The 2026 Hormuz Crisis is causing the largest and most complex energy shock in modern history, exposing deep vulnerabilities in Europe's energy system. The immediate disruption to fuel supplies stems from the conflict in the Persian Gulf, but the crisis reveals a longer-term problem. This is stated in an analysis by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS). It was prepared by experts Irina Patrachau and Lucia van Guns.
Europe remains highly dependent on external energy supplies and continues to respond with emergency measures rather than structural reforms. As geopolitical tensions and climate-related risks increase, the continent faces a difficult choice between recurring crises and building a sustainable model.
The HCSS notes that the analysis was completed in early June 2026, but the events it examines continue to unfold.
The key findings of the study report that the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is causing disruptions in energy and other supplies that surpass the 1973 oil crisis in both volume and commodity scope. They range from oil to liquefied natural gas (LNG), fertilizers, chemicals and plastics. Even after the strait is opened, it is expected to take at least six months for the market to stabilize, and its pre-crisis normality may never fully recover.
The global impact of the current crisis is highly uneven, revealing which countries have invested in resilience and which have not. Asian economies, including Vietnam, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, are facing the most acute problems, having imported 60-75% of their crude oil, petroleum products and liquefied natural gas through the Strait. In contrast, China has large strategic reserves and a highly electrified economy, which shows that previous structural investments directly determine the resilience of the crisis.
Resilience is about access, not just production. The crisis reveals that vulnerability is not determined only by the global volume of energy products, but also by who controls the channels between producers and consumers and which countries have the financial and logistical capacity to absorb their sudden blockage.
Europe has reacted reactively to the energy crisis, and this has led to increasing costs that it can no longer afford. Europe entered the crisis heavily dependent on imports. It is relying on the release of strategic reserves, coordinated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), and has deployed its fourth temporary support framework since 2020. This is reminiscent of the events during the energy shock following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Each crisis that subsides without the European Union (EU) completing its structural reform makes the next one more expensive, more politically destabilizing and more difficult to finance.
Europe must move towards an integrated energy system based on security. The energy transition is not just a climate imperative, it is the only lasting solution to ensure sustainability. But the transition itself is not enough if supply chains reproduce the same vulnerabilities in critical products that Europe is trying to avoid with respect to fossil fuels. An integrated, security-oriented energy strategy is needed that combines binding diversification targets, strategic reserves for refined products and liquefied natural gas, sustainable supply chains for critical materials and alternative fuels, and a permanent investment model that does not have to be rebuilt from scratch every time a crisis arises. The 2026 crisis is painful. But its clearest lesson is the one that Europe has already learned and chosen not to learn.
The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the attacks on energy infrastructure that Israel and the US have exchanged with Iran have caused the largest energy shock ever recorded, the IEA said. A quarter of seaborne oil trade passes through the strait, with supplies coming from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have had to significantly reduce their production. About 25% of supplies can be rerouted through pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but the rest is blocked as a result of the conflict. The oil market has never experienced a physical blockade to this extent. The problem is not only that supplies can no longer pass through the Strait of Hormuz, but also that the capacity of Gulf producers has been significantly affected by the conflict.
The main global consequences of the 2026 energy crisis have been widely discussed in the last few months, but how is Europe responding to the crisis? Irina Patrachau and Lucia van Guns examine the European response, characterized by reactive policies and state support to minimize the impact. They argue that immediate structural reform is needed to enable the European energy market to build resilience into the system and reduce exposure to global events.
The biggest energy crisis in history
The 2026 Hormuz crisis differs from the 1973 oil shock in both mitigating and aggravating factors. On the positive side, the global economy is using approximately 60-70% less oil per unit of GDP than in the 1970s. Three structural changes stand out: much more energy-efficient transport, the near-total elimination of oil from electricity generation, and the growth of services and high-tech industries that require little energy to produce. This means that the same spike in oil prices is causing significantly less damage to GDP than in 1973.
In the current situation, however, this buffer is being undermined for several reasons. The volume of supplies disrupted is significantly larger. The important point is that this is not just an oil shock. The crisis affects not only refiners that depend on crude oil from the Persian Gulf, but also consumers of petroleum products such as diesel and jet fuel, liquefied natural gas, aluminum, as well as petroleum-based and other chemicals and commodities such as fertilizers, helium, and plastics. About 17% of the world's liquefied gas supplies, 10-30% of the quantities of fertilizers, helium and plastics have passed through the Strait of Hormuz.
Producing countries have oil that they cannot export. Consumer countries pay for oil that they cannot get. The crisis reveals that the important thing is not the quantity of energy resources, but who controls the obstacles in the way between producers and consumers and which countries have the financial logistical capacity to cope with a sudden stop in supplies.
Paradoxically, the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf themselves are among the victims, as they cannot export their products and are forced to reduce production as their storage facilities fill up. The crisis is therefore both less severe as a share of GDP, more complex, with a broader commodity coverage, and more dangerous for the specific countries least able to neutralize its effects.
The geographical impact is also reversed. While the 1973 crisis affected the United States and Europe, the current one is hitting the export-oriented economies of Asia hardest, many of which have only weeks of reserves. Among the worst-hit countries are Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, which import 60-75% of their crude oil across the Strait. India and Indonesia are the worst-hit by shortages of liquefied natural gas, on which 80% and 90% of households depend for cooking, respectively. According to the IEA, liquefied natural gas exported from the Middle East to Asia was used for cooking by 820 million people.
China has not been hit as hard as its neighbors. Large oil reserves make the country more resilient to an oil crisis, although prices have also risen there. However, China's economy is largely electricity-based, so oil is a smaller part of the energy mix.
The long-term impact of the conflict depends on its duration and the ability of Gulf oil producers to recover from the attacks. Overall, even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens in the short term, it could take months for the market to stabilize again, due to the time it takes to repair damaged energy infrastructure, such as refineries. Saudi Arabia has the best chance of recovering the fastest. It has the largest technical and financial resources and has proven its ability to recover from the 2019 attacks on its facilities in a very short period of time - reaching production levels of 10 million barrels per day in just 10 days and restoring maximum capacity of 12 million barrels in 2 months. The UAE, Qatar and Kuwait are also in good positions, although they depend on more factors such as offshore production and bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
Europe: Choosing subsidies over structural measures?
Imports of petroleum products into Europe, in particular diesel and jet fuel, have been significantly affected. Half of Europe's aviation fuel imports come from the Gulf region and are difficult to replace with other imports given the tight market. It is also difficult to quickly expand domestic production, as each refinery's product mix differs depending on the technology and the types of crude oil imported. Short-term measures such as the release of strategic reserves and the easing of sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil have eased some of the pressure, but the impact can only be mitigated for a limited period. Stockpiles were depleted in the first four weeks of the crisis, with stock levels below the average for the period since the end of March.
In response, the European Commission (EC) announced the AccelerateEU plan in April 2026. It outlines measures to address the fossil fuel crisis, including urgent national action to secure jet fuel and diesel stocks. It also includes assessments of available stocks and refining capacity and increasing domestic production of sustainable fuels. The plan also includes a reassessment of the Oil Stocks Directive with a view to expanding the specifications of oil products in strategic reserves.
The crisis has exposed the vulnerability of the European fuel system and the slow pace of structural measures to reduce risky dependencies. Europe has been in this situation before, and that is precisely the problem. In 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a so-called generational payment for energy dependence, which led to ambitious policy packages and bold rhetoric about structural reforms. European countries spent over €1 trillion on state subsidies and infrastructure to overcome the gas crisis.
Now, in 2026, the Gulf crisis finds Europe in a fundamentally familiar position: highly exposed, responding with emergency measures and reaching for the same set of short-term subsidies and long-term promises of structural change. The EU is providing the additional costs to consumers through its Temporary Framework for State Aid for the Middle East - the fourth such scheme since 2020.
In every crisis, diversification and acceleration of the energy transition are pursued until they relieve the immediate pressure, but no more. European countries react quickly and manage to overcome crises by paying for the costs of mitigating the impact on consumers. However, there is no guarantee that the EU will be able to pay the necessary funds alone in a crisis. To some extent, the model worked during the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, COVID-19 and the energy crisis of 2021-2022. But each time, there is less and less fiscal capacity left in reserve. And potential upcoming shocks, especially related to climate change and geopolitical fragmentation, may be larger and more frequent than anything before. The margin for the next response is narrowing.
The way forward: Towards an integrated energy policy based on security
The crisis confirms once again that energy security and climate policy are inseparable and that Europe has been slow to embrace this.
In the short and medium term, pragmatic damage control is essential. Europe needs to ensure that its fuel refining capacity and gas infrastructure remain operational in the short term so that it is resilient to potential future crises. Imports of crude oil, diesel, jet fuel and liquefied natural gas (LNG) need to be diversified again - not only across countries but also across geographical regions. European vulnerability arises in times of supply crises, but also in times of demand peaks, for example in the event of armed conflict. The EU must be ready to deal with such challenges.
In the long term, the deeper imperative is the energy transition itself. The transition from fossil fuels is no longer just a climate strategy, but a security strategy. Renewable energy is by definition immune to geopolitical shocks. Wind over the North Sea cannot be sanctioned. Electrolyzers producing green hydrogen are not subject to closure like the Strait of Hormuz. And synthetic biofuels can be produced locally and blended with liquid fuels.
However, the transition depends on a supply chain that is itself exposed to geopolitical risk. Critical raw materials, lithium, cobalt, rare earths, essential for batteries, wind turbines and electric motors, are highly concentrated in a few countries, with China foremost among them. Raw materials for biofuels are also largely sourced from China. Europe cannot replace one strategic dependency with another.
An integrated, security-oriented energy strategy is needed that combines binding diversification targets, strategic reserves for refined products and liquefied natural gas, resilient supply chains for critical materials and alternative fuels, and a permanent investment system that does not need to be built from scratch every time a crisis occurs.
This crisis is painful. But it is also clarifying. Europe has received another warning that it cannot afford to ignore.