In 2022, elections were held for candidates for the Supreme Judicial Council, which did not lead to a new composition of the council, due to the parliamentary quota. Now, 4 years later, the magistrates are on the verge of new elections. Some of the candidates who appeared then are appearing now, the difference is that now they have a different position on the management of the prosecutor's office, while then they were active only in its defense. However, a new concept does not mean a new biography. Harsh words against the government do not absolve from responsibility those who participated in it or publicly defended it.
Krassimira Filipova, Vladimir Nikolov and Dobrinka Kalcheva were elected in the first round in 2022. Today they are again asking for the trust of the prosecutors. The documents they have now submitted to the Supreme Judicial Council clearly show their harsher assessments of the government, personnel practices and internal dependencies. However, their previous positions remain part of the consistency check. A change of opinion is permissible, but for a candidate who participated in the management or represented the professional community, it requires an explanation. Especially when the criticism is directed at the personnel body, which continues to function beyond its mandate, without the new composition elected in 2022 taking office.
Filipova: management experience does not exempt from responsibility
Krassimira Filipova was appointed Deputy Prosecutor General in January 2020 at the proposal of Ivan Geshev and will remain in office until June 2023. She manages the work of prosecutors from the “Judicial“ and “Administrative“ departments. Previously, she held the positions of Deputy Administrative Head of Prosecutor's Offices at the regional, district and appellate levels and the post of Deputy Minister of Justice. Her biography shows extensive participation in government. This circumstance makes questions about her own responsibility inevitable.
In 2022, Filipova reported “significant progress“ by the SJC in ensuring and upholding the independence of the judiciary, which should be continued. In a public interview in June of the same year, she objected to the discussed models for investigating the Prosecutor General with extraordinary powers: “However, all such models are unconstitutional“. This was her position while she was Geshev's deputy. Today, her reasons describe a violation of the rule of law, a lack of responsibility and self-criticism, isolation from ordinary magistrates, and early elections. She insists that the future SJC end the negative practices of the current one.
The difficult diagnosis makes the question of her own role even more difficult. When did the recognized progress turn into violated rule of law? Which practices did she challenge while she was part of the top leadership of the PRB? What specific actions has she taken?
Filipova owes more than a critical vocabulary. She owes an explanation for the assessments she gave and for the behavior she had while she was Deputy Prosecutor General. Without such an explanation, the current position leaves a convenient division - management participation brings professional prestige, and the shortcomings of management are attributed to others.
The claim to fix the system is unconvincing when your own participation in its management remains unaccounted for.
Nikolov: Geshev's defense is not erased with a new concept
In 2021, during Geshev's term, Vladimir Nikolov moved from the district level to the leadership of the District Prosecutor's Office — Pleven through election as administrative head. Geshev attended his inauguration. In the same year, Nikolov headed the Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria. These circumstances do not prove personal dependence, but place his public behavior in a specific institutional context.
His public support is also manifested through participation in joint events with the leadership of the Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office. In 2023, Nikolov participated in the protest in defense of Ivan Geshev, when prosecutors from all over the country came out in togas in front of the courthouses. Nikolov did not stay in Pleven, with his colleagues, but was at the Courthouse in Sofia, where he spoke to the media after Geshev and Siika Mileva. At the separate meeting in Boyana on August 24, 2020, after Geshev's speech and the applause, he also took the floor and stated that “the Bulgarian prosecutor's office is the most reformed part of the judicial system“. He places criticism of the institution in the context of political pressure.
In July 2021, he contested the proposal to remove Geshev, saying that it “cannot be based on rumors, suggestions and similar things“. In January 2022, he again defined the prosecutor's office as being strongly reformed, and the requested resignation of Geshev — as a political issue.
This is a consistent public line of defense by Vladimir Nikolov towards the then leadership of the Public Prosecutor's Office. He also activated the Association of Prosecutors in Bulgaria, which regularly spouts defensive positions. Later, its Board of Directors accused the former chairman of using the organization for Geshev's personal protection, including through over ten texts without prior discussion and an explicit decision of the governing body. This is an accusation of the current leadership of the APB in a public dispute, which requires a specific response.
Today, Nikolov's motives speak of circles of influence, abuse of office, and leaders imposing illegal practices.
It is interesting where was this categoricalness of Nikolov during Geshev's time, when he had the rostrum of the professional organization and the administrative post? When did Nikolov recognize the described vices and how did he counteract them, while publicly presenting the prosecutor's office as the most reformed part of the system?
The defense is documented. The opposition must be shown with the same concreteness. Without this assessment, the new concept changes the assessments, but leaves the responsibility for the previous positions unclear.
Kalcheva: today's diagnosis calls into question yesterday's assessment
Dobrinka Kalcheva moved from the district to the appellate prosecutor's office in 2014, before Geshev's mandate. This development cannot be attributed to his administration. However, her public positions in 2022 are subject to direct comparison with the current ones.
Then she stated that citizens' appeal to the prosecutor's office “unequivocally refutes the claim that they do not trust the state prosecution“. The argument is weak: seeking assistance from an institution with certain legal powers does not in itself prove trust in its leadership and work. Regarding the possible release of Geshev, Kalcheva states that she would decide according to the facts, evidence, law and morality.
Today she describes informal networks of influence, personal dependencies and the creation of a network of obedient leaders. She claims that the Prosecutor's Office contributed to the negative processes, while simultaneously defending the previous election as legal and democratic.
The categorical nature of Kalcheva's current assessment requires an explanation for the moderation of her previous position. Which dependencies arose after 2022 and which were visible even then? What did she do against them?
The electoral support received does not answer these questions. The defense of one's own result must be accompanied by clear guarantees against administrative influence on the election. Otherwise, it remains unclear why internal dependencies are so sharply named today, while back then the public emphasis was on protecting the institution.
Petkov: criticism was documented even under Geshev
With Plamen Petkov, the critical line can be traced back to 2022. His motives challenge inertia, cabinet encapsulation, and empty promises of reforms. He proposes deadlines for competitions, participation in general meetings in nominating leaders, and annual accountability for SJC members.
The current documents continue these themes with an emphasis on predictable career development and protection against internal informal pressure. This is easily established through the texts from both elections.
During Plamen Petkov's speech before the SJC in 2022, Geshev demonstratively left the hall, but he continued to speak in the same vein. More significantly, his criticism of the previous election compared to other candidates was recorded by the then leadership.
The electoral process also requires verifiable guarantees. In 2025, the Partnership Council at the Supreme Judicial Council insists on a reliability analysis and a new audit of the electronic system. This does not prove a manipulated prosecutorial vote in 2022, but it shows that the issue of trust does not end with the announcement of the results.
Those elected in 2022 owe a report on their positions under Geshev before asking for a second vote of confidence, because anyone who condemns a management model today must explain what they did when they participated in it or defended it.
Source: trud.bg