First Maduro, now Khamenei – who is next? Donald Trump continues to forcibly eliminate leaders of countries he considers undesirable. Moreover, they were all dictators and all actively adhered to anti-Western rhetoric, opposing their regimes to US hegemony. Vladimir Putin sometimes does almost the same. Is he in danger now? And what does a new war in the Middle East mean for Russia, a long-time ally of Iran? Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Berlin Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, answers these questions in an analysis for the independent Russian publication Meduza.
After the death of Ali Khamenei in joint US-Israeli strikes, Vladimir Putin found himself in a difficult situation. As we recall, he prayed that Donald Trump would reach the presidency alive. In the end, it turned out that Putin had prayed for the murderer of his ally, the head of a sovereign state, its official "spiritual leader" - while Russia was confronting the West on spiritual grounds.
The arrest and extradition of Nicolás Maduro were tolerated in Moscow, albeit with difficulty. Sergei Lavrov and the Foreign Ministry, tasked with spreading anti-American rhetoric after Trump came to the White House, were allowed to remain silent, under the guise of criticism. Putin and the Kremlin refrained from harsh assessments then. This is partly explained by the fact that, according to the Trump doctrine, the Western Hemisphere is the American Hemisphere. That is, recognizing their sphere of influence there, they could try to establish a similar sphere of influence in their own region. And because arrest and deportation are not murder after all.
Current events are unfolding in what Russia considers to be "its hemisphere" and to some extent its sphere of influence - a BRICS country. There, the Americans are killing a leader with whom they had just been negotiating.
The death of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 became a turning point in Russian politics and an official pretext for Putin's decision to return to the Kremlin as president (which, of course, had already begun) and one of the most important justifications for the new anti-Western course. Putin has repeatedly stated: "they themselves invited Gaddafi to their capitals, shook his hand, recognized him as the leader of the country, and then easily allowed him to be killed." He returned to the assassination of Gaddafi as often as he now returns to the topic of the "coup d'état in Kiev", where the central complaint was also Western betrayal.
But at least Viktor Yanukovych, like Bashar al-Assad, was saved. And now, the first assassination of a head of state in office since Gaddafi. Twice in two months, Putin failed to fulfill his role as savior, even of the life of an allied dictator - even though he was not asked to do so. Moreover, the killer of an old ideological and political ally is another promising ideological ally, Donald Trump.
What Russia's reaction to the assassination of Khamenei says
Unlike the kidnapping of Maduro, Putin strongly condemned the assassination of Khamenei. In a message published on the Kremlin website, he expressed deep condolences for the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and members of his family, "committed in cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law".
The message itself is a dry genre; unlike a response to a question or a video message, it lacks intonation - there is no anger, no indignation. But the main thing in Putin's message is what he does not say: who killed Khamenei? There are at least two candidates - Israel and the United States. And Putin phrased it this way to avoid direct accusations against Donald Trump.
Since the beginning of the year, Putin has twice found himself in a difficult position with his allies and the Global South - on whose behalf Russia has voluntarily agreed to speak. He has bet on Trump being a different kind of American president than all the others, and has pinned serious hopes on rapprochement with him. Now he finds it difficult to exit this special relationship without jeopardizing Trump's friendly neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and in the negotiations.
Russia has long used a variety of political languages to deal with such complex situations. For example, when the friendly military regime in Myanmar was exterminating the Rohingya, Moscow generally supported the regime, but Ramzan Kadyrov defended the Rohingya Muslims and accused the Myanmar army of genocide. The position of Kadyrov and some other official Muslim spokesmen in Russia is much harsher than the official one, even towards Israel. And after Maduro’s arrest, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a classic anti-imperialist, anti-American statement, while the Kremlin remained silent. In its current configuration, the Foreign Ministry is usually delegated the task of criticizing the United States, while the Kremlin builds special relations with it.
The meeting of the Russian Security Council on February 27, which was shrouded in media silence, was undoubtedly devoted to the war against Islamic Iran. A sharp statement from the Foreign Ministry soon followed, but this time Putin also spoke out.
His statement, without direct accusations against Trump and the United States, seems even weaker than what he said after the US air force killed Iranian General Soleimani on January 2, 2020. That statement was made unofficially, in the context of "they just went and killed an Iranian general, they really lost their temper". But even then, Putin - characteristically - did not mention the retiring President Trump, nor even the United States.
These omissions perfectly portray Putin as a weak strongman - a leader who prides himself on his power and lack of restraint, but in reality cannot afford to verbally attack an American president who is destroying his allies. However, the Russian regime has every opportunity to distance itself from these dangerous connections.
Why Putin is still not in danger after the kidnapping of Maduro and the assassination of Khamenei
The Kremlin is well aware of the fact that Trump attacked Iran not as a Russian ally, but as a separate target. And certainly not as a representative of the "axis of evil" with its capital in Moscow. Trump's hatred of Iran and Khamenei personally goes back a long way and is completely self-sufficient. He feels nothing of the sort towards Russia, much less towards Putin personally. Trump does not view Iran and Russia as a single entity, and he does not see Khamenei as an extension of Putin. The US attack on Iran is therefore not a projection of Trump’s hostility to Putin, Russia, or even dictatorships in general.
The official new US course is more concerned with democratizing European allies that prevent the current administration’s ideological allies from coming to power than with hostile autocracies that were previously viewed with coolness. For Trump, Maduro, Khamenei, and Putin are not part of a series of “who’s next” memes, just as the attack on Iran is not yet a proxy attack on Russia.
Too vigorous support for Iran would mean openly siding with Trump’s enemies, falling into his hatred, becoming a party to the conflict. That would undermine the United States’ valuable neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and the potential avoidance of sanctions. This is clearly not the strategy the Kremlin has chosen for its relationship with Trump. Putin clearly does not want to push Trump into the same camp as numerous American politicians, for whom there has long been no difference between Putin and Khamenei.
Why Trump's methods are similar to Putin's
For Trump, the war against Iran is only loosely connected with pressure on Russia, but this does not mean that the Kremlin views the situation as a bystander. In Russia, the leader is surrounded by an aura of sanctity and inviolability. The assassination of a sitting head of state is an unpleasant reminder that such a thing is possible. After all, the status of the first person should be sacred in the eyes of his subjects; his immunity is built up over years in the country and in international relations. And then someone appears for whom this immunity means nothing, and in an instant a bomb reduces this sacred figure to the level of mere mortals.
In Putin's conceptual framework, it is permissible to kill traitors and opposition figures, considered equivalent, but even an unpleasant head of an enemy state - such as the head of an enemy clan among rival mafia groups - is protected to some extent by unwritten and written rules. And even by the simple fact that the bosses communicate with each other.
Putin, despite using street insults against Zelensky, has so far avoided even a symbolic attempt to eliminate him - for example, destructive missile strikes on the presidential office. Russian officials have even been forced to justify this, including after the assassination of Khamenei. A key element of this explanation is the very fact of the negotiations.
The Foreign Ministry's statement on the attacks on Iran, which is sharper than Putin's, focuses specifically on the fact that "the attacks are again being carried out under the guise of the resumed negotiation process" and "contrary to the signals conveyed to the Russian side." This "again" alludes to Venezuela, where Maduro's capture was also preceded by negotiations between him and Trump personally, as well as between the administrations.
When Gaddafi died, Putin was particularly hurt by the fact that his death was authorized and approved by the same people who had interacted with the Libyan leader as head of state, brought him out of isolation and "shook his hand." Therefore, high-level negotiations do not prevent his removal, but may frame it. And the transition from one to the other is rapid.
Russia is also conducting negotiations, the outcome of which may not satisfy the American president-mediator. For him, it turns out, negotiations without a formal termination could lead to the arrest or physical elimination of the other side and then continue under bombing.
The statement by Russia's permanent representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzia, that Russia has not received signals about Israel's interest in the war sounds like a complaint of deception: they said that they had gathered troops not for an attack, but for intimidation, and they attacked - in short, they "deceived and deceived us!" And if Moscow has been transmitting these signals to Tehran, then this is another failure of the Russian mediation mission.
But Russia itself demands that Ukraine negotiate under fire, and it itself has denied its interest and intention to invade Ukraine, massing troops on its borders. But betrayal is always more obvious in the eyes of the neighbor.
Trump’s actions seem illogical. But they are a fact nonetheless
The treachery of the West has found yet another confirmation. But this does not mean that the Kremlin directly applies the Iranian situation to itself or feels helpless in relation to it. While critics may equate anti-Western dictators with one another, the dictators themselves do not necessarily see themselves as part of the same group.
The "Axis of Evil" is complex. The military engagements that have existed between Russia and North Korea since 2023 do not exist between Russia and Iran. Russia associates itself much more closely with China, a major nuclear power, than with Iran, a regional power that has never crossed the nuclear threshold. Putin, looking for proof that he got the special military operation right, may see such proof in the fate of Iran. After all, Iran failed to eliminate threats from its borders and allowed itself to be surrounded by American bases and hostile governments.
However, the Russian regime has built its strategy on Trump’s difference, on how he stands out from his predecessors in the White House, both Democrats and Republicans. Contrary to this vision, Trump—despite announcing a new foreign policy based on U.S. economic and security interests rather than on supporting democracy worldwide—is ultimately acting in line with American democratic globalism.
A brutal strike on yet another sovereign dictatorship undermines Russia’s strategy, which is tied to hopes of a Trump-led political revolution. It strengthens the position of deterministic skeptics in the Russian leadership, who believe that the contradictions with the West, and in particular with the United States, are insurmountable and that their hostile policy towards Russia is somehow predetermined.
Although the Kremlin does not associate itself directly with Iran, the removal of the Iranian leadership once again raises the question of succession in Russia's domestic politics in the event of a sudden removal of the regime from power. The involuntary "eye roll" is intensifying. Although the leader of the regime had no intention of transferring power, senior officials and elite groups may begin to formulate their strategy for such an eventuality.
Especially since in Iran, as in Venezuela, Trump seems to be trying to rely not only on the opposition, but also on part of the nomenklatura during the regime change. They remove the leader, eliminate other irreconcilable elements if necessary, and attempt to negotiate with those who remain under threat of destruction. They pressure them to comply with the necessary conditions, while at the same time calling on the people to seize power.
The joint attack by Trump and Netanyahu on Iran is rightly seen by world public opinion as yet another proof of the collapse of the world order and the triumph of force. While the Bush administration remembered Colin Powell's test tube on the UN podium and his attempt to win over the international community on the eve of the war with Iraq, Trump did not even try to convince anyone. He did not seek approval from Congress, let alone the UN.
He is not interested in either a test tube or consistent logic. Six months ago he reported that Iran's nuclear and missile programs were significantly slowed down during the summer attacks, and now he justifies the need for war by claiming that Iran is closer than ever to developing a nuclear bomb. Meanwhile, unlike the 2025 campaign, the targets bombed are more likely to be related to regime change than to weapons of mass destruction programs.
The abrupt transition from theatrical peacekeeping, which "stopped many wars," to starting a new war with his own hands is completely inexplicable and does not seem to pose a problem for the initiator. Trump acts as a man equally indifferent to war and peace, but addicted to success, in his case expressed in approval ratings and impressive social media posts.
Peace or war are means to the same end, just as for Putin, everything - from liberalization to Stalinist practices - is a means to maintaining power. Similarly, the declarative pragmatism and realism of the MAGA faction, which has rejected democratization and state-building abroad, are combined with classic US actions, including armed ones, to change authoritarian regimes and rhetoric about liberating peoples from dictatorships.
The global institutional order seems definitively dead. However, one of its important foundations still remains intact. Trump refuses to declare the export of democracy as his goal, citing instead American benefit and the elimination of threats. However, as before, authoritarian regimes bear the real blows. Not always the most long-standing or the most repressive, but rather the most unwanted, hated and least protected - for example, from nuclear weapons. They are vulnerable precisely because of the internal institutional fragility and legitimacy deficit inherent in autocracies.
The new US administration, unlike previous ones, is making threats against both autocracies and democracies - Greenland, Denmark, Mexico, Canada, the EU. This is unheard of. The pretext used is the same: US security and interests.
But there is not the slightest institutional capacity, no legal or conceptual framework for using force against democratic regimes. First, because such states do not threaten the United States and its allies (the rare exceptions are Israel's threats to its authoritarian allies in the Middle East or its actions against a generally democratic Lebanon).
Second, justifying attacks against democratic countries like Denmark or Canada, as it turns out, is unrealistic even for Trump. Although autocracies literally find themselves in the aforementioned role of weak strongman - terribly fragile from within.
The weakened legitimacy of authoritarian regimes becomes a significant, if not the main, threat to their security if non-systemic players like Trump appear. In this respect, Russia really ranks alongside Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, which means that Putin is really personally experiencing the drama of Assad and Gaddafi, and now Khamenei.