Todor BELENSKI
On September 1, 2026, former Minister of Finance of Armenia and former Head of the State Revenue Committee Gagik Khachatryan was brought to the court on a stretcher. His lawyers said that he suffers from a serious spinal disease and is in severe pain. The next day, after a session that lasted all night, the Anti-Corruption Court of Armenia ruled that he remain in custody for two months. The Armenian Investigative Committee says that the case is related to charges of receiving bribes and laundering money on a particularly large scale. Hetq reported that his lawyers subsequently appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for urgent interim measures.
The Khachatryan case is just the latest in a series of criminal proceedings against prominent opponents of Armenia's pro-Western Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. On August 25, former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and his eldest son Sedrak were detained after searches of offices of a number of companies linked to the family. The prosecutor's office accused Kocharyan of abuse of office, bribery and large-scale money laundering. The Armenia Bloc coalition of political parties, which he heads, described the case as “politically motivated.”
Associated Press reported that four other people had also been detained. Reuters described Kocharyan as a “prominent opposition leader” and placed the case in the context of “broader actions” against critics of the “Pashinyan” cabinet.
Oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan, another prominent opposition politician and businessman, was detained in July on charges of fraud and money laundering. On September 4, an Armenian court extended his detention by another two months, Armenian Public Radio reported. The pressure on the opposition was already visible before the recent parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7, 2026. Criminal proceedings were initiated against several candidates from the “Strong Armenia“ Alliance, one of the main opposition forces. Ultimately, the alliance received 23.29% of the vote and took 28 seats in parliament.
But the confrontation is not limited to political opponents.
In August, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Catholicos Karekin II, went on trial along with six senior clergy. They are accused of intentionally obstructing the implementation of a court decision to reinstate a deposed bishop. Reuters described the case as “another stage in the confrontation” between the church and Pashinyan. Al Jazeera also reported that the trial is taking place "against a backdrop of deepening conflict" between the Armenian government and the church.
The pattern is hard to ignore: opposition politicians, former presidents, businessmen linked to the opposition, and now the leadership of Armenia's national church are facing criminal proceedings. Yet the level of international attention is noticeably different from that accorded to Azerbaijan.
For years, European institutions and major Western media outlets have closely followed political persecution, arrests of opposition figures, and alleged human rights abuses in Baku. The European Parliament (EP) has repeatedly criticized Azerbaijan, including in the current 2026 term. At the same time, criminal proceedings against the Armenian opposition and church leadership have generated significantly less and less consistent international pressure.
The peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is being presented in Washington as a "significant diplomatic achievement". Meanwhile, Brussels is deepening its own relations with the authorities in Baku. The EU Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Marianna Kuyundzic, recently described relations between Brussels and Baku as "entering a new phase". Negotiations on a new bilateral agreement are ongoing, while the two sides have also reached a preliminary understanding on a new document on the priorities of the partnership. Report.az quotes her comment on September 4. This is where the EU's double standard becomes "impossible to ignore."
When the Armenian government prosecutes leading opposition figures and engages in an unprecedented confrontation with the leadership of its national church, the same language is used far less frequently.
The question is not whether Azerbaijan should or should not be criticized. It should. The question is whether the same standard is applied to governments that are strategically useful to the West. If human rights become a political tool — loudly defended when it serves a geopolitical purpose, quietly ignored when it complicates a preferred alliance — then the problem is no longer simply one of hypocrisy. It is the transformation of a supposedly universal standard into a foreign policy tool. And that has consequences beyond Armenia.
The South Caucasus is entering a potentially decisive period. A peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan could fundamentally change the region. But peace built on selective outrage will always have a political price. The question is therefore not who deserves criticism. Both governments in Baku and Yerevan can and should be subject to close scrutiny.
The real question is much simpler: why do some violations become an international cause, while others remain largely a domestic matter? The answer may have less to do with the gravity of the violation than with the identity of the government committing it — and who benefits from the silence.
The author is a Bulgarian journalist, geopolitical analyst