Few countries occupy as much space in the European Union's diplomatic imagination as Israel. EU institutions devote extraordinary attention to Israeli policies, actions and conflicts, often placing them at the center of diplomatic discussions in a way that is difficult to explain by Israel's size, power or formal relations with the Union. This is what Professor Sharon Pardo, a senior fellow at the Jewish People's Policy Institute and professor of European Studies and International Relations in the Department of Politics and Governance at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, wrote for Euronews.
"This disproportionate focus raises important questions. Does the EU apply its diplomatic control consistently to different countries and conflicts? And if not, what are the implications for its credibility and influence in the Middle East? At the same time, Israel’s growing tendency to dismiss the EU as strategically irrelevant may be creating its own problems.
A new study by the Jewish People’s Policy Institute sheds empirical light on these questions. The researchers analyzed more than 24,000 official statements, press releases, and diplomatic communications issued by the European External Action Service (EEAS) between 2017 and April 2026. Of these, 895 were directly related to Israel. The study also examines how Israel has been represented in the EU’s diplomatic discourse.
The results are striking and serve as a warning to both Brussels and Jerusalem. Israel occupies an unusually prominent place in the Union’s diplomatic imagination. It accounts for approximately 4% of all official diplomatic statements by the EEAS over the period under review. This level of attention is not explained by Israel’s formal relations with the Union – Israel is neither a member of the EU nor a candidate country, and it is not among the world’s major powers. Nevertheless, it attracts far more attention from Brussels than its size and status would suggest.
The tone of this attention is equally telling. Over the entire period, 38% of EEAS statements referring to Israel were negative, 49% neutral, and only 13% positive. After the massacre of 7 October 2023, the balance shifted even further: negative statements rose from 29% before the attack to almost 46% after it; positive statements fell from almost 20% to just 8%.
Criticism of Israel is neither illegitimate nor surprising. Democracies are subject to scrutiny because they are expected to uphold democratic values, and Israel should be no exception to this observation. The question is not whether Israel should be criticized. The question is whether such standards are consistently applied in the international system.
The comparative data raise serious doubts. Iran receives the most negative treatment among the countries considered, mainly because of its military cooperation with Russia and its broader role in regional instability. Turkey is a different case. Despite years of weakening democratic standards, restrictions on freedom of expression and increasing tensions with European capitals, approximately three-quarters of the EEAS’s official statements on Turkey are neutral, with most focusing on technical issues related to its EU membership bid.
The most telling comparison is with Qatar, for which more than two-thirds of European statements are positive; negative ones are almost non-existent. This is despite the "Qatargate affair", which raised serious questions about foreign influence in the European Parliament. The affair barely figures in the official rhetoric analyzed by the researchers.
The contrast is hard to ignore: a democratic state waging a war sparked by the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust faces constant scrutiny and mounting criticism, while authoritarian countries are often treated with apparent caution or condescension.
This discrepancy is not just a public image problem. It undermines the EU’s ability to present itself as a credible and impartial actor in the Middle East. For decades, European leaders have sought a central role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But influence depends on trust, and trust depends on consistency. By applying seemingly different standards to different countries, the EU is weakening its own claim to be an indispensable diplomatic broker in the region.
The Institute’s study also reveals a growing intellectual divide between Brussels and Jerusalem. More than half of all EEAS statements on Israel contain references to the two-state solution or the creation of a Palestinian state.
The problem is not that the EU continues to support the two-state solution; many serious analysts still consider it the only possible long-term framework. The problem is that European diplomacy often uses it as if October 7th had not fundamentally changed Israel’s perceptions of the threat. A formula that fails to take these perceptions into account will not convince Israeli society, regardless of its diplomatic authority.
But perhaps the most important conclusion of the study is not that the EU talks too much about Israel. It is that Israel talks too little to Europe. While the EU remains heavily focused on Israel, Israel has largely stopped paying attention to Europe. Since October 7, Israeli diplomacy has understandably focused on Washington, regional security challenges, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords.
These priorities are legitimate. But they have come at the expense of sustained engagement with EU institutions, European governments, the media, universities, and think tanks.
This neglect carries risks. The EU remains Israel’s largest trading partner. Approximately 1/3 of Israel’s trade in goods is with EU member states. The EU is also Israel’s most important partner in research, innovation, and higher education. No other partner offers comparable access to an ecosystem of scientific funding, academic collaboration, and technological networks.
At a time when economic competitiveness increasingly depends on scientific excellence and technological innovation, relations with the EU are not a diplomatic luxury. They are a strategic asset. But many Israelis are beginning to see Europe as a lost cause, accepting that European attitudes are fixed, EU institutions are irreversibly hostile, and that investing in relations will not pay off. This is not realism, but appeasement.
Foreign policy is not about engaging only with those who already agree with you. It is about shaping debates, building coalitions, and defending national interests even in difficult environments. When Israel withdraws from the European stage, others fill the vacuum. When it stops trying to influence European discourse, it should not be surprising that that discourse develops without Israeli participation.
The EU should ask itself why Israel occupies such a large space in its diplomatic imagination, and whether this overfocus reflects balanced diplomacy or an entrenched double standard. Israel should ask itself why the Union occupies such a small place in its own strategic thinking and whether it can afford to neglect its most important economic, scientific and technological partner.
Neither Brussels nor Jerusalem benefits from the current trajectory. The EU is risking its credibility as a diplomatic power. Israel is risking its influence, its economic interests and its scientific future in a relationship it cannot afford to neglect.
Both outcomes are preventable, but only if both Israel and the EU start taking this relationship with the seriousness it needs.