There are 30 days left until the elections. An interesting campaign is ahead, in which many things can change. And after the vote, the party landscape will be seriously reformatted. Hopefully for the better. By Daniel Smilov.
The election campaign that has begun will be of great importance for the final outcome of the elections. Rumen Radev's coalition "Progressive Bulgaria" (PB) started strongly with about 33-35%, but several sociological surveys have already registered a certain decline from the initial momentum. It seems that PB is currently at about 30% in the preferences of voters, which gives the other main parties a chance to recover some of what was lost. The hopes of smaller players to enter parliament are also alive. From this point of view, the election campaign will be decisive for whether there will be a parliament with up to 5 parties and a strongly expressed leader, or whether we will witness fragmentation and many players again.
"Progressive Bulgaria"
Many expectations are concentrated in the PB as new on the field. At the beginning, Radev's strategy to remain silent for a long time and not enter the daily political debates was profitable, but over time it led to a decline in enthusiasm and interest in voting, which also explains the known outflow of voters from this formation. It continues to be a leader in the forecasts and has a chance to attract more voters during the campaign. In presenting the party's program, the team, as well as the main ideas for dealing with the oligarchy and judicial reform, looked like a remake of the PP from 2021. This opens up serious coalition possibilities for the PP-DB and allays some of the fears that Radev is trying to create a pro-Russian formation of the Orban type. There was nothing of the sort in the presentation of the formation's ideas, and its more prominent pro-Russian spokesmen did not play a central role in the event. There was also something like an extended hand to GERB for a majority of 160 deputies to elect a new Supreme Judicial Council and a new prosecutor general. Putting the fight against the oligarchy in first place makes a post-electoral governing coalition with GERB rather impossible. And indeed, after the protests of December 2025, Radev would lose a significant part of his legitimacy if he governs with GERB and Borisov.
The difficulties facing Radev's campaign are mainly two. First, initial sociological polls showed that half of his electorate is pro-Russian and Eurosceptic. If the campaign continues in the spirit of the program presentation, this segment will not be happy and may orient itself towards "Vazrazhdane" or pass the elections. Probably, in order to prevent such a development, the pro-Russian spokespersons of the PB will become more active with attacks against the PP-DB and the EU. (The belated opposition to Angela Merkel by volleyball player Vlado Nikolov should be read in this light). The other difficulty is that Radev has apparently firmly decided not to mention Peevski and Borisov in his statements. With this, his anti-corruption rhetoric loses sharpness and clarity and opens the way for suspicions about the real intentions of the PB. Corruption has already been fought once with software from BORKOR and the results of this fight are extremely clear - zero. Oligarchy is a personalized, not an abstract and digital phenomenon.
GERB
GERB registered a serious drop of 6-8% with Radev's entry into party politics, but part of this loss seems to have been compensated for at the moment. Even one study reduced the difference between PB and GERB to 3%, but it is more likely to be around 9-10%, since GERB is around 20%. More interesting is that Borisov stated (again) that he is distancing himself from Peevski and with his rhetoric is positioning himself as a potential coalition partner for Radev. Borisov himself knows that distancing himself from Peevski in his case is impossible – experience so far shows it. The only episode of a real break in relations was 2013-2014, and it was highly traumatic for Borisov. The Bulgarian public also knows that the Borisov-Peevski tandem is inseparable.
Borisov is also certainly aware that it is unlikely that Radev will form a coalition with him. But the very fact that GERB will not be isolated behind a red cordon by Radev is beneficial to GERB in the election campaign. This, as well as Radev's refusal to personally point out Borisov as a problem, seems to explain the return of some of the trust in GERB.
GERB also has another chance. The fact that Andrey Gyurov took over the caretaker government demobilized the protests against Borisov and Peevski. Conveniently for them, they retained many levers of power through services and the prosecutor's office, without being in the executive branch. From this perspective, many of the defects of their governance will not be accounted for (to an adequate extent) as having been produced by GERB-DPS, such as the loss of hundreds of millions of euros from PVU, for example.
PP-DB
The coalition has lost some of the momentum it had gained during the protests. At the peak of these protests, it had reached 17-18% support, while now it enjoys 12-15%. There are two factors that will determine its performance. On the one hand, PP-DB is a desirable coalition partner and is usually the first formation that everyone starts talking to. The fight against corruption could become the basis for a government with "Progressive Bulgaria" after the elections. The economic policies of the two formations are also completely compatible.
Another positive is Gyurov's caretaker government, which the public associates with PP-DB, although this formation has no control over it. Either way, it will bear both the liabilities and the negatives of caretaker government. At least for now, the government is doing quite well, with the prime minister and some of the ministers managing to generate public support or at least attention.
The "Petrohan" scandal is one of the negatives for the PP-DB. Its use by the services and the prosecutor's office to denigrate the PP-DB is being capitalized on by smaller formations, the DPS, and also by GERB. The entire operation to politically denigrate the PP-DB during the investigation is so well-crafted, however, that the majority of society is now more angry at the institutions than at anyone else. In this sense, "Petrohan" is becoming another symbol of the use of institutions for political purposes, which is one of the main political themes of the PP-DB.
DPS
DPS has practically completely absorbed Ahmed Dogan's formation. The outcome of the movement will depend mostly on whether its leader will be able to convince local structures that he will have some influence on the distribution of public resources and the operation of state institutions after the elections. It seems that this will not be easy. Also, the government's measures against vote buying and manipulation may have an impact on the outcome of this formation.
"Vazrazhdane"
The vote for "Vazrazhdane" is strongly linked to that for PB: Kostadin Kostadinov's party lost almost half of its electoral support with Radev's entry into politics. But the game is not lost for it and part of this electorate may return if PB seems too soft and pro-European to them.
The remaining formations depend mostly on voter turnout. If it is over 3 million, the higher it is, the more their chances of entering parliament evaporate. If Radev manages to generate additional energy around the PB in the campaign, this will also be fatal for many of these smaller parties, including the BSP.
Overall, an interesting campaign is ahead, in which many things can change. The party landscape in Bulgaria will be reformatted quite seriously after the elections. Hopefully, it will be for the better.
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This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the State Gazette as a whole.