Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the direction of Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole, but also in the western part of Zaporizhia region. These counterattacks have tactical, operational, and strategic effects that could disrupt Russia’s plan for a spring-summer offensive campaign in 2026.
Russian forces are facing a much more difficult battlefield situation in southern Ukraine in early March than they were in early 2026.
This is commented on by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Ukrainian forces have blocked Russian forces in the direction of Hulyaipole and Aleksandrovka, and Russian forces have been forced to adapt quickly to the communication and command and control problems that arose as a result of the Starlink blockade on February 1.
Ukrainian counterattacks have prevented Russian forces from consolidating the positions they had advanced to in the fall of 2025. The success of Ukrainian forces is due in part to the fact that Russian forces did not follow up on the progress made through Russian penetration tactics, consolidating their newly captured positions.
The infiltration tactic relied on Russian infantry to penetrate Ukrainian rear areas, regroup, and fortify new frontline positions, but Russian forces appear to have attempted to continue their advance without adequately reinforcing themselves, allowing Ukrainian counterattacks.
The ability of Ukrainian forces to take advantage of these Russian mistakes likely deprived Russian forces of the starting offensive positions from which they intended to launch a summer offensive with the unrealistic goal of reaching the city of Zaporizhia.
The Russian command likely hoped that the Russian advance towards Hulyaipole would complement the Russian advance near Orekhov, which in turn would allow Russian forces to advance towards Orekhov from the east and west, and later on the city itself. Zaporizhia.
In early December 2025, ISW assessed that the tactical breakthrough of the Russian 5th Army north and northeast of Khuljaipole could allow Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Khuljaipole and Orekhov directions.
Counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having a strategic effect in other parts of the theater of operations.
Assessments from March 9 indicated that the Dnieper Operational-Strategic Group may have to withdraw units from the Kherson region to help Russian forces in the western part of Zaporizhia region deal with Ukrainian counterattacks.
The cascading effect that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the direction of Oleksandrivka, Khuljaipole and Zaporizhia have caused in other sectors of the front show how limited the Russian military structure in Ukraine actually is.
ISW has already observed reports that Russian forces have been forced to deploy forces from their operational reserve simply to support ongoing combat operations - possibly including in Kupyansk, where Ukraine has conducted a series of successful counterattacks.
On March 7, ISW also assessed that the Russian command has likely redeployed elite airborne and marine units from the Donetsk region to the southern front line, possibly in order to respond to recent Ukrainian successes in the direction of Aleksandrovka and Khulyaypole.
Russia's limited reserves of personnel may hinder the Kremlin's plans in other areas of the theater of operations, as the Russian command's decision to redeploy forces from the Donetsk region to the Zaporizhia region could hinder the expected spring-summer offensive in 2026 against the Ukrainian fortress belt.