Ukraine is most likely also fighting Russia in the Sahara. According to an investigation by the American media outlet CNN from September 2026, around 15 Ukrainian drone specialists are assisting Tuareg rebels in northern Mali. Their common enemy is the military government in Bamako and its Russian allies. But how reliable is this information? And what price could Kyiv pay for its military involvement in Africa?
Marta Oliinyk-D'omochko, coordinator of the African Studies Programme at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in the Ukrainian capital, sees a clear strategic motive: “Ukraine’s main interest is to weaken Russia’s influence globally,” she told DW. If Russia’s military presence is limited, the economic benefits Moscow derives from it will also decline.
Russian historian Irina Filatova, an honorary professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, considers it plausible that Ukraine is supporting the Tuareg movement, although she has no independent evidence of this.
Old suspicions
Kyiv’s presumed partners are highly controversial: the separatist "Front for the Liberation of Azawad“ (Front de libération de l'Azawad - FLA) cooperates with the jihadist group JNIM, which is part of the al-Qaeda network. The Tuaregs justify their resistance by saying that they need to protect the local population from repression and attacks by government forces and Russian mercenaries.
As early as July 2024, DW reported on the possible involvement of Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (HUR) in an ambush targeting fighters from the Russian mercenary group „Wagner“ in northern Mali. At the time, HUR spokesman Andrii Yusov said that the separatist Tuaregs had received information necessary for their attack. Ukraine denied any direct involvement in the fighting.
In the attack, fighters from the Kremlin-linked „Wagner“ group and Malian soldiers suffered heavy losses. A jihadist group linked to „al-Qaeda“ also claimed to have taken part in the operation. CNN’s investigation raises the question of whether the war between Russia and Ukraine is also being waged on African soil.
Hints from Kyiv, but no confirmation
Suspicion was further fuelled by a post by Kyrylo Budanov on the X platform. The former head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, who is now chief adviser to President Volodymyr Zelensky, wrote on 7 September that Ukrainian intelligence protects the country’s interests all over the world – “from Russia to Africa, both among the hot sands of the desert and among the ice of Antarctica”.
Budanov did not explicitly mention Mali. CNN, however, reports that a Ukrainian group of around 15 people had, according to reports, assisted the rebels, including by helping them use drones. It remains unclear whether this assistance was limited to training and technical advice or also included intelligence sharing and the coordination of attacks.
DW sent an inquiry to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) asking whether personnel had been sent to Mali, whether the political leadership had authorised such a mission and what measures had been taken to prevent the rebels there from deriving indirect benefits from Ukrainian support. We did not receive a specific response – a spokesman merely said that information would be provided at a later stage. The question of possible Ukrainian involvement therefore remains open.
Why Mali matters to Kyiv
Following the military coups in 2020 and 2021, Mali has increasingly distanced itself from its Western partners and turned towards Russia. The „African Corps“ replaced the „Wagner“ group. Moscow is seeking to consolidate its influence in the Sahel and establish itself as a reliable security partner. According to Ulf Laessing, head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Syria and Iraq programme, Russia continues to expand its activities in Africa. The „African Corps“ uses Syria and Libya as stopovers for flights from Russia – for refuelling, cargo handling and other purposes – in support of its operations on the continent.
From Ukraine’s perspective, putting pressure on Russian forces in Africa makes sense. In this regard, Filatova says that “the Ukrainians see Russian troops as legitimate targets wherever they are in the world”. Possible setbacks in Mali could tie up Russian resources and damage Moscow’s reputation as a security partner, she adds. Cooperation with the Tuaregs, however, is not a comprehensive alliance, Oliinyk-D'omochko stresses. The FLA separatists do not want to overthrow the government in Bamako, but seek self-determination or broad autonomy in the northern part of the country. The expert describes Ukraine’s relationship with them as an alliance of convenience: “It is more a situational alliance against a common enemy than any kind of comprehensive alliance.”
The uncertain alliance with the jihadists
The FLA is fighting for independence in the predominantly Tuareg-populated north of Mali. The jihadists of JNIM, meanwhile, follow an Islamist agenda and are linked to „al-Qaeda“. Both groups oppose the military government and its Russian allies, but pursue different goals. Possible support for the FLA would not prove that Ukraine directly supports JNIM. The jihadists could, however, benefit indirectly if they conduct joint operations with the Tuaregs or gain access to military knowledge and equipment. Their cooperation has historical roots. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, armed Tuareg fighters began fighting in Mali for an independent state. In this process, separatist ambitions became intertwined with the interests of Islamist movements.
For Kyiv, this also entails political risks. In many African countries, the Tuaregs are perceived as separatists. Consequently, any cooperation with them could create the impression that Ukraine is interfering in another country’s internal affairs.
Serious accusations, but no evidence
Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso accuse Ukraine of supporting armed groups and threatening the territorial integrity of their countries. The three countries – all governed by military governments – severed diplomatic relations with Kyiv and deepened their cooperation with Russia.
In September, Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop accused Ukraine at the United Nations of supporting terrorist and criminal groups. These claims require independent verification, because the governments in question have a political interest in legitimising their partnership with Moscow and portraying Kyiv as a destabilising factor.
What would the price be?
Ukraine’s engagement in Mali could give it a relatively inexpensive tool for weakening Russian interests outside Europe. A small team of specialists could train local fighters and improve their skills in using drones.
Nevertheless, such cooperation with the FLA carries political risks. Since the Tuareg separatists cooperate with the JNIM group, which is part of „al-Qaeda“, Kyiv could be accused of indirectly supporting Islamist fighters. And this would not strengthen Ukraine’s ties with African countries.
Authors: Antonio Kashkaysh | Ihor Burdyha