Hybrid war, subversive actions, political engineering: Russia is currently an external threat to Bulgaria, says about "Deutsche Vele" prof. Todor Tagarev.
Prof. Tagarev, was Biden's authorization of Ukraine to use long-range missiles against Russia agreed with Trump after they agreed on a smooth transition of power?
There are two versions. One is that at the meeting between the two, this decision was really discussed and agreed upon, which unties the hands of the Ukrainian army to inflict defeats on the advancing Russian forces already on their territory. According to the other version, the presidential institution, currently headed by the Democrats, sets conditions for the Trump administration, which to some extent limit its future actions. Because if Trump fails to end the war in one day, as he claims, and it continues, and he makes concessions to Russia, he will look weak. But I don't have enough information to judge which version is correct.
Do you even expect that Trump will significantly change the understanding in the US of the war in Ukraine – about their own role in it, about who is the aggressor and who is the victim, about the price of peace, etc.?
First, I think that with the focus of the election campaign on domestic problems, Trump hardly had much time to discuss with his like-minded people more strategic international topics. Second, in the US, including the Republican Party, there are authoritative and experienced politicians who understand perfectly well what it means to allow Russia to profit from its aggression against a non-nuclear state. And while Trump will have a lot of freedom and support in this term, his decisions in the field of international security cannot be entirely his, much less impulsive. I expect to see an in-depth discussion in this administration on the issue of Ukraine.
Ultimately, is Trump dictating to Republicans or are they dictating to him? And will they agree that after Republican Reagan played a key role in the collapse of the Soviet Union, now Republican Trump has such a role in returning Soviet influence to its current Putin format?
This internal balance is not always easy to find in each of the parties. One of the explanations, for example, for the delay in American aid to Ukraine and the dropping of restrictions on its use is that there were serious contradictions in Biden's team between Blinken and Austin on the one hand, and Sullivan and Burns on the other. The removal of restrictions is a testimony that the tandem of Blinken and Austin has finally prevailed. It is these complex configurations in American politics that protect against personal improvisation.
Will the defense of democracy worldwide cease to be a NATO cause?
I will take the liberty of correcting such general wording – NATO was not created to protect democracy, but to maintain stability, deterrence and military defense when necessary. Of course, if a totalitarian regime poses a specific military threat, NATO's primary goal is to counter it. But if we assume that such a threat can come from a democratic regime, NATO will take measures against it as well.
What are the lessons for today from the history of NATO, as told in the book about Peter Aps “Preventing Armageddon", which you presented on Thursday at its Bulgarian premiere?
There are many current questions that the book poses, the main one being hinted at in the title: how will we prevent Armageddon (a catastrophe that would lead to the end of the world). In this sense, nuclear threats from Russia cannot help but be disturbing, but the book shows that they appear periodically and NATO manages to adapt to them and develop defensive policies. There is also talk of a number of other post-Cold War threats - terrorism, cyber-attacks, disinformation, propaganda and the division they cause in democratic societies. The realistic representation of the way NATO works sounds particularly relevant. Many people tend to idealize it as an organization that is driven entirely by shared values. No, it is guided by values, but also by the interests of individual countries, and the important thing is that it has so far managed to find a solution to every problem that has arisen. This gives us reason to look to the future relatively calmly.
Now, however, as a result of Trump's statements and intentions, isn't NATO in crisis, and have there been similar crises before?
Oh, yes. This is one of the topics that Peter Apps follows – about isolationist trends in US engagement with European security. Donald Trump is far from the first to make NATO discuss this issue and look for new solutions and the achievement of consensus in making them. It seems to us that right now it is the most complicated and tense, but when we read the book we find that it has been like this throughout the history of NATO.
What sign is it that Radmila Shekerinska from North Macedonia was elected Deputy Secretary General of NATO? Could it be a “Trojan horse" in the organization, given the influence of Serbia on Macedonian politics and of Russia on Serbian along the so-called Orthodox arc?
Not at all, quite the opposite. Shekerinska is a politician with extremely rich experience as an MP, Minister of Defense, Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs and for a short time as Prime Minister. She personally has a great merit for North Macedonia to receive an invitation and become a member of NATO, and let's not forget that she is from the opposition of the current administration, for which there could be such concerns. So, as a representative of NATO, it is impossible to take positions that contradict the defined interests of the alliance. The good news for us is that again at such a high level there is a representative from Eastern Europe. Another specific point is that this post is occupied by a former minister of defense, because in the previous mandates all of them had diplomatic experience, which shows that military issues, specifically those of defense, have gained much more weight for the alliance because of the war near our borders.
Let's say a few words about Chancellor Scholz's hour-long conversation with Putin – what was its meaning or was it not meaningful at all?
What Scholz told Putin is completely logical and justified – stop the war, it leads to senseless casualties, you will achieve nothing, we support Ukraine, etc. However, there are two worrying points. One is that he initiated the conversation without coordinating it with the allies, and in it he appears to be the supplicant, which gives Putin a psychological advantage. Second, that he held it after his coalition collapsed and the prospect of him being in the lead again was slim. It is true that Germany, perhaps with the residual sense of guilt of this generation of politicians, has always tried to seek a peaceful solution, but, evaluated strategically, Scholz's move was weak.
If the US withdraws to some extent, can the EU single-handedly hold Ukraine until victory in the war with Russia?
Not only can, but must, because if Putin achieves his goals in Ukraine, he will deal a severe blow not only to Ukraine, but also to European security for decades to come. Having said that, however, I believe that we absolutely must continue to work together with the US within NATO, whether or not the new administration decides to reduce its military presence in Europe. The concept of deterrence relies on their nuclear arsenal, space surveillance, communications, intelligence and the like, which Europe at this stage could hardly compensate for. Maybe in terms of conventional weapons and ammunition production, but I hope there will be no such development.
Does the situation after Trump's victory overseas, and because of his supporters in Europe, require a reformulation of our national security strategy?
It is entirely possible that some issues such as the increase in defense spending and closer cooperation with the EU on the creation of joint formations and projects for the development and supply of weapons will have to be reconsidered. These issues should be given a much higher priority. The goal is to fulfill our alliance commitments, because there is no hypothesis that we can defend ourselves. And not only us, it has been clear to all of Europe for a long time, even without Trump's claims, that it must take greater responsibility for its own security.
What are the risks of a government coming to Bulgaria that wants to make us allies of Russia rather than NATO? And what are the risks, if this does not happen, that Russia will go from the current hybrid to a hot war on our territory?
The former, I regret to say, can happen, albeit without acknowledging it at the declarative level. On the second question – whether, if we have a truly European and NATO-oriented government, we could become the target of a Russian attack. The answer is a firm no. Because the more solidly we stand in these alliances and work together with our allies to increase our common defense capacity, the lower the risks are for us. If we go back to Aps's book, we find that NATO achieves more when it consistently sticks to its positions than when it makes concessions with seemingly good intentions.
At the moment, is Russia the only external danger for Bulgaria?
From a military point of view – yes, but not so much as a direct threat, because Bulgaria is in NATO, as with its subversive actions, where I also include political engineering.
Can we believe that Putin's next nuclear threats will not come true just because it happened with the previous ones, or do we have other reasons?
There are others, of course. First, the Kremlin has received enough signals from our allies not to even think about it, because it will suffer damage that it will not like at all. And secondly, Putin is trying to position Russia as a global player at the pole, opposing the Euro-Atlantic one with the US at its center. And he understands that he cannot achieve it without the support of countries such as China, India, and Brazil, which he will instantly lose if he allows himself to use nuclear weapons. Xi Jinping had made it very clear to him. I think his threats are an attempt at psychological influence or what the Russians call information-psychological special operations (IPSO). However, this does not mean that even without the use of nuclear weapons, the war in Ukraine will not escalate, as happened in the last week with the launch by Russia of the Oreshnik ballistic missile.