More with Trump than with Europe and with Russia than with Ukraine - Radev's government has given the first signals about what it considers to be the national interest. Among them are risky fiscal policy and timid anti-corruption activity.
There has been great confusion in society due to the use of the phrase "Bulgarian national interest" by the new rulers. It has become clear that this interest is a "thin" and "multi-layered" matter, especially in terms of foreign policy, but there are still doubts about what exactly it consists of according to Rumen Radev and his team.
In addition to citizens, the European Commission is apparently also puzzled. In order to bring some clarity, they have sent Bulgarian European Commissioner Ekaterina Zaharieva to test our government's positions on sensitive issues, claims "Politico". Most likely, these issues are about the budget and the war in Ukraine.
From the budget through Ukraine to Peevski's security
In order to provide definitional assistance inside and outside the country, below are listed the previous uses of the term "national interest" in defense of certain policies proposed by "Progressive Bulgaria". The claim of this new formation is that it not only defines, but also defends the national interest in an unprecedented and uniquely correct way.
From the work of the "Radev" cabinet so far, we have learned that, in "Bulgarian national interest" are the following actions or inactions:
The 2026 budget with a record deficit of 5.7%;
The postponement until next year (and beyond) of reforms that will bring state finances within the Maastricht framework;
The call of the former already i.f. Prosecutor General Borislav Sarafov to resign (he did);
The removal of Borisov and Peevski's security guards;
The refusal to investigate whether this security was provided lawfully or not in previous years;
The suspension of unilateral financial and military aid to Ukraine;
The sale of weapons to Ukraine for money given to it by the EU (i.e. partly by Bulgaria itself);
The refusal to support the establishment of an international court, initiated by the Council of Europe, the EU and the member states, for the crimes in Ukraine committed by the aggressor state and its leadership;
The adoption of a new law on the judiciary, which would make possible election of a new Supreme Judicial Council, Judicial Inspectorate and Prosecutor General in the fall;
The disclosure of trips by Delyan Peevski and Desislava Atanasova on a private plane;
The lack of inspections and investigations of institutions that made it possible to repeal the "Magnitsky" financial sanctions in Bulgaria;
The lack of concrete steps on corruption cases, including high-profile scandals such as Petyo Euroto, the Notary, the "Bozhkov" affair, etc. until the election of a new chief prosecutor;
The requested resignation of the head of the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office Emilia Rusinova for her connection with Petyo Euroto - the resignation was not granted, followed by the refusal of the Supreme Judicial Council's prosecutorial board to remove her;
The reappointment as head of the National Security Agency of Bulgaria of Plamen Tonchev - a man trusted by both Radev and Borisov;
The setting of a condition for the US - that American air tankers remain at "Vasil Levski" airport - Sofia only against the abolition of visas for Bulgarians;
Non-participation in the coalition of the willing, which is also developing an anti-ballistic program jointly between Europe and Ukraine;
Expressing declarative approval of the assistance provided to Ukraine by the EU and the aforementioned coalition of the willing;
Support for the 21st package of EU sanctions against Russia;
Blocking the EU's personal sanctions against Russian Patriarch Kirill, Vagit Alekperov and another Russian oligarch from Putin's entourage;
Giving the "Bezmer" airport for use by the US in the campaign against Iran;
The request from Poland for old MiG 29s, promised to Ukraine, but used by the Polish government as leverage against Kiev;
The refusal to finance a children's hospital with the 2026 budget, although the government claims that funds will be provided in other ways;
The refusal to impose restrictions on online gambling;
The refusal or at least strong skepticism towards the joint project with "Rheinmetall" for a gunpowder and ammunition plant, agreed upon by previous governments.
What are Radev's interests in foreign policy?
Where all this is going, let everyone answer for themselves. At least a few highlights should not be missed. First, the new Bulgarian government does not believe that Russia should be severely punished for its aggression against Ukraine. On the contrary, its efforts are concentrated on limitations and restrictions that Ukraine should bear - including the suspension of aid to it. Obviously, this emphasis is being pursued as far as it can, without Bulgaria itself becoming the focus of the suspension of funds or the use of other forms of pressure by the EU. But within the "framework of the possible" it is quite clear that the new government is acting against Ukraine and is willing to assist Russia with various small steps so far. Standing against Ukraine, paradoxically, is ideologically justified by Orthodoxy and our national identity.
Secondly, again from an ideological point of view, Radev seems to feel closer to Trump than to the leaders of the EU. For Radev, the EU is simply "an alliance in which we are members", without any particular value connection and solidarity with it and its other members. The value connection with Trump seems to be stronger and it would have been even more emphasized if Orbán had won the elections in Hungary. This ideological proximity explains Radev's interest in the possible entry of the American highly conservative media corporation Newsmax into Bulgaria. It also explains the loopholes regarding the American tanker planes of the Bulgarian government. The coup with the lifting of American visas and saying "no" to an American president was clearly just a staged event for internal use, assuming that the military part of the conflict with Iran was ending. When it became clear that it was far from over, the Bulgarian position on the issue quickly changed: the planes were accepted again, and the American visas were forgotten.
What did the budget and the first steps against corruption tell us?
Third, for the first time since 1997, a Bulgarian government is pursuing a high-risk budget policy. In an extremely difficult-to-predict international environment, Radev and his colleagues are opening a very serious budget deficit. They are responsible for this deficit: in Asen Vassilev's budgets, the deficit has always been up to 3%. All Bulgarian governments in recent decades have taken a low financial risk (in a non-crisis situation) with a deficit of up to 3% of GDP. 5.7% is too much, especially considering that the budget does not foresee any strategic investments for the country, in fact, it even postpones some of them. This fiscal interpretation of the national interest is extremely controversial and hopefully will not turn out to be tragically wrong.
Fourth, for now the new government is using the fight against corruption as a PR stunt. The emphasis is on piquancy like Peevski's trips, without assessing and investigating the activities of institutions used as umbrellas and bludgeons. The excuse that we have to wait until the fall for such actions is only partially valid. Minister Demerdzhiev seems to be willing to do the job, but the overall framework in which he is placed suggests theatricality and superficiality of his actions. The appointment of Plamen Tonchev as head of SANS also speaks more about continuity than about any serious anti-corruption reform.
The main picture is already clear
Although relatively little time has passed, the main benchmarks of the new government are emerging: more with Donald Trump than with Europe; against Ukraine and in support of Russia; risky fiscal policy; timid and superficial anti-corruption activity. The one who has won over 50% of the seats in parliament has the right to define the national interest as he wishes. This does not mean that his definitions and actions are justified and will lead to something good.
This text expresses the opinion of the author and may not coincide with the positions of the Bulgarian editorial office and the State Gazette as a whole.