Daniel Smilov's comment:
Rumen Radev has a strategy for how to keep his voters happy in the short term. And this strategy has been successful so far: polls show very high and stable support for him and "Progressive Bulgaria", although there is a small erosion of the government's rating.
Radev's voters get two things. The Russophile part feels rehabilitated by policies such as Bulgaria's refusal to join the international tribunal against the crimes of Putin's Russia, the requests that no military aid will be given to Ukraine, the "expulsion" of American planes from Sofia airport and other more symbolic gestures. In addition, Radev has apparently prepared an extremely generous budget, which is designed to satisfy the demands of all possible clienteles and social groups.
However, Rumen Radev does not have a strategy for Bulgaria, or at least it is not evident from the first steps of his administration. Therefore, it is no coincidence that many people are confused when trying to figure out what exactly Bulgaria wants at the moment. The confusion has the following dimensions:
EU: Is Radev pursuing an Orban strategy?
Does Bulgaria want to become a second Slovakia or even Orban's Hungary? Rather not. At least for now, Radev has not blocked important pan-European initiatives, has not threatened a veto, and the European Commission is very favorable to him: significant funds were released under the Recovery and Resilience Plan, probably only on the basis of a change of government.
But what is the strategy for Bulgarian EU membership beyond providing a budgetary framework for the next seven years in which funding for cohesion and agriculture is preserved? The main question is whether Bulgaria will join countries that want more integration in the fields of defense, financial markets and foreign policy, or will it remain on the periphery of these processes. Perhaps it is wise to decide such issues "when the time comes". But in fact, their time has come, and the Bulgarian answer is unclear.
Is there a strategy for the war and sanctions?
It has already been said that in relation to Ukraine, wanting "an end to the war" actually means nothing. Because this is a phrase that would cover everything from Ukraine's capitulation to Russia's withdrawal from all occupied territories. Perhaps Radev's strategy is to be "in the middle" between Russia and the EU. To both assist Ukraine and protect Patriarch Kirill and Alekperov.
To claim that Russia is an aggressor, but to be against an international tribunal for international crimes committed by the aggressor; to participate in collective assistance to Ukraine, but not to provide unilateral assistance, etc. This is a strategy of waiting: to see which way the military wind will blow, in order to decide more in one direction or the other. Wind vanes are useful, but no one respects them much - on both sides of the conflicts.
What is the strategy for relations with the US?
Donald Trump's administration has a negative attitude towards the EU, which is also evident in the latest US National Security Strategy. In the event of tension between the US and the EU, which will inevitably arise at some point, will Radev and the Bulgarian People's Party behave like a loyal member of the EU or not?
Of course, the US is our key partner in NATO, but it is still important whether Radev is for a strong and united EU or would he rather prefer the internal fragmentation of the union and its disintegration into coalitions on important geopolitical issues. In fact, it is about Bulgarian interests and whether they will be better protected within the framework of a strong EU. Radev seems to be tempted by the opportunism of Viktor Orban, who wanted to extract positives from the US, Russia, and China. Eastern European countries have always suffered from such opportunism, and in the end, the "cunningest" have suffered the most.
Will a strategy of friendship be maintained towards Russia?
What does Bulgaria want from Russia? To maintain political and economic ties with a regime that is aggressive and imperially minded towards its neighbors? To encourage Russia to behave in this way, while guaranteeing the most profitable cessation of hostilities in Ukraine for it? To restore energy supplies and projects, as before the war? Radev gives the impression that these are his preferences, but still he does not have a clear strategy on all these issues. And it is not clear whether it is possible.
The war in Ukraine has shown that Russia is turning the energy dependence of other countries into a means of pressure against them. Bulgaria has so far paid Russia $600 million for reactors it did not order and built "Turkish Stream" at its own expense, forgiving the Russian side the penalties under previous contracts. Adding to all this the "Botaş" affair, which is suspected of being a three-way deal with Russia to get "what it deserves" after the suspension of Russian gas supplies, many questions arise regarding the price of energy ties. What is Bulgaria's long-term strategy?
What strategy is this budget pursuing?
The first truly big mistake of the "Radev" government was the budget with a 5.7% deficit. This is unjustified waste and a real pulling of the sovereign by the tail. In the end, the "Zhelyazkov" government fell for far smaller budgetary transgressions.
The explanations for the strange move are twofold. First, perhaps there is a desire to show "how bad" the previous rulers were. But this, besides being petty, does not correspond to reality. In the current situation, both Asen Vassilev and Yordan Tsonev would propose budgets within the 3% deficit, without blowing up social peace and without putting the brakes on the economy. A 3% deficit does not mean a sharp consolidation, nor a particular risk of slowing economic growth. On the contrary, the rapid accumulation of debt with a deficit of 5.7% will worsen Bulgaria's credit rating, and will also increase inflation unnecessarily. That is, to pluck the eyebrows of his opponents, Galab Donev will poke the eye of the country's financial stability.
The other explanation is that Radev wants to demonstrate the risks of the eurozone and the dangers of rapid indebtedness on a Greek model in it. But if so, what he will demonstrate is that he himself is the driver of unnecessary indebtedness, which is neither required nor encouraged by the eurozone.
Anti-corruption strategy - is there one?
Can corruption be fought without making special cuts in large client payments through the budget? Instead of the oligarchic model, why not change only the one who holds the tap for state funds for the oligarchy?
The delay in specific reforms in the judiciary and the investigations into the "Euro" and "Notary" cases are increasing doubts about the strategy of the ruling party in this area.
National populism - is this a strategy for the country and the region?
The topic of studying religion in school was once again put on the agenda. Almost every day in the media we see news about the exchange of insults between Bulgaria and North Macedonia at a high level. It must be said that the Macedonian side is to blame for most of them, but if the rule is that the smarter one is not led astray by provocations, who is the smarter one is not very clear.
The question is rather whether Radev wants to establish in Bulgaria a national populist ideological government based on the models of Vučić, Orbán, Mickoski, Fico, etc.? Of course, our government will not be Serbian, Hungarian, Macedonian, but Bulgarian. This will undoubtedly make it better than foreign analogues. Or will it not? What is the strategy here? After all, Orban is no longer in power, Vucic is on his way to follow him, and Mickoski is rarely mentioned as a role model. It is more important to answer the question of what kind of Balkans do we actually want? Integrated, connected, modern? Or medieval, remaining the most fragmented and therefore underdeveloped region of Europe?
The lack of strategy makes Radev's government more vulnerable than the sociological surveys show. The big mistake with the budget, the flirtations in the pro-Russian and national-populist direction, as well as the silence in the anti-corruption sphere could consolidate a large pro-European majority against the new government, which would also include anti-corruption-minded people and those who want responsible management of state finances. Attempts at protests are already being made. If the new government does not take into account the factors that lead to these sentiments, autumn could be quite hot for it.