Ukraine as a potential adversary during a possible conventional war with NATO, but would also provide Russia with additional resources and men to engage in a full-scale confrontation with NATO. Regardless of how a Russian victory would divide Ukraine, Russia would have access to millions more for military service, and most of Ukraine's resources and industrial capacity.
Which is why Putin and the Kremlin likely see victory in Ukraine as a prerequisite to being able to go to war with NATO, and any truce or negotiated settlement short of Ukraine's full capitulation as a temporary pause in their efforts to destroy an independent Ukrainian country.
The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and continue its efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West. The Kremlin has repeatedly engaged in a large-scale reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making.
Reflexive control is a key element in Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit and relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary will voluntarily take actions that are advantageous to Russia.
Kremlin officials say Russia is open to talks in December 2022, which would likely delay the delivery of Western tanks and other equipment essential to Ukraine's continued mechanized counteroffensive.
U.S. officials recently said that the resumption of U.S. security assistance will help Ukrainian forces resist Russian attacks for the rest of 2024, and that Ukrainian forces will seek to conduct counteroffensive operations to regain the territory in 2025
Putin directly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president on May 24, the latest in a series of attempts to deny Zelensky's authority to engage in or reject talks with Russia and undermine Ukrainian confidence in Zelensky. Putin said during a press conference with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus on May 24 that Russia was willing to negotiate with Ukraine, but that the "legitimacy of the current Ukrainian head of state is over," referring to a Russian intelligence operation falsely claiming that Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine, as his term was set to expire on May 20.
Putin has argued that Ukraine's parliament and constitutional court should review the Ukrainian constitution to determine the legality of officials remaining in office beyond their stated terms, which Putin has described as an internal Ukrainian matter (which he nevertheless chose to express an opinion).
Putin's reference to the Ukrainian constitution while explicitly denying Zelensky's legitimacy is strange because the Ukrainian constitution expressly allows a sitting president to postpone elections and remain in office after his term ends during martial law.
Zelensky's decision to postpone the March 2024 elections is in full compliance with the Ukrainian constitution. Although Putin appears to have no understanding of Ukrainian law, his statements encourage a broader Russian information operation aimed at undermining Ukrainian confidence in Zelensky by portraying him as the only obstacle to a negotiated peace in Ukraine.
The Kremlin is trying to foment internal unrest in Ukraine, centered around distrust in the Ukrainian government under Zelensky. Ukraine's General Directorate of Military Intelligence (GUR) warned on February 27 that Russia is conducting an information operation dubbed "Maidan 3" that uses multiple rhetorical lines to undermine domestic confidence and international support for the Ukrainian government, undermine Zelensky's legitimacy , to sow panic and incite conflict.
The head of the GUR, Lieutenant General Kirilo Budanov, warned on April 27 that "Maidan 3" is "advanced" and aims to disguise pro-Russian actors, ideals and movements as social tensions and other issues to influence Ukrainian society. GUR warned that the peak of the operation "Maidan 3" will reach March-May 2024, and GUR spokesman Andriy Yusov similarly warned on May 23 that Russia will continue to step up Operation Maidan-3. until July 2024
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on May 20 that anonymous online accounts are calling on groups of hundreds of Ukrainian Telegram users to participate in the "Maidan-3" demonstrations. in Kyiv's Independence Square on May 21, including some offering payments of 1,000 hryvnias (just under $25) per hour.
RFE/RL noted that all of these Telegram groups chose the May 21 date to coincide with the end of Zelensky's first presidential term if Ukraine held elections in March 2024. RFE/RL reported that a similar information operation is taking place on TikTok, both calling on users to demonstrate against Zelensky and spreading propaganda claiming that Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president.
The Kremlin may be setting information conditions to eventually announce a Kremlin-backed person as Ukrainian president instead of Zelensky. Putin said on May 24 that Russia was seeking to find out who the "legitimate Ukrainian authorities" were before starting negotiations, hinting that the Kremlin could declare a figure of its choice as the "legitimate" at some point in the future. Independent monitoring project Belarus Hajun reported that the plane of former pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who fled Ukraine to Russia during the 2014 Euromaidan protests against his rule, arrived in Minsk on May 24, coinciding with Putin and Russia's Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov's visit to Minsk for extensive negotiations on a union state.
It is not clear why Yanukovych will be in Minsk or who he met with. Western and Ukrainian media have highlighted Yanukovych as a possible Kremlin-chosen replacement for Zelensky if the early days of the Russian invasion force Ukraine to capitulate.
The Moscow Times, citing unnamed sources, reported on May 24 that the recent arrests of five high-ranking defense officials by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) are likely the first of dozens or hundreds of expected arrests.
Russian authorities have notably arrested five senior Russian Defense Ministry officials and former military commanders since April 24, including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov, Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov, former commander of the 58 All-Army Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Main Directorate of Communications Lieutenant General Vadim Shamarin and Head of the State Procurement Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Vladimir Verteletsky.
A source told The Moscow Times that the FSB was "cleaning up" defense officials linked to former Defense Minister and recently appointed Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu and that the FSB could only conduct this type of operation with the approval of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
A source close to the Kremlin claims that these arrests show that the FSB is "triumphant" over the Russian Defense Ministry and that the arrests were part of the FSB's effort to convince Putin that the Russian Defense Ministry was responsible for the failures in the first weeks of the Russian Defense Ministry's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Kremlin has undoubtedly debated which department deserves the blame for the initial failures of the Russian military in Ukraine, but it is unclear whether Putin remains interested in assigning blame for the first months of the invasion for two years later.
Furthermore, the FSB is one of the most logical branches of the Russian government to make these arrests, as it is tasked with issues of internal security, counterintelligence, economic crimes and surveillance of the Russian military.
While Putin is known to balance his favor among silovaki (Russian strongmen with political influence) and encourage infighting, it is at least as likely that the FSB's involvement in the ongoing removal of high-ranking Russian defense and military officers is due of delegated responsibilities directed by the Kremlin, and not as part of a wider FSB conspiracy to gain control of or deflect blame to the Ministry of Defence.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on May 24 that NATO member states should consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-supplied weapons to strike military targets in Russia.
Stoltenberg said these restrictions make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to defend themselves against the Russian offensive in the northern part of the Kharkiv region. ISW continues to assess that Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia have created a haven in Russia's border area from where Russian aircraft can launch guided bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and where Russian forces and equipment can freely collect before entering battle.