Russia’s war against Ukraine has transformed Moldova from a peripheral post-Soviet state into one of the most important geopolitical test cases for Europe’s future. Situated between Romania and Ukraine and facing the unresolved conflict in Transnistria, the country has become a strategic crossroads between European integration and Russian influence. Today, the stakes are far greater than the accession of a small country to the European Union. The real question is whether the EU is capable of safeguarding democratic transformation along its eastern borders and countering the hybrid threats through which Moscow seeks to preserve its influence in the region. Speaking to Fakti about these issues is Niccolò Boccone, lecturer in Italian and English at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, freelance translator, founder of the geopolitical analysis platform Diplomaticamente, and contributor to Geopolitical Monitor.
- Mr. Boccone, why has Moldova, despite its small size and limited military capabilities, become one of the most important geopolitical flashpoints in the rivalry between Russia and the European Union?
- Moldova matters not because of its military strength, but because of its geographical position, political trajectory, and symbolic value. It lies between Romania, an EU and NATO member, and Ukraine, while remaining close to the Black Sea region and carrying the unresolved conflict in Transnistria.
For Russia, Moldova is part of the former Soviet space that Moscow still considers strategically important. A successful Moldovan transition toward the European Union would therefore represent more than another enlargement case. It would demonstrate that a small and vulnerable post-Soviet country can escape Russia’s political influence and consolidate itself within the European legal, economic, and institutional order.
For the European Union, Moldova has consequently become a test of whether enlargement can also work as a security instrument. The central issue is whether the EU can protect a democratic transformation in a state that remains exposed to Russian pressure from within. Moldova’s geopolitical importance is therefore much greater than its physical size.
- Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Moldova’s European integration has accelerated significantly. To what extent is this process now irreversible, and what are the greatest risks that could still derail it?
- Moldova’s European integration is more advanced and more deeply institutionalised than ever before, but I would not describe it as completely irreversible. Since 2022, Moldova has moved rapidly from political aspiration to practical accession.
It applied for membership in March 2022, received candidate status in June 2022, opened accession negotiations in June 2024, and later began work on the first negotiation cluster concerning the fundamentals of membership. This means that integration is no longer merely symbolic: it now involves legal reform, institutional adaptation, public administration, economic criteria, and the rule of law.
Nevertheless, the process can still be derailed politically. The main risks are economic fatigue, declining public support, institutional weakness, corruption, social polarisation, energy crises, and multiple Russian interferences in electoral politics. Russia does not necessarily need to reverse Moldova’s orientation completely. It may be sufficient to slow reforms, discredit the European project, and create the perception that accession produces instability and economic hardship.
The process is therefore difficult to reverse structurally, but still vulnerable politically. Its success will depend on whether the EU can deliver visible benefits quickly enough to preserve public confidence.
- You describe Transnistria as both a lever of influence and a liability for Moscow. Why do you see it that way?
- Transnistria remains a lever because it prevents Moldova from exercising full sovereignty over its territory and gives Russia a permanent instrument of political and security pressure. The presence of Russian troops and Moscow-aligned local structures allows Russia to maintain influence inside Moldova without formally controlling the country.
At the same time, Transnistria has become a liability because Russia’s ability to sustain and reinforce the region has declined significantly. The territory has no direct border with Russia, and since the invasion of Ukraine it has become increasingly isolated. Its economic survival, energy system, and political stability have depended heavily on external support that Moscow can no longer guarantee as easily as before.
This creates a paradox. Russia can still use Transnistria to intimidate Chișinău, generate instability, and complicate Moldova’s European integration. However, Moscow must also manage the economic and political costs of supporting a vulnerable enclave that it cannot easily reach.
- How has the strategic importance of Transnistria changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
- Before 2022, Transnistria was often seen as a relatively secure Russian foothold in Moldova and as a potential instrument for projecting influence toward Ukraine’s southwest.
After the full-scale invasion, its position became much more fragile. Ukraine’s control of its border with Transnistria and the absence of a direct land corridor to Russia have sharply reduced Moscow’s ability to reinforce the enclave militarily. Its value as a conventional military platform has therefore diminished.
However, its political and hybrid value remains significant. Transnistria can still be used to generate fear, produce energy crises, encourage separatist narratives, and create uncertainty about Moldova’s territorial integrity. Its strategic role has shifted from being primarily a military foothold to becoming a tool of political disruption and coercive diplomacy.
In other words, Transnistria is less useful as a launching point for conventional operations, but it remains highly relevant as an instrument for keeping Moldova vulnerable.
- Does Russia still have the capacity to open a new front in Moldova, or is it now relying almost entirely on the instruments of hybrid warfare?
- Under current conditions, the opening of a conventional military front in Moldova appears highly difficult. Russia has no direct land connection to Transnistria, while Ukrainian territory separates Russian forces from Moldova. Any serious conventional operation would therefore depend on a major change in the military situation in southern Ukraine.
This does not mean that the military risk should be completely dismissed. Russia’s capacity would increase considerably if it achieved major territorial advances toward Odesa. Nevertheless, in the present context, hybrid warfare is the more realistic and effective strategy.
Russia can influence Moldova at a much lower cost through cyberattacks, disinformation, political financing, vote-buying, energy pressure, and support for destabilising actors. These instruments allow Moscow to weaken the country without crossing the threshold of open war.
The objective is not necessarily to occupy Moldova, but to make it politically divided, institutionally weak, and incapable of completing European integration.
- How do you define hybrid operations, such as cyberattacks, disinformation, energy leverage, and covert political financing? Which of these instruments do you believe poses the greatest threat to Moldova’s stability?
- Hybrid operations are coordinated actions that combine political, economic, informational, technological, and covert instruments to weaken a state without launching a conventional military attack.
Their purpose is often to create confusion, deepen divisions, undermine trust in institutions, and influence political outcomes while allowing the aggressor to deny direct responsibility.
In Moldova, the most dangerous threat is not one single instrument, but the combination of several tools. Disinformation becomes more effective when it is reinforced by economic frustration. Energy pressure becomes more politically damaging when pro-Russian actors exploit it during elections. Covert financing becomes more powerful when it supports media networks, vote-buying, and organised protest.
Among these instruments, I would identify covert political financing and disinformation as the most immediate threats. They directly target the democratic process and can produce political change from within. Energy leverage is also extremely dangerous because it creates the social and economic conditions in which disinformation becomes more persuasive.
The greatest risk is therefore an integrated campaign in which economic pain is transformed into political instability.
- To what extent is the European Union prepared to protect Moldova against such hybrid threats?
- The EU is much better prepared than it was before 2022, but its response remains incomplete.
European institutions now recognise that Moldova is not simply an enlargement candidate but part of Europe’s eastern security perimeter. The EU has provided political support, assistance for institutional resilience, energy diversification, cybersecurity cooperation, and measures against foreign information manipulation and interference.
This is an important change because Brussels increasingly treats hybrid threats as security threats rather than merely domestic political problems.
However, the EU still tends to act reactively. Its financial and technical assistance must be faster, more coordinated, and more visible to Moldovan citizens. Support should include cybersecurity, intelligence cooperation, electoral protection, independent media, judicial reform, energy infrastructure, and the tracing of illicit political financing.
The EU has developed many of the necessary tools, but the real test is whether it can deploy them quickly enough to prevent destabilisation rather than simply respond after a crisis has already emerged.
- Do you believe the EU needs a new, comprehensive strategy toward the countries of the Eastern Partnership?
- Yes. The original Eastern Partnership framework is no longer sufficient for the geopolitical environment created by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The countries of the region now follow very different trajectories. Moldova and Ukraine are pursuing accession, Georgia’s political direction has become more contested, while Armenia and Azerbaijan have their own security and foreign-policy calculations. A single policy framework can no longer address these differences effectively.
The EU needs a differentiated strategy based on each country’s ambitions, vulnerabilities, and reform progress. For states pursuing membership, the EU should combine enlargement with security support, economic integration, energy resilience, infrastructure investment, and democratic protection.
The most important change is conceptual. The Eastern Partnership should no longer be treated mainly as a neighbourhood policy. It should be understood as part of Europe’s broader security strategy. Russia already treats the region geopolitically, and the EU must be able to do the same while remaining faithful to democratic and legal principles.
- How do you assess Romania’s role in this process? Could Bucharest become the main guarantor of Moldova’s European integration and security?
- Romania is already Moldova’s most important European partner. The two countries share deep linguistic, cultural, historical, and social ties, while Romania provides Moldova with a direct connection to the European Union and NATO.
Bucharest can play a central role in supporting energy interconnection, infrastructure, education, administrative reform, economic integration, and diplomatic advocacy within EU institutions. Romania is also particularly well placed to understand Moldova’s internal vulnerabilities and explain its strategic importance to other European governments.
However, Romania cannot become Moldova’s sole security guarantor. Such an approach could be politically sensitive inside Moldova and could be exploited by Russian propaganda, which frequently presents European integration as a project of Romanian absorption.
Romania should therefore act as Moldova’s principal advocate and strategic partner, but within a wider EU framework. Moldova’s security and integration must remain European projects, not merely bilateral Romanian initiatives.
- What would it mean for the security of the Black Sea region if Russia succeeded in destabilizing Moldova or blocking its path toward European integration?
- A destabilised Moldova would create another zone of insecurity close to the Black Sea and directly behind Ukraine’s western flank.
It would increase pressure on Ukraine, particularly in the area surrounding Odesa, and force Kyiv to devote additional attention and resources to a potential threat from the west. It would also create new opportunities for Russian intelligence networks, organised crime, smuggling, political interference, and regional destabilisation.
For the EU, such an outcome would weaken the security of Romania’s eastern border and undermine the credibility of enlargement as a geopolitical instrument. It would show that Russia can prevent neighbouring states from choosing a European future without having to invade them directly.
The wider message would be that frozen conflicts and hybrid pressure remain effective tools for controlling the political orientation of vulnerable states.
- What consequences would such a scenario have for Ukraine, the European Union, and NATO?
- For Ukraine, the consequences would be immediate. A hostile or unstable Moldova would threaten its western rear, complicate the defence of the Odesa region, and create an additional channel for Russian pressure.
For the European Union, it would represent a serious political and strategic failure. Moldova has received candidate status, financial assistance, and repeated promises of European support. If the country were destabilised despite that commitment, the credibility of EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy would be severely damaged.
For NATO, Moldova would not trigger direct collective-defence obligations because it is not a member. Nevertheless, instability would emerge close to Romania, a NATO ally, and would affect the security environment of the Black Sea region. NATO would likely need to strengthen surveillance, resilience, and defensive measures along its eastern flank.
The consequences would therefore extend far beyond Moldova. They would affect Ukraine’s war effort, EU credibility, and NATO’s regional security posture.
- In your view, has Moldova already become a test case for the European Union’s ability to protect democratic countries from Russian influence? If the EU fails in Moldova, what message would that send to the rest of the region?
- Yes, Moldova has already become a major test case.
The country is attempting to reform its institutions and move toward the European Union while facing disinformation, energy coercion, foreign political financing, cyberattacks, and the unresolved presence of a separatist territory supported by Russia.
If Moldova succeeds, the EU will demonstrate that enlargement can protect vulnerable democracies and that Russian coercion does not have the power to permanently block the sovereign choices of neighbouring states.
If the EU fails in Moldova, the message will be to all of Eastern Europe. It would suggest that European promises are insufficient when confronted with sustained Russian pressure. Governments and societies in Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and elsewhere could conclude that moving toward Europe creates risks without providing adequate protection.
Russia, by contrast, would interpret failure as proof that hybrid warfare is effective. It would show that Moscow can stop European integration without occupying a country, simply by exploiting political weakness, social division, and economic vulnerability.
For this reason, Moldova is not a peripheral enlargement case. It is a test of whether the European Union can defend democratic transformation at its eastern frontier.