"If we believe in our own strength, we are capable of ending the communist dictatorship. If we are determined enough, we can force the ruling party to submit to free elections," Viktor Orban said in 1989 on the occasion of the re-internment of Imre Nagy, the post-war prime minister of Hungary who led the 1956 Hungarian Revolution against the USSR, he told "Politico" Suzana Zeleny, former Fidesz MP.
From a liberal leader calling for Hungary to separate from Moscow, the Hungarian prime minister has become a self-proclaimed defender of illiberalism and the Kremlin’s best friend in Europe. At a time when the EU is struggling to counter Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine and the rest of the continent, the Hungarian prime minister has become the man Russian President Vladimir Putin can count on.
Ahead of Hungary’s critical elections on April 12, 2026, Orbán blocked a €90 billion EU loan package that Kiev desperately needs to keep fighting. Meanwhile, the country’s foreign minister was forced to explain last week why he had been forwarding confidential procedures to the Kremlin.
Making Hungary Great Again
When Hungary’s first free elections were held in 1990, Orbán and Suzana Zeleny were among the 22 members of Fidesz, then a liberal-centrist group of anti-communist students and intellectuals, elected to the National Assembly. Orbán’s transformation began shortly thereafter.
Orbán was elected party chairman in 1990. The young politician quickly achieved complete dominance over Fidesz. He took action to remove those who challenged his leadership or even dared to challenge his decisions. In 1994, Orbán abruptly changed its ideological stance from liberal to national-conservative. Since then, the party’s history and Orbán’s have been intertwined.
Orbán’s transformation has been a gradual one. After a brief stint as prime minister at the turn of the century, he spent eight years in opposition, doing everything he could to disrupt the National Assembly and sabotage the then socialist-liberal government.
After retaking the country’s highest office in 2010, he made it his goal to never lose again, rewriting the constitution, changing basic laws to reduce democratic checks and balances, weakening media freedoms and judicial independence, and tilting the electoral field in his favor.
The first stage of Orbán’s transformation, the initial ideological shift, was driven by personal ambition and a thirst for power. He reckons that Fidesz will have a clearer path to power and better electoral prospects in the less crowded conservative end of the political spectrum, where the main right-wing party is in disarray and decline.
Orbán’s tilt toward Russia has been slower but no less noticeable. The turning point came in 2014, when Orbán signed a deal with the Kremlin for a huge loan to expand Hungary’s Paks II nuclear power plant. This agreement signaled not only a pragmatic dependence on Moscow but also the beginning of a meeting of ideological minds.
Just six months later, the prime minister outlined his goal of building an illiberal state in Hungary based on national and traditional Christian values, explicitly citing Putin’s Russia as a model—a remarkable development considering that in 2007, “he told party workers in a speech that Russia was essentially an empire and could never be trusted.”
Other Hungarian prime ministers have also sought closer economic ties with Russia, but under Orbán, economic cooperation has not only accelerated but also quickly translated into stronger political ties. He spoke of “opening to the East,” arguing that it was important for Hungary to improve relations not only with Russia but also with China and Turkey in order to balance its relations with the West. And in 2019, when most of Central Europe held large celebrations to mark the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, state-sponsored events in Budapest were noticeably more subdued.
The Metamorphosis
For Peter Molnar, a fellow student of Orbán’s at Budapest’s Eotves Loránd University and a former Fidesz lawmaker, Orbán’s journey from Russian enemy to Russian friend reflects his international ambitions. “Orbán cannot make Hungary great again,” he said, referring to how about two-thirds of the country’s territory was torn apart after World War I. “But maybe he thinks he can make it great again.”
And with each clash between Budapest and Brussels, Hungary's relations with Putin have only warmed, just as they would later with US President Donald Trump.
Molnar, now an academic, highlights his university colleague's relentless drive for success. The young Orbán attended illegal underground dances, a form of youth rebellion often monitored by state security police. And despite little interest in art or literature, he wanted to attend a performance of "How Mr. Mockingjay Healed His Afflictions," by German-born writer Peter Weiss, a satire about the struggles of an ordinary man in an oppressive society.
According to Molnar, there was nothing at the time to suggest Orbán's subsequent political path from liberal to European MAGA darling, except that the immense ambition was there. "If the political constellation were such that the liberal path offered that, he would probably remain a liberal," he added.
Political journalist Pál Daniel René, who wrote Orbán's 2021 biography, notes that Orbán is fascinated by power itself. I think that's what drives him the most. If we lived in a time when liberalism was on the rise, he would be a liberal," he said.
Viktor Orbán realized in the 1990s that being a nationalist, being a conservative, would give him more freedom in how to govern, control and build communities. It's easier to build communities in Hungary if you're a traditionalist. And in the 1990s there was a huge socialist party and a fairly strong liberal party, while the conservative party, the MDF, was collapsing," Reni stressed.
"It was obvious to him that he had to move to the right to take over the political space." And along the way, Orbán studied right-wing role models abroad. During his trips to the United States in the early 1990s, he became interested in the political infrastructure of the Republican Party.
Meanwhile, former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi fascinated Orbán. The way he approached conservatism, the way he shaped the party he founded around himself, the colloquial language he adopted so that ordinary men and women could understand him, and his fusion of football and politics and the political instrumentalism of the game," Rennie noted.
Like Berlusconi, who owned the AC Milan football club, Orbán founded a youth academy in his hometown of Felchut that grew into a football team with a 4,000-seat stadium - big enough to hold the entire population of the village twice.
Also, "Orbán ends his speeches with "előre magyarország" - or "forward, Hungary" - in a clear homage to Berlusconi, whose party is called Forza Italia, Reni said.
The Evil Empire
For Frank Furedi, an Orbán ally who heads the Brussels branch of the Hungarian government-backed "Matthias Corvinus" college, in fact, "the EU has changed" and has become more liberal and more insistent on undermining the national sovereignty of member states.
"I think Orbán would see his journey as a smooth transition. I think at some point the hostility to the EU had an important influence on his views. You have to remember that the leader he replaced in Budapest was the EU boy. And Brussels was really upset that he lost the election to Fidesz in 2010." "I think this is the key dynamic", Furedi said.
He highlights Orbán's response to the 2015 refugee crisis as a turning point. "Until then, Orbán had been viewed with suspicion by the EU establishment, but he was tolerated nonetheless. But when he was confronted with the migration policy adopted by the European Commission, tolerance gave way to hostility. The fact that many member states are now adopting Orbán's approach to mass illegal migration means that from the Commission's perspective, everything Orbán does is unforgivable," he said.
With this interpretation, according to Orbán, Brussels has replaced Russia as the "occupying" power of Hungary. In his election campaigns since 2010, Orbán has often portrayed Hungary as a country under siege, fueling the image of a constant threat from larger neighbors, supranational powers, or shadowy financial forces. It’s an approach that cuts through a thick layer of historical resentment dating back to 1848, when Hungary rebelled against Habsburg rule and sought independence.
In a 2011 speech, he declared: "In 1848, Vienna would not have dictated us, and in 1956, Moscow would not have dictated us. And now, Brussels or wherever else will dictate us." It continues to be a strategy that works. In Budapest, people generally hate the idea of rapprochement with Russia. But in the countryside, Orban's warnings about dragging Hungary into war are resonating.
Not everyone is convinced, however, that Orban himself has not changed.