The German media outlet Die Welt conducted a large-scale simulation of a hypothetical Russian military strike against a NATO member state, in order to identify weaknesses in the response of Germany and its allies.
The scenario, although fictitious, is built on the basis of realistic assessments by security experts and was implemented in the form of a so-called "war game" - an analytical military-political exercise used by governments and armies to prepare for crisis situations.
The simulation takes place at a fictional moment - October 27, 2026, when Russian troops are massed on the border with Lithuania and are ready to enter the country's territory. Within the simulation, two teams - "Blue" (the German government and its allies) and "Red" (the Kremlin) - play out the key decisions in the first hours and days of the crisis. The roles include former high-ranking politicians, military personnel and experts, including former CDU Secretary General Peter Tauber as Federal Chancellor, and political scientist Alexander Gabuyev as Russian President.
The military simulation ("wargame"), organized by the German media outlet Die Welt, shows a worrying scenario in which Russia manages to achieve most of its goals in Lithuania without deploying large-scale forces, taking advantage of hesitation and lack of rapid reaction from NATO allies. According to the analysis, Moscow is using a limited military contingent and hybrid actions to create a fait accompli on the ground.
"The Russians achieved most of their goals without moving many of their own units," said Bartłomiej Kot, a security analyst who played the role of the Polish prime minister during the exercise. In a commentary for the Wall Street Journal, he stressed that the simulation exposed a deep-seated problem in Western thinking: "Once we were confronted with the Russian narrative of escalation, we assumed that we were the ones who had to back down."
A key element in the scenario is the city of Marijampole in southern Lithuania, a strategic hub where several major European transport corridors intersect. The Via Baltica highway, used by the EU and Ukraine to access the Baltic states via Poland, passes through it, as does the transit route between Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, which Lithuania is obligated to keep open under an older international treaty. In the simulation, Russia interprets the invasion and occupation of Marijampole as a "humanitarian mission".
In the scenario, the United States refuses to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which provides for collective defense. Germany hesitated to respond to the attack, and its brigade stationed in Lithuania did not intervene after Russia used drones to mine areas near a NATO base. Poland mobilized its troops, but ultimately decided not to send them to Lithuanian territory.
"Deterrence does not depend only on military capabilities, but also on how the adversary perceives our political will," said Austrian military analyst Franz-Stefan Gaddy, who plays the role of the Russian army chief of staff in the simulation. According to him, it was precisely Germany's expected hesitation that was enough to give the "red team" a strategic advantage.
According to the results of the simulation, Russia managed to achieve "most of its goals" with an initial force of about 15,000 soldiers. However, the Lithuanian military disputes the most pessimistic conclusions. Rear Admiral Giedrus Premeneckas, Chief of the Lithuanian Defence Staff, said that in a real situation, the country and its allies would have had advance intelligence and that even the Lithuanian armed forces alone could handle a limited operation around Marijampole. He also highlighted the strategic risk for Moscow: in a conflict with NATO, Russia could lose Kaliningrad, which should be clearly communicated as part of the policy of deterrence.
The simulation is not intended to predict a future war, but highlights vulnerabilities in the European security system - primarily in the speed of decision-making and in demonstrating political will in the first critical days of a crisis.
The exercise was conducted in early December 2025 at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg, with the assistance of the university's German Wargaming Center. Experts assisted in developing the scenario and documented the decisions made to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional response.
Among the main conclusions of the simulation is the problem of communication and the so-called "electronic footprint" of German forces, including the 45th Panzer Brigade stationed in Lithuania. According to analyses cited in the project, the excessive use of radio and satellite communications makes units vulnerable to the enemy. It is precisely such weaknesses, which can be eliminated in advance, that are among the key goals of the simulation.
WELT emphasizes that such simulations do not predict the future, but help political and military leaders understand the logic of a potential adversary and improve the decision-making process. The results of the exercise will be presented publicly through a series of podcasts, publications and television materials - a rare move for a format whose conclusions usually remain classified. The goal, according to the organizers, is to encourage public debate about Germany's and NATO's crisis preparedness and the importance of timely decisions in the face of growing tensions in Europe.