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The West Is Right About Ukraine’s Diagnosis, but Wrong About the Treatment

The Western “realists” calling on Ukraine to capitulate simply cannot let go of the past

Nov 19, 2026 23:01 48

The West Is Right About Ukraine’s Diagnosis, but Wrong About the Treatment - 1
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In the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, almost everyone has watched The Irony of Fate - a 1976 romantic comedy in which a Moscow surgeon gets drunk in a public bathhouse on New Year's Eve and eventually ends up on a plane to Leningrad. He gives the taxi driver his Moscow address - “3rd Builders Street” - and arrives in front of an identical apartment building, where his key unlocks the entrance door. This is what Georgian reporter Ani Chkhikvadze writes for Foreign Policy.

“The world the film depicts was once much larger than Russia itself. You could arrive in Kyiv, Tbilisi or Riga and speak Russian; quote the same Soviet films; laugh at the same jokes; and assume that beneath all the flags, languages and newly drawn borders, there was still some common social and cultural space holding everything together.

When Russia set out to restore this world by force, some of its nostalgic talking points, until then confined to state television, found broad support in the West. Tucker Carlson, who has made this a recurring theme on his shows, convinces his audience that Ukraine is weak, corrupt and doomed. Candace Owens traveled to Russia and returned declaring: “They are lying to us about Russia.” Others, such as U.S. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, refuse to support aid for a country defending itself against an invasion.

John Mearsheimer and Noam Chomsky built their long careers around explaining that whatever Russia does, someone else is to blame. Francesca Albanese - the UN special rapporteur - called for an end to arms deliveries to a country fighting an invader.

The left and the right rarely agree on anything, but in this case some of their thinkers arrive at the same position: sooner or later, Kyiv must learn to live with Moscow's demands. Whether it is Owen Matthews writing in The Spectator that Ukraine is losing the war, or Jeffrey Sachs insisting that Kyiv will never join NATO, the same belief lies at the core. For some people shaped by that world, its disappearance is sad. There is something of Anton Chekhov's The Cherry Orchard in them: they are so attached to the estate that they can barely imagine a world beyond it.

Leaving Russia and moving to the West did not always mean abandoning imperial ideas. Joseph Brodsky, persecuted and expelled by the Soviet state, greeted Ukrainian independence with a poem full of insults, in which he imagined Ukrainians on their deathbeds turning to the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin rather than to their own Taras Shevchenko. Pushkin himself, in his poem “To the Slanderers of Russia,” called on Europe not to interfere in what he portrayed as a family quarrel between Slavs during Russia's suppression of the Polish uprising of 1831.

What is striking is how many people who have never lived in this world have reached the same conclusion. These commentators correctly point to Ukraine's problems. Kyiv lacks soldiers, funds and Patriot interceptor missiles; corruption continues to exist; and its allies' declarations far outstrip their actual actions. They are right about the diagnosis, but wrong about the prescribed treatment.

They also exaggerate the threat. Russia is advancing at enormous cost to Ukraine, but if a snail had set out from its starting positions, it would probably have reached parts of today's front line before the Russian forces. Ukraine won the decisive battle for Kyiv, when Moscow's goal was to disarm the country and place it under a Russian-appointed government. Ukraine does not have to retake all its territory to win. If it preserves its sovereignty, security and Western orientation, the broader Russian project will fail. The only real Russian victory is the one these arguments lead to - leaving Ukraine vulnerable and subordinate to Moscow's will.

The worst thing about this so-called realistic approach is the claim that it is in Ukraine's own interest. According to the predictions of these observers, the country was supposed to lose in 2022, and then in every subsequent year. Instead of reconsidering their initial thesis, they simply postpone the deadline and wait for history to vindicate their views.

Even the more serious skeptics acknowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not changed his military aims and that U.S. special envoy Jared Kushner is naive if he believes business deals can lure the Kremlin toward peace. If Putin cannot be persuaded, what exactly should Ukraine negotiate about? Conceding to a man who wants the maximum will only be an initial installment. Georgia learned this the hard way. Its 2008 truce with Russia was followed by Russia's invasion of Crimea, while the Minsk agreements were followed by the full-scale invasion.

Another argument that keeps resurfacing is that the West provoked the war. Mearsheimer and Chomsky describe Russian aggression as a response to a threatening NATO - the supposed existential threat Putin talks about and his Western interpreters helpfully repeat. But Moscow was using military force in Moldova and Georgia as early as the beginning of the 1990s, when NATO enlargement could hardly have served as an excuse. Some call these events ethnic conflicts, but after so many Russian acts of aggression, ignoring reality requires considerable determination. The only power that has invaded other countries in the region is Russia. NATO merely prevents it from doing so.

Running through all of this is an old fatalism, familiar in Russia: Russian power is a constant, Western resolve is fickle, and Ukrainian resistance is doomed. It is called realism, but it is actually pessimism, in which history can change everything except Russia's behavior. This view treats Moscow's wishes as objective reality, and Ukraine's goals as childish aspirations, in the spirit of the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” according to which small states are free to choose, as long as Moscow approves their choice.

Soviet power once appeared just as eternal. In the words of Alexei Yurchak: “Everything was forever, until it was no more.” The Baltic states were told that Russia would never allow them to join NATO. They did not move on the map. Politics and the debate changed because Western governments decided it should happen. Yes, they joined while Russia was weak. That is precisely the point.

If Western policy has failed, it must be changed. If Ukraine lacks air defenses, the solution is to provide it with more air defenses. Pressure on Russia must increase until Moscow understands that the West will not back down and that the war will end in a strategic defeat for Russia even if it captures the rest of the Donbas, which it has no real need for in the first place. This means guaranteeing Ukraine's future security and depriving Moscow of this lever of pressure. Is there already a Western consensus on this issue? No. Let us hope one emerges, because otherwise the problems will end up much closer to home.

Why, then, does this argument keep resurfacing? For some, the reason is such intense hatred of the West that every war becomes a story about American wrongdoing. For others, it is about the audience. Outrage and extreme positions sell well, while Moscow provides a suitable backdrop for a story about the decline of the West. And for quite a few people, the reason is simply their obvious sympathy for Russia - for its strong leader, for its fanaticism presented as tradition, and for its fantasy that it is the Third Rome standing against a decadent West.

For others, the reason is fear. In my mountain village in Georgia, my neighbor - a man named Valeri - says almost the same thing as these commentators, although Valeri deserves more understanding. Russian troops already occupy part of his country, and one morning he may discover that his barn is on the Russian side of the dividing line. When he says that Russia is too big and too dangerous, one can understand him. His foreign policy is the policy of the village bench. But the same worldview, only without the cows, also appears in American television studios and newspapers - among people who know they have more choices.

Whether they repeat this view from Moscow or from the West, these people will discover that postwar Ukraine will be even harder to recognize. Young Ukrainians speak more Ukrainian, consume less Russian culture and understand fewer and fewer of the Soviet references that once spread from Moscow to Mykolaiv. After generations of Russification, rebuilding national consciousness is not an easy task. It may be accompanied by mistakes. But a country bombed in the name of a supposedly common history, preserved at the cost of tyranny and bloodshed, cannot be expected to safeguard that history for the convenience of people who remember it fondly.

Putin may drop more bombs, and probably will, but after almost five years of war it is difficult to imagine Ukrainians deciding that capitulation is the answer. Like other empires, the Russian one will sooner or later collapse - including in people's minds. Along with it will disappear the longing to arrive in Kyiv or Tbilisi and expect one's key to fit the lock.”

* The original title of the article is “Soviet Nostalgia Is a Geopolitical Dead End”

Source: news.bg