Both Putin in Ukraine and Trump in Iran found themselves in traps that they set for themselves. What dangers does this pose for Europe and what strategy can Bulgaria follow? What are the main conclusions. By Daniel Smilov.
The war is likely to escalate on both of its current fronts: in Ukraine, and in Iran and the Persian Gulf. This simultaneous escalation is dangerous and could lead to opportunism and unmeasured, even reckless actions by some of the players. Europe and the EU were not included in the negotiations between China and the US and China and Russia, but this does not mean that Europeans will not be affected. At the same time, the likely military quagmire into which the US, Russia, and to some extent China will enter would paradoxically open the door for Europe to assert itself on the geopolitical stage.
The trap for Trump
The US Iranian operation turned out to be a trap for the Trump administration. Few would call it “unexpected”, because it could have been predicted that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz at some point even without a serious navy, aviation, and other technological advantages. The mines, drones, and missiles that Iran has in abundance guarantee sufficient control over the strait.
The options before Donald Trump - if Iran does not agree to serious concessions - are in the direction of escalating the conflict: new air strikes together with Israel, even a partial ground operation (which is unlikely). There are no indications, however, that Iran is not ready to bear these blows, and accordingly attack targets in neighboring Gulf states and American bases there. This is a nightmare scenario for the world and the global fuel trade, because it is not known how and, above all, when all this will end. If Iran manages to maintain the blockade of the strait after the new campaign, it will control a large part of the fuel and fertilizer trade until alternative routes are found for them.
Trump's visits to China did not lead to a clear solution to this problem. Perhaps the negotiations are continuing and China has given some hope for mediation. As a sign of goodwill, the US almost gave up on a possible defense of Taiwan, not strongly opposing China's de facto ultimatum on this issue. Perhaps Trump was looking for some kind of deal like “Iran vs. Taiwan”. But at least for now there is no result and if this status quo persists, Trump will probably resort to escalation.
The trap for Putin
Vladimir Putin is also in a trap that he himself organized with his military "special operation" in Ukraine. There is no need to talk about the immorality and dishonor of this aggression anymore - they are clear. As a result of the aggression, Putin already controls about 20% of Ukrainian land, but for some reason this is not enough for him. A rational player would stop there and consolidate his gains. However, Putin will have a hard time explaining to the Russians why he did not stop the war three years ago, when the front was more or less in the same place where it is now. Why were there suffering and casualties - hundreds of thousands on both sides?
This question has no answer that is favorable to Putin. And the current situation is one of a heavily blocked front line and growing Ukrainian capabilities to attack targets deep in Russia's rear, including Moscow. It is difficult to say how effective the strikes are, but at least those on some military targets and the oil industry are having an effect. And they are completely changing the mood in Russia: even Muscovites are no longer invulnerable, and even Margarita Simonyan is fleeing at night with her family to seek refuge. Add to this the frequent interruptions of mobile internet and the likelihood that Ukraine will soon start using ballistic missiles, and it is clear that the situation for Putin is becoming very worrying. He is under constant pressure even from his biggest apologists (such as Vladimir Solovyov and the Z-bloggers) to escalate the war. If he does not do so, he will have to stop it.
The options for escalation before Putin are as follows:
A new major mobilization. This is possible, but politically very difficult. First, Russia is in a difficult financial situation to bet on the long-term and expensive equipment of a new large army. Second, the massive saturation of the front line with drones makes the concentration of many people and equipment in one place very vulnerable. According to the Ukrainian side, Russia is losing about 30,000 people per month. Even if this is an inflated figure, drones clearly have serious capabilities for hitting infantry. And third, this measure will not stop attacks on Russian cities in the foreseeable future;
Opening a new front of the war from the north - Belarus. This would be a new attempt to conquer Kiev. But the difficulty here is that without mobilization or exposing the front in Donbas, the transfer of troops to the north cannot happen. The Belarusian army can be used, but this will only be if Putin literally captures Lukashenko (on the "Maduro" model) and takes Belarus under manual control. Lukashenko himself is unlikely to voluntarily join the war now - if he were to do so, there were much more convenient and safe moments for him;
Bombarding Ukrainian cities and infrastructure: The problem with this option is that it is still being used now, and it is not clear whether Russia has the conventional capacity for something qualitatively different;
Assassination of Zelensky and other leaders of Ukraine. Attempts in this direction have not ceased. They will undoubtedly become stronger, but it is not clear whether they will be successful. And the experience with Iran shows that the removal of leaders can lead to the hardening of the opponent's position and its replacement with an even tougher option.
Opening a front against NATO countries, most likely in the Baltics. Russia currently does not have the capacity for a full-fledged attack on a NATO country. At the very least, a serious mobilization must be carried out before that. But drone strikes, provocations, border operations by special forces to enter foreign territory are probably being considered. And some provocations are already happening daily in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Such a semi-hybrid attack would test NATO and would probably show hesitation on the part of the United States to protect its member states from Russia. But whether this will really happen, Putin cannot be sure. Despite declarations of troop withdrawal from Europe, Trump is sending 5,000 new American soldiers to Poland today. And even without them, European armies will be able to quickly deal with provocations, be it with drones or special forces. Therefore, this option would rather worsen Putin's situation, making him an aggressor also in relation to NATO, so it is generally unlikely.
Nuclear strike. This is the usual Russian threat when things are not going well on the front. After all, everyone is free to commit suicide, but why would they do it? A tactical nuclear strike will not decisively change the situation on the front. A strategic nuclear strike on Ukraine would also contaminate a large part of Russia, and would also provoke retaliation and international isolation, which are of an unpredictable nature. At the very least, in each of the options, Russia has numerous nuclear power plants that would immediately become a (Ukrainian) target. From this perspective, the nuclear option is rather out of the question.
In this sense, escalation is likely to come either through a new major mobilization or through an attempt to openly involve Belarus in the war, or perhaps both. This, combined with massive drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, is likely to be seen in the coming weeks. If this does not happen, Putin should consider ending the war, because his situation would become untenable in domestic politics.
Europe and Bulgaria
The paradox is that Europe can follow the Chinese strategy in this case: do nothing special and win. The EU must prepare for a fuel crisis and price increases as a result of the crisis around Iran. It is not clear how this problem will be avoided. This also applies to Bulgaria. The new budget, as well as the one for 2027, must provide serious buffers for negative developments in the Gulf of Hormuz. The markets are currently too optimistic on this topic and do not calculate the possible strong negative development. This means that shocks can be expected in terms of both prices and supplies. Europe needs to prepare for this: it is in a better situation than Asia, for example, in this regard.
With regard to Russia, we also have to wait, while in the meantime the overall military capacity and coordination are increasing. That is, the Europeans simply have to stand together and united at least as much as before.
From this point of view, Radev's visit to Merz, his subsequent visits to Macron and Meloni are a good signal from Bulgaria. Despite the obvious hint of bilaterality in relations, the very fact that the visits are to the engines of supranational Europe is indicative. And with regard to Russia, Europe has so far demonstrated quite solid unity, despite Orban's and, to some extent, Fico's vacillations. More importantly, the likelihood of an escalation with a direct clash between the EU and Russia is not that great, but, alas, it is not ruled out by Russia. There have been cases in history when, instead of minimizing losses, countries have behaved in a gamble and rushed with all their might into lost and costly causes.
In fact, escalations on both fronts of the war will most likely turn out to be exactly such causes for those who initiate them. That is why they are best avoided.
This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the DW as a whole.