< p>U.S. officials continue to try to clarify the country's policy on Ukraine striking a limited number of Russian military targets in Russia with U.S.-supplied weapons. But it remains unclear for now. National security spokesman John Kirby said during a press conference on June 4 that "there has never been a restriction on the Ukrainians shooting down enemy aircraft, even if those aircraft are not necessarily in their airspace.
Kirby made the statement in response to a question about whether America's recent partial lifting of the restrictions referred to strikes against Russian aircraft operating in Russian airspace. Kirby said Ukrainian forces have already done so since the start of the war. It remains unclear what official US policy is on which Russian aircraft pose an "imminent threat" about Ukraine and how the US administration views this issue.
This is stated in the daily analysis of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself depends largely on the use of US-supplied air defense systems before Russian aircraft can strike Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure and forward positions.
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The current lack of clarity in U.S. constraints routinely misses the opportunity to force Russia to exercise restraint against carrying out such strikes on Ukrainian territory from Russian airspace.
Russian forces continued to conduct intense attacks against Ukraine on June 5, likely mostly from Russian airspace.
Kirby also said during the press conference that the US could not confirm whether Ukraine had already used US-supplied weapons in strikes against Russia since May 30. But the Associated Press (AP) reported on June 5, citing an unnamed US senator and a Western official, that Ukraine had used US-supplied weapons to strike Russia "in recent days".
ISW has reviewed geolocated footage from June 1 or 2 that shows a possible Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in the Belgorod region.
Western-supplied artillery munitions have reportedly begun arriving to front-line Ukrainian forces, though not in quantities that would allow the forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage. Ukrainian soldiers operating near Vovchansk (northeast of the city of Kharkiv) confirmed to the Telegraph in an article published on June 5 that Western-supplied ammunition had begun to reach their sector of the front line, but that Russian forces in the area still maintained advantage in ammunition.
Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid. Ukraine will face even greater energy constraints in the summer of 2024. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out over half of Ukraine's power generation capacity, reducing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 the gigawatt (probably meaning yearly) of 55 gigawatts per year before the start of the war in 2022.
The European Union (EU) ambassador to Ukraine, Katarina Materovna, told the FT that Russia had destroyed 9.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity from the end of March 2024.
A Ukrainian official told the FT that Russian forces damaged 1.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity during strikes on energy infrastructure on the night of May 31-June 1 alone.
Ukraine's state-owned electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo said on June 5 that it expects Ukraine's power system to go through its most difficult period in mid-summer 2024 as energy consumption increases due to the heat.
Russia is likely to continue periodic mass strikes to cause significant long-term damage, while also creating conditions for marked humanitarian pressure in the winter of 2024-2025.
The Ukrainian publisher "Liga" reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's General Directorate of Military Intelligence (GUR) said that approximately 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel are concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.
ISW cannot independently verify this data. These likely include combat and other non-combat military personnel performing support functions. The commander of Ukrainian ground forces, Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Pavlyuk, said that as of May 3, approximately 510,000 to 515,000 Russian troops were deployed in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in December 2023 that in the "combat zone" 617,000 Russian military personnel are deployed - presumably referring to all Russian military personnel in the "special military operation" zone, which includes deployment zones in Russia's border regions.
GUR spokesman Andriy Yusov reported in January 2024 that there are 35,000 Rosgvardiya personnel in occupied Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardiya personnel to the occupied areas.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russia's defense industrial capacity along with former Tula Oblast Governor and presidential aide Alexei Dyumin and the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Shoigu, Dyumin and Medvedev would oversee an unspecified aspect of efforts to increase Russia's defense industrial capacity.
Shoigu's roughly equivalent position with Dyumin and Medvedev further indicates that the Kremlin demoted Shoigu after his removal as defense minister. It suggests that he is a secondary figure in newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's task of significantly mobilizing the Russian economy for a protracted war in Ukraine.
Shoigu currently works with the Presidential Administration's Military-Industrial Complex Commission and the Federal Foreign Office, suggesting that Shoigu is likely involved in the Kremlin's efforts to strengthen relations with Iran, North Korea, Belarus and China People's Republic (PRC) to help Russia procure the components and materials it needs to increase its military industrial capacity.
The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council and Secretary of United Russia Andrey Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin's ongoing efforts to remove from power political and military figures who lost his trust in 2023 The Russian Federal Council terminated Turchak's powers on June 5 after Putin appointed him governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.
Russian insiders and political bloggers claimed that he most likely removed Turchak because of his alleged close relationship with the deceased financier of "Wagner" Yevgeny Prigozhin, as well as a conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) regarding control over the occupied Ukrainian territories.
A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on migration policy reflected Russia's conflicting policies of attracting migrants to fill Russia's labor shortages while catering to its ultra-nationalist anti-immigrant electorates. The HRC held a meeting on June 4 to "ensure the rights of Russian citizens in the implementation of migration policy". and discussed several initiatives to strengthen Russian federal control over migrant communities living in Russia.
The Council discussed mandatory Russian language tests for all children of migrants hoping to enroll in schools and kindergartens; creation of "centers for social adaptation" for learning the Russian language by migrants; and recognizing children who do not speak Russian at the legally defined level as having "special educational needs", all of which would require federal oversight and funding to facilitate the integration of migrants into the Russian social sphere.
Some participants in the HRC meeting proposed much harsher policy changes. For example, Kaluga Oblast Minister of Internal Affairs Oleg Kalugin called for a rule barring migrant workers from bringing their families to Russia in the first place, suggesting that the cost of helping migrant families integrate into Russian society is not worth the social burden on Russian society.
Russian business publication Kommersant notes that these policies are mainly aimed at migrant communities from Armenia and Central Asia, primarily Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The meeting's focus on migrant policy as a means of protecting Russian citizens (mostly implied to be ethnic Russians or naturalized foreign nationals) rhetorically drives a strong wedge between "Russians" and "migrants" as opposing camps and specifically identified Central Asian migrants as potential threats to the rights of Russian citizens. Russian domestic policy relies heavily on migrant labor, particularly from Central Asia, to support its domestic economy as it continues to offset economic deficits resulting from the war in Ukraine. At the same time, it disenfranchises migrant communities to cater to its vote and an influential ultra-nationalist electorate.
Similarly, the HRC will have to balance promoting policies that encourage and attract migrants to move to Russia in the hope of economic gain, while appeasing cadres of commentators who hold anti-migrant and xenophobic views who believe that migration policy is a threat to ethnic Russians.
The head of the Russian Guard of the Chechen Republic and deputy of the Russian State Duma, Adam Delimkhanov, accused the deputy chairman of the State Duma and head of the "New People" party; Vladislav Davankov at odds with the Russian constitution and an attempt to divide Russian society, revealing the ongoing tension between Chechnya's efforts to act autonomously and the Russian state's efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and local Muslim communities. On May 28, Davankov submitted a bill to the State Duma that would allow educational institutions and regional authorities to ban religious clothing that "partially or completely hides the face" in municipal and public spaces.
Delimkhanov responded to Davankov's proposal by stating that the Russian constitution guarantees religious freedom and noted that the hijab, which he says is a religious obligation for Muslim women, does not cover the face.
However, Delimkhanov claims that Chechens are against the niqab, which covers the face. In addition, Delimkhanov argued that Davankov's bill could cause a split in Russian society, as it raised "one of the most sensitive topics" without "proper consideration of the subject". Delimkhanov also noted that Russian Orthodox Christianity expects women to wear headscarves as a sign of piety and humility. Davankov defended himself against Delimkhanov's criticism by referring to Russia's secular education system. He claimed that the parents requested the ban in the schools because the children of the migrants "show difficulties even speaking Russian".
The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the ban on religious clothing in schools in the Republic of Mordovia in 2015
This dispute highlights ongoing tensions between the Chechen Republic and the Russian government's long-term efforts to subjugate Chechnya, possibly exacerbated by the Kremlin's increased crackdown on local and migrant Muslim communities since the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.
The renewed debate over restrictions against Islamic religious dress is likely to continue to fuel division along ethnic and religious lines, despite the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russia as a harmonious and united multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country.
The Russian state gas company "Gazprom" estimates that it is unlikely to recover the gas sales it has lost since the start of the war in Ukraine. In doing so, it illustrates how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts on Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's military efforts. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom's management had commissioned a report in late 2023 on the long-term outlook for gas sales, which found that Gazprom's annual exports to Europe by 2035 would average 50 billion up to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe before the full-scale invasion. "Gazprom" noted that a new pipeline to the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to compensate for lost export volume to Europe, but will have the capacity to transport only 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.
Russia relies on oil revenues to prop up federal budgets amid increased spending on the war in Ukraine, and long-term curbs on other energy exports are likely to limit further significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.
Russia managed to maintain a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to circumvent the G7 price ceiling on Russian oil and oil products. The West is expanding sanctions to curb Russia's efforts to circumvent the G7 price ceiling. Significant restrictions on Russian oil exports could also have a significant impact on Russian government revenues.
Russian investigative publication Insider and Moldovan publication Little Country published an investigation on June 5 about the former chief of the Moldovan General Staff Igor Gorgan, who acted as an agent on behalf of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU). The publications obtained access to Telegram correspondence between Gorgan and his GRU superior Colonel Aleksey Makarov, which shows that Gorgan has regularly reported on internal Moldovan affairs and visits by representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to Moldova since 2019 .
The Insider reported that an unspecified military intelligence source said the GRU's active contact with Gorgan began when Gorgan served on a NATO mission in 2004.
Gorgan served as Moldova's Chief of General Staff in 2013 and from 2019 to 2021 and reportedly offered the GRU information on Moldovan military capabilities and activities, requests from the Ukrainian MoD, and information on internal Moldovan politics.
Gorgan reportedly assured the GRU that he still had contacts in the Moldovan MoD who could continue to supply him with information. Gorgan regularly told Makarov that Moldova was ready for the arrival of Russian forces and that he would keep "the whole situation in the army under control" and will help Russia "deal with Moldovan politicians".
GRU's response to Gorgan's proposals is not yet clear. The Kremlin is committed to efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova from joining the European Union (EU), and its connection with the GRU illustrates how Russia uses pro-Russian Moldovan politicians and how much it can rely on them to conduct future hybrid operations.