The national security strategy of Donald Trump’s second administration states that "the days when the United States upheld the entire world order like Atlas are over". This attitude has shaped much of the administration’s foreign policy over the past two years, and its approach to Europe is no exception. This is what Klaas Mertens and Nairi Woods write for Foreign Affairs.
"In 2025, the United States halted military aid to Ukraine, and in May this year announced that it would withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany. President Donald Trump threatened to seize Greenland — the territory of another NATO member state — and promised to impose tariffs on member states that opposed the move. When the United States and Israel attacked Iran in February, they neither consulted the European powers nor warned them, and Europe was largely left to deal with the economic consequences of the war on its own.
Europe did not remain passive in the face of this pressure. In 2025, it stepped in to fill the gaps left by the United States’ withdrawal from financial support for Ukraine. During the Greenland crisis, European countries, confronted with tariff threats, persuaded Trump to back down by threatening large-scale retaliatory trade measures against the United States. The continent also began deepening other relationships. The EU created a $168 billion defence loan scheme, with Canada becoming its first member outside Europe. Earlier this year, the EU finalised the largest trade agreement in its history — with India — and signed a long-delayed agreement with the South American economic bloc Mercosur.
These measures are an encouraging departure from the bureaucratic indecision for which the EU has often been criticised. But despite European leaders’ newly discovered interest in autonomy, Europe remains dependent on the United States. In fact, some of its efforts to rely on its own capabilities have made it even more dependent on the US. European defence planning, command, nuclear deterrence and systems for supporting military operations still rely on American capabilities. Increased defence spending is leading to the purchase of American weapons. As of 2025, the United States supplied more than half of the EU’s liquefied natural gas imports. Many of the continent’s most promising technology companies continue to move to New York or San Francisco.
This continued dependence, in turn, undermines confidence in Europe among other countries seeking new relationships in security, technology and the economy. For decades, Europe’s offer to these countries was based on the continent’s relationship with Washington. As long as the United States guaranteed European security and welcomed Europe’s integration into the American economy, that offer was attractive. Now, however, as Washington has begun treating both arrangements as subjects for negotiation, it no longer is. The more transatlantic relations weaken, the more Europe needs the export markets, raw materials, defence-industrial capacity and solidarity of other countries against coercive pressure — and the harder it becomes to convince them that it is worth being its partner. Europe needs a better offer, based on its own capabilities rather than those of its unpredictable ally.
European countries have long presented themselves as leaders on issues such as environmental protection, consumer protection and high regulatory standards. To neighbouring countries, Europe offered EU membership and association with the bloc. Beyond the continent, it promised development partnerships and humanitarian aid through the EU and national agencies. Until recently, these terms were attractive: since 2004, 13 countries have joined the EU, while more than 140 countries have received some form of assistance through programmes of the EU or its member states.
The United States maintained the foundational security and economic order that made these offers possible. Countries seeking EU membership could rely on Washington to guarantee Europe’s defence through NATO, while countries outside Europe could rely on a US-led rules-based economic order within which they could easily receive European aid, access European markets and attract European investment.
However, the US withdrawal accelerated the emergence of a more warlike disorder, dominated by the principle that "might makes right" and in which other needs came to the fore. Countries are now seeking security partnerships to strengthen their defence capabilities, stable trade relations to protect them from economic warfare, and financing to offset cuts in aid and rising government borrowing costs.
For example, when Ukraine turned to Europe shortly after 2010, the reason was the prosperity and modernisation promised by economic integration. But Kyiv now needs intelligence and weapons to repel Russia, and Europe can provide them only through the United States. For countries also seeking security assistance and cooperation, dependence on such an inconsistent partner is a disadvantage.
Partners affected by Trump’s tariffs need access to reliable markets where they can export the goods and services previously intended for the United States. Europe, however, has deemed it necessary to protect its own economies rather than open its markets to them. For example, the European Commission significantly increased tariffs on steel and reduced duty-free import quotas, preventing India, South Korea and Turkey from selling on the European market — precisely when these countries were seeking alternatives to the American market.
Other countries need financing for infrastructure and the energy transition. Europe has the financial resources to meet these needs, but its commitments turn into completed projects too slowly. Here, as in the field of security, the US withdrawal has left Europe without a clear direction. For example, the G7’s joint financing packages for building clean-energy capacity in Indonesia, South Africa and Vietnam suffered when Washington withdrew its support in 2025.
Recently, Europe has shown some ability to respond to the challenges. In 2025, the EU member states’ combined annual military spending amounted to approximately $461 billion — less than the United States’ $954 billion, but more than China’s $336 billion and Russia’s $190 billion. When the United States gradually ended its aid to Ukraine in 2025, European governments covered most of the shortfall and have since committed to financing Kyiv’s war effort through 2027. The continent also has an existing defence-industrial base, two permanent seats on the UN Security Council and nuclear forces. Partners immediately outside Europe’s core add further capabilities: Ukraine has a battle-tested army and an innovative drone industry, while Turkey has NATO’s second-largest army and access to the strategically important Black and Mediterranean Seas.
There is also reason for optimism in trade and finance. The 2026 EU-India trade agreement eliminated nearly all tariffs for both sides, reduced non-tariff barriers to trade and facilitated the temporary employment of Indians and Europeans in each other’s markets. The EU’s investment programme, "Global Gateway" — Europe’s response to China’s "Belt and Road" initiative — exceeded its target of mobilising $335 billion ahead of schedule.
These individual successes show that Europe has the potential to offer its partners more attractive terms. Much of this potential, however, remains unrealised.
The Agony of Self-Defeat
Europe has significant resources in security, trade and finance, but lacks the internal cohesion needed to combine them into a comprehensive package that attracts other countries and strengthens its own autonomy. When Europe could rely on US leadership in institutions such as the World Trade Organization and NATO, internal division was less of a problem: American military commanders not only supported European defence but also organised it, while US-backed global trade rules opened foreign markets to European exports and reduced the need to negotiate bilateral agreements. Without that leadership, the continent must overcome its internal fragmentation on its own.
Nowhere is this fragmentation more visible than in security. European leaders committed to improving the continent’s defence in response to Washington’s uncertainty about NATO, but defence budgets, industries and armed forces remain primarily national. When governments prioritise negotiating the most advantageous deals for local companies and other interest groups, conflicts arise: joint projects fail, purchases are duplicated, and redundant research and development efforts waste valuable resources. Ultimately, these frustrations led the continent simply to buy more American systems. The EU’s "Security Action for Europe" programme aims to reverse this trend by financing joint purchases of European equipment by member states. But loans alone will neither overcome disputes over the distribution of benefits and costs nor create common command structures, standards and logistical systems.
Europe negotiates its trade agreements with one voice. Many of them, however, must be ratified in each individual country, leaving them at the mercy of local lobbies — from farmers to car companies — seeking to protect their own markets at the expense of the continent’s common interest. For example, more than a decade after Canada and the EU negotiated the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, it has been ratified by only 17 of the EU’s 27 member states. The 2026 trade agreement with Mercosur, prepared over decades, was immediately challenged politically and legally by individual member states and their representatives in the European Parliament.
In finance, Europe does not suffer from a lack of funds, but channels them through a complex system of EU instruments, member-state agencies, development banks and constantly changing flagship initiatives. Partners must navigate this maze of funding sources, each with its own procedures, timelines and conditions. In Ghana, for example, Europe is present through EU programmes, member-state development agencies, the European Investment Bank and Global Gateway initiatives. When Trump administration cuts to the US Agency for International Development affected Accra, a better-coordinated Europe could have made its funding more visible, accessible and politically reliable.
Many of these challenges predate the US withdrawal. But they did less damage to Europe’s relations with other countries while Washington maintained an imperfect but generally secure global order. Now, however, with US leadership no longer part of Europe’s offer, these problems are becoming far more significant for potential partners.
Help Yourself
The United States is not the only great power to have turned control over critical niches into a means of applying pressure. Beijing and Moscow have also used their dominant positions in key industries to coerce other countries. Europe’s problem is that its efforts to reduce its vulnerability to critical dependencies on Russia and China too easily increase its dependence on the United States. Abandoning Russian pipeline gas means buying American energy. Securing rare earth elements outside Chinese supply chains means cooperating with Washington in the exploration of critical minerals. For example, when Beijing used demand for French cognac as a means of pressure in October 2024, imposing tariffs on the drink, the industry’s best alternative was the American market — until the Trump administration imposed its own tariffs. A more attractive offer to other partners must be built on economic ties and capabilities that do not depend on US commitments.
To make such an offer, Europe must first reduce its dependence on American defence guarantees and equipment, seeking to become a more equal partner within NATO. Although Europe is unlikely to replace the United States as the global security guarantor, it must be able to offer third countries viable security partnerships, sustainable deterrence in its neighbouring regions and the ability to act in a coordinated manner when American priorities change.
It can begin by working more quickly and effectively with its current friends. Since 2022, Poland has purchased South Korean tanks, howitzers, aircraft and multiple-launch rocket systems; more recent agreements go beyond off-the-shelf equipment purchases and provide for technology transfers that allow production, servicing and repairs to be carried out in Poland. Japan joined Italy and the United Kingdom in developing next-generation combat aircraft through the three countries’ contractual Global Combat Air Programme. The EU-India security and defence partnership, signed in January 2026, provides a framework for cooperation in maritime security, emerging technologies and the defence industry. Europe should build on this approach by using its partners’ strengths for the benefit of both their own security and its own.
Europe’s dependence, however, extends far beyond security. Europe has the scale, capital, universities, industrial base and regulatory capacity needed to be a technological power. But a shortage of later-stage funding, fragmented product markets and a lack of sufficient specialised talent and computing capacity have too often prompted European entrepreneurs — including the founders of such leading technology companies as Hugging Face, Arm and Wise — to create, expand or list their companies in the United States.
These companies could be persuaded to remain in Europe if they could rely on investment and a genuinely unified market. At present, however, only a negligible percentage of European pension-fund assets is invested in venture capital. The EU has announced a number of initiatives to increase venture-capital funding, but still has nothing comparable in scale to the largest American funds. The more difficult tasks are integrating capital markets, reducing regulatory differences between member states and removing barriers to cross-border investment and trade. A pan-European financial system and consumer market would make investment more attractive and keep the continent’s most promising innovators at home, rather than forcing them to cross the Atlantic in search of funding and customers. A competitive technology ecosystem would give Europe not only control over the leading technologies it creates, but also the ability to offer its partners a viable alternative to the American innovation ecosystem.
Europe must also reduce its dependence on energy and raw materials. As the war in Iran showed, exposure to volatile fossil-fuel markets can harm economies that rely on them excessively. The International Energy Agency notes that renewable energy has partly shielded European economies from truly catastrophic fossil-fuel price shocks. But the risk of shortages of refined petroleum products, especially diesel and aviation fuel, is a daily reminder that the continent continues to rely on imports over which it has no control.
Integrated energy markets offer a way to ensure that dependence does not force Europe to sharply alter its foreign policy. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Germany, which had imported more than half of its gas from Russia in 2021, initially opposed an embargo on Russian oil and gas before changing its position in May of the same year. When Russian gas supplies subsequently stopped, Berlin avoided shortages and a more severe economic crisis largely thanks to other European countries, which provided emergency supplies. The continent appears to have drawn the right lessons from this case: the European Commission’s 2026 work programme, its annual legislative plan, explicitly commits to building a "genuine energy union" by modernising electricity grids and removing cross-border bottlenecks. The more resilient Europe’s energy system becomes, the more reliable a partner it will be.
As for raw materials, Europe has little chance of achieving self-sufficiency. The European Commission’s planned Critical Raw Materials Centre will collect market information, coordinate joint purchases and facilitate stockpiling. But measures focused solely on demand cannot secure the raw materials the continent needs. Europe could begin building a global network of partner countries by creating conditions for investment in mines and refineries in Africa, North and South America, and Asia. Since mines, processing facilities and infrastructure for transporting their output require long-term planning and prices are volatile, joint action could make projects more attractive to finance and less risky, while also guaranteeing a market for the minerals produced.
Finally, Europe needs the ability to hit back when China or the United States threaten to strangle it by restricting access to critical resources or markets. Europe’s response to US threats to impose tariffs showed how difficult it can be for the European powers to agree on retaliatory measures. But Europe has a powerful tool. In 2023, it created the Anti-Coercion Instrument — a package of economic countermeasures, including tariffs, restrictions on imports or exports, and limits on access to EU public procurement, foreign direct investment and intellectual property rights. In practice, it allows European countries to weaponise other countries’ dependence on economic relations with them. A global version of this instrument, bringing together the resources of partners outside Europe to take stronger joint countermeasures, would not solve all the problems of Europe and its partners, but could quickly turn some of Europe’s strongest advantages into a partnership offer with real security benefits.
A New World, New Friends
Europe’s relations with the United States were based on shared values, mutual dependence and reciprocity. They allowed European countries to focus on rebuilding their economies after the Second World War and on establishing institutions to prevent future wars on the continent. The upheavals of the past two years have shown that Europe took the benefits of those relations for granted. Today, the continent faces threats different from those of 80 years ago and can no longer assume that the United States will come to its aid. Instead of mourning the loss of its partner in Washington, Europe must find new partners by recognising a different form of mutual dependence: most countries have little chance of resisting coercive pressure from great powers if they act alone.
Building these new relationships to reduce Europe’s dependence on the United States does not mean completely excluding Washington. Both sides continue to benefit from security cooperation through NATO, from continued trade and investment, and from an integrated international financial system. Cooperation with the United States will remain valuable, but it will no longer be indispensable. Europe will be able to negotiate better terms with the Trump administration and its successors if it negotiates from a position of strength, backed by more diverse partnerships.
These partnerships will not emerge overnight. Nor will a new coalition immediately become a unified strategic actor. But a better European offer will set this coalition on the right path. As with all important endeavours, the hardest part is taking the first step".
* The original title of the article is "Europe’s Credibility Gap" (Europe"s Credibility Gap)
Source: news.bg