The fifth year of the war in Ukraine is not off to a good start for Moscow. Recent Ukrainian successes on the battlefield belie Russian threats that things could get worse the longer Kiev delays capitulation to Russian demands.
The realities on the battlefield as of late February 2026 show that Russian combat successes are not inevitable. Ukrainian forces have recently achieved their most significant battlefield successes since Ukraine’s invasion of the Kursk region in August 2024 and have liberated the largest area of territory within Ukraine itself since the 2023 counteroffensive.
This is according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Ukraine has held onto its gains in Kupyansk since mid-December, despite Russian efforts to reverse them, and current battlefield dynamics do not suggest that Russia will quickly regain territory in the area. Ukrainian forces also launched limited counterattacks in early February 2026, liberating numerous settlements in the Aleksandrovka and Gulyaipole directions in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts.
ISW has seen evidence that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 200 square kilometers in some areas of the Novopavlovka, Aleksandrovka, and Gulyaipole directions, while losing 35 square kilometers in other areas of these three directions over the same period, up from 165 square kilometers in February.
Ukrainian forces continue limited counterattacks in these areas.
Russia has failed to achieve any of its initial military objectives and is facing setbacks on the battlefield amid mounting casualties. Putin began the war in Ukraine four years ago with an unsuccessful attempt to capture Kiev in three days.
Russian forces have also tried and failed to capture Kharkiv; the entire Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson regions; or the Mykolaiv and Odessa regions, among other initial targets of Russian military operations. Russian forces have yet to retake the four regions that Russia illegally annexed in 2022. Putin began the war with the goal of "denazification" of Ukraine - Russian code for replacing Ukraine's democratically elected government with a pro-Russian puppet state.
Ukraine, by contrast, remained committed to holding free and fair democratic elections under its own constitution and laws.
Putin also intended to "demilitarize" Ukraine - reducing the Ukrainian army to such a low level that Ukraine would be unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression. The Ukrainian armed forces are now the second largest and most powerful army in Europe after Russia's and share four decades of combat experience with the West.
Putin's pre-war demands also included that NATO halt its expansion and refrain from deploying weapons to new NATO member states.
Russian actions prompted Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Europe has come together to help Ukraine fight Russian aggression, providing billions in military support and aid, alongside billions provided by the United States.
Ukraine's European allies have also created the Coalition of the Willing, which will deploy peacekeepers to protect the peace agreement in Ukraine.
Putin's pre-war demands included that Ukraine commit to neutrality. Ukraine has not joined NATO, but it has signed several partnerships and agreements with Western countries, including a 100-year agreement with the United Kingdom, and is in talks with the EU to join the bloc.
The challenges facing Russia on and off the battlefield are forcing the Kremlin leadership to make tough decisions to sustain its military effort, as ISW has long predicted it would have to. Russia faces critical recruitment problems. Russia's casualty rate surpassed its recruitment rate in January 2026, after years in which Russia's recruitment rate consistently reached its replacement target levels.
Russia faces problems financing its current recruitment efforts as the Russian government struggles to find funds at both the federal and local levels to continue paying out the large cash incentives it has used to generate the necessary number of volunteers.
Russia's domestic economy is suffering from labor shortages and inflation, and Western sanctions on Russian energy exports have led to a sharp decline in Russia's oil and gas revenues, which form a significant part of the Russian budget.
Russia's growing military and economic problems are forcing Putin to consider how he can continue his war at the current pace. Putin must reassess Russia's force generation mechanisms to determine how Russia can continue to send the number of troops to the front lines needed to sustain the relentless offensive operations he demands.