The proposals of “Progressive Bulgaria“ for changes to the Electoral Code come very timely according to democratic understandings - soon after the parliamentary elections, and not on the eve of the next elections. They are trying to meet the expectations of a society that had felt disgusted by a series of elections that were perceived as flawed and ultimately meaningless.
The greater turnout in the last elections is not explained by a sudden increase in trust in the electoral commissions, but by the determination of nearly a million and a half Bulgarians to give Rumen Radev and his party a chance to restore the rule of law and the sovereign's sense of justice.
The announced draft changes are a first step in the right direction, but insufficient if we want to permanently restore citizens' trust in the fairness of the electoral process.
The removal of paper ballots from polling stations with over 300 voters is news number one in the new project, but why not go all the way to 100% voting by machine? The supplier company has already announced that they can provide machines for smaller polling stations as well. The CEC may also consider some consolidation and optimization of the sections. It is hardly necessary to have a section in a settlement where the mayor and his cousins are members of the commission and the only voters.
The amendment to Art. 56 of the Code to establish a training unit and a public register for certification of commission members is desirable. It does not state that having a certificate is a mandatory condition for participation in a commission, but only that it gives an advantage. Who will consider this advantage when the parties appoint their representatives to the commissions? Another important question is why only political parties and coalitions have the right to propose candidates for training?
The removal of the fictional region “Abroad“ is inevitable, because it cannot be implemented in practice without distorting the people's vote to some extent.
The proposed project generally stops there and does not address the most serious defects of the electoral legislation in Bulgaria.
In our new democratic history, elections in Bulgaria are organized by party-appointed commissions. This leads to constant scandals, mutual accusations of fraud, and distrust of the results regardless of who wins.
The main criticisms of the current model of forming the CEC are related, first of all, to its politicization. Its members generally defend the positions of the parties that nominated them, and decisions are often made by party vote, rather than by professional consensus. Another criticism is the lack of serious experience among some members in areas such as electoral law, election administration, and IT security (especially important in machine voting). Added to these is the low public trust due to the belief that the CEC is reorganized with each change in the parliamentary majority. The shortcomings of the CEC are multiplied as huge defects down in the regional, municipal and especially in the section commissions.
Bulgaria is one of the few countries in Europe where the parties themselves count and legitimize their election results. In most countries, this work is entrusted to professional organizations.
In Germany, the head of the Central Election Authority is a senior civil servant (usually the head of the statistical office). He is appointed not by parties, but by administrative means, with elections being organized mainly at the local level. This is an extremely expert model that ensures high professionalism and stability, but relies heavily on trust in the state administration.
The model in France can be described as legal. It relies on judicial control. There is no central election commission there like in Bulgaria. The elections are administered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the legality and results are controlled by the Constitutional Council. The French model also works well only with strong institutions.
The balance between democratic legitimacy and independence is characteristic of the regulatory model in the United Kingdom. The Electoral Commission is an independent body. Its members are appointed by Parliament, but do not represent parties. They undergo public hearings and are prohibited from active party affiliation.
It is not realistic to make a complete transition to a professional election administration overnight, copying ready-made models from countries with a different history and political culture. As a start, we can start by reducing the political quota. This does not mean the complete exclusion of parties, but a smaller number of members proposed directly by parties and strengthening the expertise by introducing an expert quota. Increasing the expertise implies attracting people with proven professional experience in constitutional and electoral law, public administration, information systems and cybersecurity, statistics and data processing. In addition to nominations from parties, nominations can also be made by professional organizations, universities and others.
The expertise can also be strengthened by developing a permanent professional apparatus at the CEC, which includes full-time experts in electoral law, IT and cybersecurity, logistics, control and audit. These experts should be appointed under the Civil Servant Act, and not along political lines.
The greatest importance for increasing expertise would be the introduction of a requirement for all members of the commissions to have a valid certificate. Initially, this should apply at least to the chairmen and secretaries of the commissions. By the way, the certificate should not be lifelong, but should be valid for no more than four years and be renewed after new training, as well as revoked in case of violations. Certification should include training in electoral law, operation of the machines, counting procedures, protocols and signals, a code of ethics and disciplinary liability.
Confidence in the impartiality of the CEC would increase if the mandate of its members were increased to 6-7 years, without the right to a second mandate, and its composition was partially renewed every two to three years. Persons who have held a party or electoral political office in the last 5 years should not be elected as members of the CEC.
The principle of territorial distance would also help a lot to dispel suspicions of manipulation. This means that the members of the CEC should be appointed by lot in settlements other than their permanent address, with the state covering their transportation, accommodation and business travel expenses. The goal is to break local dependencies and limit the possibilities for pressure from mayors, local businessmen, party leaders, etc. For the same reason, representatives from Bulgaria should be sent to all sectional commissions abroad.
Elections should not be won in the commissions. They should be won in front of the voters. The amended Electoral Code should restore trust, reduce political tension and protect the vote of every citizen regardless of who they vote for and who wins the vote.