The covert surveillance of magistrates, the lack of transparency and the suspicions of systematic abuse of special intelligence means once again call into question the independence of the judiciary. A disturbing picture is revealed to the public - hundreds of authorizations for the application of SRC against judges, prosecutors and investigators, without a clear connection to real criminal proceedings. Against this background, serious questions arise: are these tools used to investigate crimes or as a mechanism for pressure and control? And who actually holds the key information that can shed light on what is happening in the system… Lawyer Adela Kachaunova, Director of the Legal Protection Program of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, spoke to FACTI.
- Ms. Kachaunova, your analysis shows that over 200 permits have been issued for the use of CPC against magistrates – what does this scale mean for the state of the judicial system?
- Πp the total composition of the judiciary of about 4200 magistrates with 251 registered cases of application of CPC, which means that 6%, or every 17 – you, from judges, prosecutors and investigators were the object of secret observation. For comparison, the probability of a magistrate being interrogated or investigated is over 1500 times higher than for the average Bulgarian citizen.
It is clear from the available data that the largest share of decisions on CPC belongs to KΠKOHΠI/KΠK – a total of 134 for the period under review, and the second is that of the Appellate Specialized Procuracy (ACpΠ). – a total of 57. The year with the most decisions was 2020 – a total of 62, all at the requests of the KΠKOHΠI and ACpΠ. The closure of the specialized courts and procuracy in 2022 caused a sharp change in the data – in 2022 there were barely 5 decisions for the CPC, and after the creation of the KΠK in 2023, the reverse growth of decisions began. Although the KΠK was created at the end of 2023, it managed to achieve 9 decisions for its short existence. Πin 2025, all decisions were at the request of the KΠK - a total of 13. In 2024, there is no data on the use of CPC against magistrates. The lack of requests for CPC against magistrates in 2024 (according to information from the Court of Appeals – Sofia) is a precedent. The connection between the murder of Bozhanov, the subsequent revelations and the reorganization in the structures of the prosecutor's office is more than likely. This “silence” However, it does not solve the problem of already accumulated data.
The use of CPC against magistrates carries the risk of affecting the independence of the judiciary. Magistrates must make decisions only on the basis of the law and the facts, without external pressure or fear. If CPCs are used against them, especially without serious grounds, this may force them to reconsider or to take decisions under pressure. It is necessary to know whether the decisions on CPCs were lawful, motivated and whether there were any abuses.
CPCs are legally permissible only for the investigation of serious crimes and on the condition that the data cannot be collected in any other way. If it is used unlawfully, inadequately or on a large scale, it is a violation of the rights of magistrates and potentially of the rights of the citizens whose cases they are investigating.
- How do you explain the fact that with so many special intelligence means used, there are not many subsequent criminal proceedings?
- The number of criminal proceedings for 10-year studies shows a serious discrepancy between the number of SRS used and criminal proceedings. The number of criminal proceedings is a total of 32 against 251 cases of SRS used. Most of these proceedings were concluded at an early stage and only a few magistrates were convicted. Moreover, the collected data do not indicate whether secret surveillance methods were used for these 32 criminal proceedings.
- The analysis indicates that not only wiretapping was used, but also penetration into homes and tracking - does this not exceed the limits of what is permissible in a state governed by the rule of law. What are the risks to the independence of magistrates when they are subject to such mass surveillance?
- The mass use of SRS against magistrates outside criminal proceedings creates a systemic risk of the judiciary becoming hostage to compromising dependence, in which personal information is used for informal blackmail and political pressure. This mechanism violates the fundamental principle of the separation of powers, as it allows structures of the executive branch and the prosecutor's office to exercise covert influence on the internal convictions of judges, provoking self-censorship and fear. We should not forget that prosecutors themselves have also been the subject of secret surveillance, which helps the Prosecutor General and his uncontrolled power over his subordinates - this way the outcome of a specific investigation that a given prosecutor is working on can be controlled.
When surveillance is used for career settling of scores or disciplinary prosecution instead of for the detection of crimes, it produces the so-called “chilling effect“ on the entire system, eroding the right of citizens to an independent and impartial court.
When magistrates are not independent, the risks are transferred to every citizen who relies on their case to be resolved impartially.
- Is it possible that these SRCs were used not to investigate crimes, but for pressure or collection of compromising material, as suggested in the analysis?
- Not only is it possible, but this conclusion is required by the disproportion between the number of SRCs and the number of criminal proceedings. The data collected from SRCs, when they are used outside of criminal proceedings, are stored indefinitely in the body that requested them. The bodies that have made the most requests are the Anti-Corruption Commission in its various transformations over the years and the specialized criminal prosecutor's office. Currently, all this data is stored in the State Security Service (SSS) and the Prosecutor's Office. It is these bodies that have leverage over magistrates.
- Is this a State Bank of Compromise?
- This is a good definition. Even if there is nothing alarming about the personal life of a particular magistrate in this data, the feeling of fear that at any moment the judge or prosecutor may be monitored is particularly unpleasant and creates an atmosphere in which one cannot work calmly.
- So institutions such as the National Security Agency (NSA), the Directorate for the Prevention of Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Commission are key in this process, but who is responsible for any possible abuses?
- The chronic problems with secret surveillance in Bulgaria are no longer just procedural shortcomings, but an “innate defect” of the system, which systematically puts us in conflict with European standards of humanity and law. To break the vicious circle described in the case law of the Strasbourg Court, we need not cosmetic changes but a radical institutional transformation in two directions:
-- Real guarantees against abuse: The rules on CPR must be rewritten to put an end to the current fictitious accountability. It is necessary to create a supervisory body with real powers to monitor the legality of each recording - from the moment it is planned to its final deletion. This is the only way to neutralize the risk of magistrates being monitored by those they are theoretically supposed to control.
-- Eliminating the compromising bank: The state must introduce an uncompromising regime for the destruction of all data that has not led to real charges in court.
As long as shadowy archives with materials from the SRC exist, they will act as a tool for the covert subjugation and discipline of inconvenient judges/prosecutors. Removing these arrays is a mandatory condition to stop the use of information as a lever for behind-the-scenes administration of justice.
- Once this information has been handed over to the National Security Agency, do you expect real consequences - investigations, sanctions or changes in practices?
- I see the National Security Agency as part of the problem. This is a closed structure over which there is almost no control, and in addition, each political authority appoints its own leadership within it.
- We have a shake-up at the top of the prosecutor's office. Do you expect any real development of everything you have handed over in the responsible institutions?
- Every change at the top of the prosecutor's office brings with it increased public expectations, but experience teaches us that personal shake-ups rarely lead to systemic changes if they are not accompanied by a new philosophy of work. The real litmus test for whether there is a real will to develop the data we have presented is not the statements, but the fate of the “information arrays“ and the files on the landmark cases.
If the new leaders continue the practice of “freezing“ inconvenient investigations or use the data collected with the SRC for internal institutional pressure, then we will simply have changed the faces, but not the model. For real progress to be made, institutions need to move beyond the "checking the check" mode and move towards concrete actions: transparent review of the SRCs used against magistrates and a clear distinction between criminal prosecution and political profiling. I am not optimistic at the moment.