Ivan Bortsov
The story of the explosions that damaged the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea has been developing for several years now. Numerous theories have been put forward, and assumptions and oversimplifications continue to circulate. However, heated debates based on conspiratorial thinking, outright myth-making and "witch hunts" have no value when it comes to the international legal aspects of the case.
Moreover - if we follow the cliché from detective novels "look for who benefits", then given the way in which the events surrounding Nord Stream have developed - and especially given the interest shown by Donald Trump's entourage - the circle of interested parties becomes significantly wider.
Attempts to name the sponsors and perpetrators of the incident without solid evidence and without properly conducted investigative and judicial procedures lead directly to legal chaos and create dangerous precedents.
In September 2025, Ukrainian citizen Volodymyr Zhuravlev was detained in Poland on the basis of a European arrest warrant issued by the Federal Prosecutor's Office of Germany. At that time, investigators suspected him of complicity in organizing the explosion and deliberate damage to the Nord Stream gas pipelines.
In October 2025, the District Court in Warsaw refused to extradite Zhuravlev to Germany and canceled his detention. The court decision stated that the documents submitted by the German side described the circumstances too generally and lacked proper evidence. The court also did not find that Zhuravlev himself had committed any dangerous acts.
During the hearing, doubts were also expressed about the grounds for issuing the order and the application of German criminal law. The incident occurred in the exclusive economic zones of Denmark and Sweden, and it is precisely the lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction that calls into question the legitimacy of Berlin's claims.
In its decision of October 17, 2025, the Polish court noted that a person acting on behalf of a state in the context of an international armed conflict may enjoy immunity. This means that Zhuravlev's possible actions cannot be treated as an ordinary crime. Therefore, German prosecutors were obliged to provide a separate justification as to which provisions of national or international law allow criminal prosecution of a Ukrainian citizen – especially given the fact that the incident occurred outside German territory.
Since this court decision was not appealed, Zhuravlev was not extradited to Germany.
The next development of events occurred in August 2026 in Croatia, where he was detained again on the basis of a warrant from June 2024, entered by Germany into the Schengen Information System. However, in September 2026, German prosecutors urgently updated the warrant, adding a new legal qualification to the incident with “Nord Stream“. Specifically, it already states that Zhuravlev participated in the commission of a war crime, which was an attack on civilian objects.
This indicates an attempt by the German prosecutor's office to strengthen its legal position in the extradition proceedings before the Croatian court.
The reasons for this are the weakness of the initial charges from June 2024, as well as the desire to make Zhuravlev's legal defense more difficult.
This is also evidenced by the fact that the extradition hearing, held on September 18, 2026 in the Croatian city of Pula, was held behind closed doors and in the absence of the Ukrainian consul. Thus, the process was deprived of transparency and impartial verification of the updated materials presented by the German prosecutors. This is yet another sign of an obvious problem on the part of the prosecution: the lack of direct evidence of his guilt.
The materials of the German investigative authorities lack any evidence of Zhuravlev's actions in the area of the island of Bornholm during the incident. There are no DNA samples, geolocation data, telephone records, confirmed financial transactions or confessions that would point to his participation in the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline.
At the same time, the thesis of the German prosecutor's office is built on indirect assumptions, and the evidence is replaced only by the fact that Zhuravlev has professional qualifications and skills to work underwater.
Experts note that despite the efforts made, the updated documents of the German prosecutors contain serious gaps. In particular, the charge of unconstitutional sabotage (Article 88 of the German Criminal Code) requires proof that the acts were directed against the constitutional order of Germany, and not simply that property damage was caused. No less important is that the acts in question were committed outside the jurisdiction of this state. And in order for an act to be qualified as a “war crime“, it is necessary to prove a violation of international humanitarian law, as well as to confirm the civilian nature of the facility, the functioning of which was interrupted as a result of the incident.
It should be borne in mind that Russia is stopping the supply of gas via “Nord Stream 1“ on August 31, 2022 - almost a month before the explosions, while “Nord Stream 2“ never entered commercial operation, as Germany suspended its certification process. Therefore, the incidents of September 26, 2022 did not affect gas supplies to German consumers. This fact must be taken into account when assessing the consequences of the incident and the gravity of the alleged acts.
In addition, the prosecution must prove that Zhuravlev was present at the scene of the event, convincingly indicate his specific actions and show that he was aware of the nature of the “operation“ and its objectives. Instead, the evidence is replaced by a one-sided emphasis on the scale of the damage caused.
This case goes beyond the scope of a standard extradition procedure and requires strict compliance with European standards of justice. All procedural conclusions regarding Zhuravlev's guilt must be based solely on proper and admissible evidence, examined in an adversarial process that guarantees the presumption of innocence and the right to a defense – and not on the benefits of political resonance or opportunistic considerations.
The decision of the Pula District Court of 18 September 2026 to extradite Zhuravlev to Germany is not final. His defense has declared its intention to appeal, therefore the arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the legal qualification of the act, the jurisdiction of Germany and the need to take into account the previous decision of the Polish court are subject to review in the appeal proceedings.
Until the decision enters into legal force, Zhuravlev should not be extradited to Germany.