The meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington showed that the two largest powers can talk and seek mechanisms to limit tension, but not that they have overcome their fundamental differences. Against the backdrop of demonstrably good relations, trade agreements and intentions for dialogue in the fields of artificial intelligence and military communication, the issues of Taiwan, technological rivalry, rare earth elements and the role of China and the US in global security remained unresolved. Why did Taiwan remain outside the American public reading, what does Xi's warning about the “Thucydides trap“ mean, how far does possible cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence go… Prof. Tatyana Dronzina, a lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Philosophy of Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, and an expert in conflict resolution, spoke to FACTI.
- Prof. Dronzina, after the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Washington, the impression was of a lot of protocol, a lot of demonstration of good relations, but relatively few concrete breakthroughs. What actually happened behind the official facade of this meeting?
- In my opinion, the meeting achieved an important, albeit limited, goal: the two leaders showed that they want to manage the rivalry between them, without allowing it to develop into a direct confrontation. The protocol was part of this message. When relations between two great powers are tense, the ceremony is not just decoration. It allows each side to demonstrate respect for the other without making substantive political concessions.
The publicly announced results are not zero either. There is a continuation of the trade dialogue, an agreement to mutually reduce some of the tariffs, a channel for talks on artificial intelligence, and the intention of the military to strengthen communication in times of crisis. These are practical tools for reducing risk. But none of them solves the main question: how the United States and China will coexist as competing powers in technology, economics, and security. That is why I would define the outcome of the meeting between Trump and Xi as a “managed pause“. The sides are buying time and preserving the opportunity to talk. The differences that could cause the next crisis remain.
- The most significant discrepancy is over Taiwan. The Chinese side reported that Xi asked Trump to oppose Taiwan independence, while in the American reading, Taiwan does not appear at all. How should we interpret this silence of Washington?
- As a carefully chosen diplomatic behavior.
For Beijing, Taiwan is a central issue of identity and sovereignty.
The Chinese side has an interest in showing its own public that it has raised the issue categorically and at the highest level. As we know, Beijing believes that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation“ cannot be completed until Taiwan is annexed. And although the task is not immediate (b.a. - there is no explicit date, but the task is built into the goals for 2035 and 2049), it is on China's permanent agenda. For Washington, publicly reiterating the Chinese demand would create another danger: it could be read as the beginning of a change in the American position, even if such a change has not occurred.
However, silence is not evidence of either agreement or refusal. It only tells us that the American side did not want to include Taiwan among the publicly announced results. If there had been a commitment to change in policy, it would have enormous consequences for Taiwan, for American allies in Asia, and for trust in the United States. For now, there is no reason to claim that such a commitment has been made. The two sides are again speaking to different audiences. Beijing emphasizes its principled demand. Washington is trying to avoid the impression of concession.
- Can we assume that Trump and Xi deliberately left Taiwan out of the public agreements because both sides understand how dangerous it is to reach a specific commitment?
- This is a plausible explanation, but it should remain an analysis, not a confirmed fact. Any overly specific formulation would have a price. If Washington promises something that Beijing considers insufficient, tensions could rise. If it promises more than it is prepared to deliver, it will unsettle Taipei and its partners. Beijing would also not want to publicly present a vague formula as a major victory if it later turns out that American practice remains the same. This explains why crisis communication is so important. The Taiwan Strait is a place where risk arises not only from strategic intentions, but also from the actions of ships and aircraft, from a misread signal, or from domestic political pressure. A military crisis prevention channel would be useful if it actually worked. It would not eliminate political dispute, but it could give time to react before an isolated incident turns into a conflict.
- After the meeting, the US ambassador to China said that Washington's policy towards Taiwan had not changed. What does this mean for Beijing?
- The most direct reading is that Beijing has not received a publicly confirmed change in US policy. The ambassador's statement is intended for both Taipei and US allies, because it aims to reassure them that the protocol warming with Xi does not mean a new course on Taiwan. The US is cautious - mainly because of the cost of a mistake: both excessive firmness and excessive concessions can provoke the war that
Washington wants to avoid.
Therefore, it can be said that American “strategic ambiguity“ is a purposeful policy.
Moreover, the military balance is no longer in the US's favor. Not to mention that about 90% of the most advanced chips are manufactured in Taiwan. However, we cannot rule out talks about specific steps, deadlines or ways to avoid provocations. Diplomacy often works with such clarifications. It would be a mistake to conclude from this general possibility that there is a secret deal on arms supplies or the status of the island. Such a conclusion requires evidence, and the behavior of the countries in the coming months will be more indicative than rumors. Beijing will probably judge the outcome by Washington's actions: whether arms supplies will continue, what the tone of American statements will be, and how the military presence in the region will develop.
- The trade part seems far more specific. Who really has stronger trump cards in this game after Washington?
- Both countries have strong tools, but they act in different ways. The US has a huge market, financial power, control over certain key technologies, and the ability to coordinate restrictions with allies. China has large-scale production, an important position in supply chains, and a particularly strong influence in the processing of critical minerals. When talking about rare earth elements, we need to look at the entire chain – mining, processing, magnets and industrial applications. There, dependencies do not change with a single political declaration.
The agreement on partial tariff reduction is useful because it relieves specific producers and consumers.
But the goods were carefully selected where the political price of compromise is lower. The difficult questions - advanced technologies, sustainable access to critical raw materials and industrial competition - remain. That is why I would not declare a winner. The real test will come in the implementation: what is actually bought, supplied and authorized, when the initial political effect of the meeting has passed.
- You talk about the “Thucydides trap“ and the need to avoid conflict between the US and China. Is this a diplomatic message, a warning or a sign of long-term rivalry?
- All three, but I would start with the last one. The phrase “Thucydides’ trap” draws attention to the risk of war between an established and a rising power. This is not a claim that war is inevitable. On the contrary, the message is that political decisions can prevent such an outcome.
Xi’s words also contain a warning to Washington: if every Chinese action is interpreted as a threat and every American measure as an attempt at containment, the two sides could fall into a series of mutual actions and reactions that neither side fully planned. At the same time, Beijing is using this framework to demand a relationship in which China is treated as an equal participant in the definition of the rules. The personal relationship between Trump and Xi can help at a critical moment, but it cannot cancel out the competition between institutions, economies and military strategies.
- Artificial intelligence has become a new front for rivalry. Is it possible that it could also become a field for cooperation?
- Yes, and this is already evident in the agreement on a dialogue on artificial intelligence and an incident channel. Cooperation is possible where both sides have an interest in limiting a common risk: for example, in dangerous system behavior, in fraud and cyber incidents, or in the use of AI in a military environment, where the speed of decisions can exceed the time for human judgment. But we should not confuse talk of risk with sharing a technological advantage. The US and China will continue to compete for computing power, chips, talent, data and international standards. They may even discuss the safety of the most powerful systems while simultaneously limiting the other side's access to technologies. The difference in language is also indicative. The American reading uses the term super intelligence, while China speaks more generally about artificial intelligence. The next meeting of the dialogue will show whether the channel has a specific agenda or is for now mainly a political signal.
- Iran was also discussed as a topic. Is there a real common ground between Trump and Xi, or just a minimal consensus?
- Rather, a minimal but important consensus. The publicly stated formula is that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons. Agreement on this goal does not mean agreement on how to achieve it. Washington and Beijing may have different positions on sanctions, military pressure, the terms of negotiations, and the regional security architecture.
For China, the stability of international waterways and energy supplies has direct economic importance. For the United States, the Iranian nuclear program is also related to the security of its partners in the Middle East. This creates a point of intersection, but not a common strategy. If China helps maintain a diplomatic channel, this would be a concrete contribution. If the two sides only reiterate a common principle, the effect will remain limited. That is why I would refrain from claiming that Beijing has promised to cut off its aid to Iran unless a clear agreement on a specific subject is presented.
- Is it possible that some of the most important agreements will not be announced publicly, especially on Taiwan, rare earths, arms supplies and Iran?
- It is possible that details were discussed that are not included in the public announcements. This is normal at top-level meetings. Leaders often set the direction, and experts then specify deadlines, procedures and permissible options. Especially on topics such as military communications, publicity may be limited. But there is a difference between a private conversation and a big deal reached in secret. We have no reason to assume the latter just because the former is likely. On Taiwan, for example, a fundamental concession would hardly go unnoticed in subsequent decisions. The same applies to the export of critical minerals: businesses and markets will sense whether licenses and supplies are actually changing. For political analysis, the most useful question is what actions would confirm that more has been achieved than announced. This way, we can test our hypotheses, rather than turning the lack of information into evidence.
- What should we monitor in the coming months to understand whether a new model of relations is beginning, or whether a temporary pause has been achieved?
- First, the implementation of trade agreements. Let's see the exact changes in tariffs, the volume of American exports and the movement of critical raw materials. The signed agreement has value when it starts to change the real behavior of countries and companies.
Second, Taiwan. Decisions on arms supplies, military activity around the Strait, and the way Washington and Beijing respond to individual incidents will be important. If the new military-to-military channel becomes operational and is used in times of tension, it would be a significant sign of better risk management.
Third, the AI dialogue. The next meeting should produce a working agenda and clear contacts in case of an incident, not just a general assurance that the talks are continuing.
Fourth, Iran: will there be concerted diplomatic action, or will the common position remain within the confines of a single sentence.
My conclusion at this point is cautious. The Washington meeting showed that both capitals understand the cost of uncontrolled conflict. That is good news. But a new pattern of relations emerges when rivals build rules that can withstand the next serious dispute. That is what remains to be tested.