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We are not at budgetary Waterloo, but we are still a long way from a victorious Austerlitz

There is no immediate financial catastrophe. Nor is there a major economic victory. The budget is more likely to hold the “front” than change the direction of the economy. If you had to assess the 2027 Budg

Nov 20, 2026 13:01 52

We are not at budgetary Waterloo, but we are still a long way from a victorious Austerlitz - 1
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There is no immediate financial catastrophe. Nor is there a major economic victory

The budget is more likely to hold the “front” than change the direction of the economy

If you had to assess the 2027 Budget using a historical metaphor, I would say the following: this is not budgetary Waterloo, as the opposition presents it, but it is certainly not budgetary Austerlitz either, as the finance minister would like to present it.

The budget is not a tragic catastrophe, but neither is it a major breakthrough. It maintains macroeconomic balance mainly through old formulas and old ideas, without offering a convincing mechanism for accelerating production, investment and real incomes.

We are not losing the battle to gradually reduce the budget deficit, but we are not winning the war for higher incomes, investment and competitiveness.

There is no immediate financial catastrophe. Nor is there a major economic victory. The budget is more likely to hold the “front” than change the direction of the economy.

And the most important question is not whether we will make it to the next budget, but whether we will remain richer, more productive and more competitive.

1. The most widely discussed issue: the proposed budget deficit of 3.5%

And since most analysts have been focusing on the budget deficit, let us recall the facts. Bulgaria has had a budget surplus only in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2017, 2018 and 2019 — these are the six years with a positive budget balance since EU accession.

For the entire period since 2007, the largest deficits have been linked to three events: the global financial crisis (2009–2010), the banking crisis surrounding KTB (2014), the COVID-19 pandemic and the latest loosening of fiscal policy (2020–2024). Therefore, the claim that Bulgaria has traditionally been a country with large budget deficits is not entirely accurate. Until the pandemic, the country was among the most fiscally conservative in the EU, with several years of budget surpluses and low public debt.

2. The revenue side: improved, but with many conditions

The revenue side is more ambitious than in 2026. A one-off 33% tax on the profits of certain sectors is envisaged — banks, insurers, telecommunications companies, large food retailers and others. The expected revenue from this measure is around €800 million.

This is an interesting change. The government, which had stated that it would not raise taxes, is nevertheless proposing new taxation. Of course, the finance minister may object that the standard corporate and personal income tax rates are not being changed. But the new tax is still a new tax — albeit a one-off measure targeted at specific sectors. And it is a disguised form of progressive taxation.

This also raises a broader question: why is only the profit of a specific type of company being taxed, rather than addressing the broader issue of tax fairness?

The flat tax remains. The standard rate of 10% on corporate profits and 10% on individuals’ income is being preserved. A person with a monthly income of €1,000 and a person with an income of €500,000 or more (there are already quite a few such people) will continue to be taxed at the same proportional rate. This is a kind of tax democracy: everyone is supposedly equal before the tax, but not everyone is equal when it comes to income.

And this is the great contradiction. The government, which defines itself as progressive, is preserving one of the least progressive features of the tax system.

3. The expenditure side: a fiscal brake for some, a much looser regime for others

This is where the budget becomes more interesting. Let us not forget that €672.80 is the calculated upper limit (ceiling) of Bulgaria’s minimum wage for 2027, determined under the new mechanism (and much-vaunted formula) in the Labour Code, which takes four economic indicators into account (including purchasing power) in August; it is now November, so under this formula it will probably be even higher.

The minimum wage for 2027 (which the government is proposing) is €660, compared with the current €620.20. The nominal increase is €39.80. But we will not see what happens to purchasing power. With annual inflation of 6%, the minimum wage needed to preserve the purchasing power of 2026 is around €657.41. Therefore, at €660, the real increase above inflation is barely €2.59 per month. If inflation reaches 7%, the required amount becomes €663.61. At 8% — €669.82. At 8.6% — €673.54.

Based on 50% of the average gross wage (the former Article 244 of the Labour Code), the minimum wage should become €686 — €26 more than the current proposal.

The new four-component formula is based on data through August 2026, with the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy specifically promoting this maximum of €672.80. In the final analysis, however, when the political and budgetary decision was made at the end of October (Council of Ministers Decree? 235), the cabinet chose not to reach the ceiling of its own formula and to set the minimum wage for 2027 at €660 (€12.80 below the ceiling and around €30 below the old formula) — a classic example of applying a fiscal brake to the lowest labour incomes, while in other periods the regime remains considerably more relaxed.

In other words, there is a nominal increase, but the real result may prove almost imperceptible or even negative. This is the difference between budget arithmetic and the arithmetic of the till at the neighbourhood shop.

Even more concerning is the planned 5% increase in public-sector salaries. With inflation at around 6%, this means a risk of reduced real purchasing power. Of course, the final assessment will depend on actual inflation during the period, but the direction is clear: a nominal increase does not guarantee a real improvement.

There is something paradoxical here: the state expects doctors, police officers, administrators and other public employees to be more progressive and more effective, yet it is not offering an increase in incomes that would certainly preserve their purchasing power.

You cannot seek European-quality public services with Balkan financing and expect European results.

4. The state is shrinking — but is the economy becoming stronger?

Expenditure under the consolidated fiscal programme is expected to fall from 43.5% of GDP in 2026 to 39.6% in 2027, and to 38% in 2029. This is a serious contraction in the relative size of the public sector.

For comparison, in many European countries public spending is around or above 50% of GDP. In the United States, during the second half of the 1980s under Reagan, total public spending at the federal, state and local levels was approximately 33–36% of GDP. The United Kingdom under Thatcher also pursued a policy of restricting public expenditure.

So, if we are looking for a historical analogy, the fiscal philosophy of the progressive government has clear and striking features of Reaganomics and Thatcherism. The irony is that a government claiming to be progressive is choosing a rather conservative fiscal philosophy. But here we must make a distinction: a small state is not necessarily a bad state, just as a large state is not necessarily a good one. The question is what citizens receive in return for public spending and whether the state creates conditions for development.

If we reduce public spending while simultaneously improving the quality of education, healthcare, infrastructure and security — that is one thing. If we simply leave these systems underfunded — that is quite another. It is not enough for the state to “shrink”. The economy must become stronger.

5. The biggest problem: the budget has no clear investment strategy

In my view, the budget’s most significant shortcoming is that it does not provide a sufficiently convincing answer to the question of how we will increase the productivity and competitiveness of the Bulgarian economy. It is not enough to redistribute the existing pool of money. More goods and resources must be created — through production, innovation, technological renewal, education and exports.

If investments are paid for, if the economy continues to rely excessively on consumption, imports and credit, while productivity does not increase sufficiently, then even a well-balanced budget will not solve the structural problems. This is the major difference between a budget that merely manages available resources and one that changes the economic future. The budget should not merely distribute the fruits of growth. It must create the conditions for growth.

6. What is missing from the 2027 Budget?

What is missing is a bolder policy on tax fairness. What is missing is a clear strategy for higher productivity. What is missing is a sufficiently convincing investment plan that would change the structure of the economy. What is also missing is a guarantee that the increase in incomes will outpace inflation.

This does not mean that every proposal for higher spending is reasonable or that every deficit is beneficial. But fiscal discipline must not turn into a fiscal end in itself. We can have low debt and a weak economy. We can have a small budget and underfunded public systems. We can have low taxes and insufficient investment.

My assessment is moderately critical. The budget is not catastrophic. It contains measures to improve revenues and limit the deficit. But nor is it a budget of major progress. How much longer can it be saddled with the meaningless label of “the most socially oriented budget” of all time!? It does not offer a sufficiently convincing change in the model of economic development, while the social system remains unbalanced — with enormous inequality and few prospects for the younger generation.

There is an old economic truth: accounting can show whether the budget is being used. It cannot, by itself, show whether society is moving forward. The budget may be balanced while development is unbalanced. We may reduce the deficit but increase the deficit of the future for young people. And that is why the most important question is not whether the budget will inspire us for 2027 through the fanfare of progress. The question is whether, three years from now, Bulgaria will produce more, invest more, pay better and be more competitive.

For now, the 2027 Budget is not the Great Beautiful March of the Great Victory (GBM-GV). It is more of a “march in place” — in the hope that the spirited music of the progressive orchestra will at least convince people for now that we are moving forward.