Eliminate senior Iranian officials one by one until the entire top leadership of the regime is exhausted. After the assassinations of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani, and figures such as Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib, the United States and Israel chose the "beheading strategy". This doctrine has proven effective against non-state actors, as seen in the elimination of Osama bin Laden in 2011.
However, this strategy has rarely been used against a regime so far. The most recent example is the campaign led by Russia in Chechnya. At the turn of the century, the Kremlin promised to eliminate Chechen rebel leaders before installing Ramzan Kadyrov, a local pro-Russian leader, in power.
Is this precedent applicable to Iran? The French newspaper L" Express interviewed Dr. Austin Long, former head of the Strategic Stability Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which was at the heart of American military planning, and now a senior fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
L' Express: Can a parallel be drawn with the "leadership beheading" strategy adopted by Russia in Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s?
Austin Long: There is a fundamental difference between Iran and Chechnya: Tehran does not have a figure equivalent to Ramzan Kadyrov, the man Moscow installed in Chechnya. Russia relied on this locally supported figure to implement its strategy.
What is happening in Tehran is perhaps more reminiscent of what happened with Gaddafi in Libya about fifteen years ago. But there is a difference: the beheading of the regime was accompanied by a local uprising against it. In Iran, we often talk about the Kurds who could take on this role. But that is not the case now.
L'Express: Can this strategy work against a well-structured regime like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps?
Austin Long: My work shows that the beheading strategy is ineffective against structured organizations. Several factors work against it: Iran is not ruled by a young, weak and disorganized structure. The Iranian army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been in power for almost 50 years. They are numerous, which means they are capable of replacing any eliminated leader. We could certainly see even more radical leaders come to power in Iran, although the regime is already very radical.
L' Express: So you are not optimistic about the outcome of the operation?
Austin Long: I am simply noting that most research on the beheading strategy has focused on its effect on terrorist or insurgent groups, not on a state. It is entirely possible that we will see the fifth successor to the Supreme Leader decide to negotiate with Washington and Tel Aviv.
The United States and Israel eliminated the first wave of Iranian leaders, then the second, and will undoubtedly eliminate the next. The resources deployed and the intelligence penetration are colossal. We are therefore witnessing a new version of leadership neutralization, the purpose of which differs from historical precedents. The idea is probably not to eliminate the leadership in order to replace it with someone more suitable - no one has yet emerged - but to undermine its administrative and security capabilities.
Unlike a terrorist organization, the leadership of a state has responsibilities: maintaining order, collecting taxes. If it constantly has to change its leaders because the previous ones have been killed, it becomes increasingly difficult for it to continue to function.
In short, what the United States and Israel are trying to do by targeting the ruling elite is unprecedented, as are the methods and approaches used to implement it. It remains to be seen how the conflict will develop. It may turn out that this strategy is more effective against a state that needs to be governed than against rebels who simply need to survive.
L'Express: Isn't this exactly the strategy Israel is using against Hamas? The conflict is still ongoing, two years after October 7.
Austin Long: Here again, the comparison with the Iranian situation is not entirely accurate: Israel had soldiers on the ground. Hamas managed to hide in tunnels and wait out the Israeli offensive. They resurfaced and tightened their control over Gaza. So this situation could change. But Gaza and Tehran are very different geographically. It is easier to regain control of a small territory than a large country with over 90 million inhabitants.
L' Express: Is the strategy adopted in Iran more Israeli or American?
Austin Long: That's not the point: the two countries are working together. Their cooperation is based on their own experience: the Israelis have spent years honing their ability to attack the leaders of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups. So it's a methodology they've mastered to perfection. The United States did the same in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In Afghanistan in 2001, very few American soldiers were on the ground - just special forces and CIA agents. But they were able to coordinate the actions of local fighters on the ground - Pashtuns, then Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north - with the air power that the United States could provide. This proved incredibly effective in removing the Taliban from power at the time. The only difference, again, is the scale of the campaign.
L' Express: Before assassinating Ali Khamenei and many other high-ranking members of the Iranian regime, the United States carried out another spectacular operation: the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, alive, on January 3. Do you see any similarities between the two operations?
Austin Long: The capture of Nicolas Maduro ultimately resembles much of what we have already seen. The discreet, high-quality operation targeted just one person, not the entire leadership: it resembles the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, except this time the target was the leader of a country, not a terrorist organization. The events that followed and his replacement as head of state by Vice President Delcy Rodriguez represent another variation. The United States did not try to change the fundamental character of the regime, only its leader, before entering into negotiations with it.
The Iranian case is completely different. First, because it is much larger in scale. Second, because the method is different. The US military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were supported by airstrikes and drone strikes, but also by special operations carried out by the regular army.
L'Express: You mentioned Gaddafi. Do you think Iran could fall apart like Libya after the fall of its leader?
Austin Long: These two situations are fundamentally different. Before Gaddafi's fall, Libya in the 2010s was still full of strong tribal traditions. These traditions were seeking expression. When the Western coalition intervened to support them, the Libyan government collapsed, overthrown by a powerful and already established rebellion. Subsequently, the different tribes clashed, which led to the current situation. In Iran, the phenomenon of factionalism is a little different. The Iranian government, at least until now, has been much more cohesive and homogeneous. There are ethnic minorities: Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs... There are also ethnic aspirations, but only on the periphery of the homogeneous and firmly established Persian state. In the current situation, I do not see any possibility of fragmentation of the regime.
L' Express: You explain that the classic strategy of beheading always involves a contingent of soldiers on the ground, which is not the case with the Israeli-American offensive. This criterion seemed decisive for Donald Trump.
Austin Long: That's right. The president declared himself against "forever wars", and Vice President J. D. Vance spoke out widely against the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the decision to attack the Iranian regime without deploying American troops on the ground was deliberate. The question that arises today is: is this strategy sufficient to lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime? There are too many variables to answer with certainty.
From a tactical perspective, the operation was indeed a success. But the long-term prospects remain unclear. Will Iran give up its nuclear program forever? Will the Strait of Hormuz be reopened? All these questions remain open. If the answers are positive, then the military strategy we have just seen could eventually be adopted in the long term, as was the case in Afghanistan after 2001.
L'Express: How do you determine whether a strategy is effective or not?
Austin Long: The results are very mixed. The Chechen operation was incredibly effective from a Russian perspective: Kadyrov has been in power for almost two decades. Strategically, Moscow managed to eliminate one of the key problems for Russia in the 1990s. Libya is another story. On the one hand, Gaddafi is gone, but Libya is in chaos. Afghanistan was a success from a strategic perspective: the United States wanted to get rid of the Taliban regime, which had taken al-Qaeda under its wing, and it achieved that. But 25 years later, Washington withdrew and the Taliban returned to power. In Iraq, the strategy of decapitation of the regime was not decisive, but it certainly helped create space for other political and military initiatives after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The effectiveness of an operation does not always translate into strategic results, since these depend on factors other than the military offensive. Among these, the state of civil society in the target country is often a determining factor.