The decision of the European Parliament and the subsequent disputes over the formulations of the Macedonian language and Macedonian identity have once again put the relations between Sofia and Skopje in the spotlight. Is the debate often conducted more on a political and symbolic level than within the framework of the real criteria for membership in the European Union... Elise Bernhard speaks to FACTI – Doctor of Public Law, Professor of European Law and Head of the Department of Geopolitics at ESSEC, Associate Researcher at the University of Versailles and Member of the Board of Directors of Hermès at the CNRS.
- Ms. Bernard, the European Parliament did not remove from the report on North Macedonia the texts related to the “Macedonian language“ and “Macedonian identity“. Do you think this is a return to a more neutral European approach or does it represent a political compromise under pressure from Bulgaria?
- The premise of the question is somewhat misleading because it attributes to the European Parliament a level of authority that it does not actually possess in the process of enlargement of the European Union. The European Parliament's reports on candidate countries are political instruments for assessment and recommendations, not legally binding acts. They express a position but do not determine the course of accession negotiations, which remain primarily in the hands of the Member States within the Council of the EU.
From this perspective, the inclusion or retention of references to the “Macedonian language“ and “Macedonian identity“ should not be interpreted as a decisive change in the EU's approach. Rather, it reflects the internal dynamics of the European Parliament itself, where different political groups and national sensitivities interact with each other. Such formulations are often the result of compromise within the institution, rather than a clear strategic signal from the European Union as a whole.
At the same time, it would be oversimplified to present this solely as the result of Bulgarian pressure.
While the bilateral disputes between Bulgaria and North Macedonia affect the broader context of enlargement, the European Parliament generally strives to maintain a balanced and forward-looking approach that supports the country’s European perspective while taking into account existing sensitivities. Ultimately, this episode illustrates a broader structural feature of the EU enlargement process – the tension between political symbolism, national narratives and the legal and institutional framework. The decisive arena remains the Council of the EU, where member states can exercise veto power and where issues of identity and language can have far more concrete consequences.
- In Skopje, the decision was perceived as a diplomatic defeat. Is there a risk that such developments will increase Euroscepticism in North Macedonia?
- The definition of this case as a “diplomatic defeat“ should be viewed with caution. The European Parliament report is not a decision-making tool in the accession process, but a political assessment that does not change the legal trajectory of the negotiations. Therefore, its immediate impact on North Macedonia's membership prospects is very limited.
Nevertheless, perceptions matter. In a candidate country like North Macedonia, where the accession process is already a long and politically sensitive one, even non-binding signals from European institutions can be interpreted domestically as a sign of support or obstruction.
This creates an opportunity for various political actors to use the situation to support their own messages, including more Eurosceptic positions.
However, it is important to remember that the members of the European Parliament, elected by European citizens, are primarily focused on the key accession criteria - the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the protection of fundamental rights and democratic standards. Their reports usually reflect these priorities, and do not aim to arbitrate bilateral disputes over identity.
There is therefore a risk of increasing Euroscepticism, but it stems more from political interpretations at the national level than from the substance of the European Parliament's position. Decisive for public trust in the accession process remain its predictability, consistency and fairness, guaranteed by the Member States within the Council of the EU.
- For years, the dispute between Sofia and Skopje has revolved around history and identity. Can the European Union really be an arbiter on such issues, or are they by definition outside its competence?
- The European Union was not created to be an arbiter on historical or identity disputes, and such issues are largely outside its institutional competence. The EU is an international organisation based on voluntary accession - states apply for membership on their own political decision and accept the values and legal order of the Union. From this perspective, the EU has no mandate to determine which national identity or historical narrative is more legitimate.
Questions of language, identity and historical interpretation are deeply political and national in nature, and the Union is neither equipped nor empowered to address them.
What the EU can do is to monitor whether candidate countries fulfil the conditions for membership. This includes the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights, good neighbourly relations and compliance with the Union's objectives. In practice, this means that bilateral disputes should not undermine regional stability or the functioning of the accession process.
It is also important to underline that the EU does not operate on the principle of a historical hierarchy between states. Older members do not have greater legitimacy than newer ones or candidates. The Union is built on the principle of equality between states, and membership depends on the fulfilment of common criteria, not on historical claims. In this sense, the role of the EU is not to resolve identity disputes per se, but to create a framework in which they do not hinder cooperation, legal convergence and integration.
– Has North Macedonia’s European integration process become hostage to historical and national narratives, rather than being guided by the real membership criteria?
- It is understandable why this perception is gaining popularity, especially given the visibility of bilateral disputes in the public debate. Issues related to history and identity tend to attract political attention and extensive media coverage, which can create the impression that they dominate the entire accession process.
However, this does not fully reflect the way in which the process actually functions. EU accession continues to be based primarily on the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular on strengthening the rule of law, judicial reforms, administrative capacity and harmonisation with European Union law. It is these elements that determine the concrete progress in the negotiations.
In this sense, issues of national identity are not part of the membership criteria.
They can influence the political environment surrounding the process, especially at the level of Member States in the Council of the EU, but they do not constitute the official indicators by which a candidate country is assessed.
Therefore, instead of saying that the process has become “hostage“ to historical narratives, it is more accurate to note that there are two parallel dynamics: a legal and technical process based on objective criteria, and a political layer in which bilateral sensitivities can influence the pace or atmosphere of the negotiations. The key issue is that the former remains the guiding framework of the enlargement policy.
It is also important to underline that the European Union does not operate on the principle of a hierarchy between states based on historical seniority. Older member states do not have greater legitimacy than newer members or candidate countries. The Union is built on the principle of equality between states, and accession depends on the fulfillment of common criteria, not on historical priority or advantage.
– After the decision of the European Parliament, can we talk about a change in the attitudes of the leading European political families regarding Bulgaria's arguments and concerns?
- It would be a stretch to interpret this case as evidence of a broader shift in the positions of the main European political families towards the Bulgarian perspective. The European Parliament does not function as an institution with a unified position on such issues, and its internal dynamics reflect multiple political priorities rather than a coordinated geopolitical line.
Positions in the Parliament are usually formed less around national arguments and more around the basic principles of individual political groups.
Some MEPs emphasize the credibility and pace of enlargement, others on the rule of law, the fight against corruption, social standards or broader strategic issues such as stability and security at the EU's external borders.
In this context, a candidate country like North Macedonia is assessed through different prisms.
Support or reservations are often related to the extent to which a country is perceived to meet these political priorities, rather than an automatic acceptance or rejection of the historical or identity arguments of a particular member state. Of course, individual MEPs may be sensitive to national narratives or bilateral issues, but this does not necessarily mean a lasting or consistent change at the level of entire political families. Rather, we observe a set of individual positions shaped by ideological preferences, institutional roles and strategic views on the future of enlargement as a whole.
– Do you see an external geopolitical influence on the relations between Bulgaria and North Macedonia – including from Serbia, Russia or other regional players who would have an interest in delaying the European integration of the Western Balkans?
- At this stage, there is no clear and publicly proven evidence that external factors such as Serbia or Russia are directly shaping the dynamics of the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Although references to external influence are often made in political and media discourse, such claims should be approached with caution unless they are supported by reliable and detailed evidence, for example from national security services.
More generally, this issue should be viewed through the prism of strategic interests. Rather than automatically assuming external interference, it is more appropriate to ask what each individual factor would specifically gain from delaying North Macedonia’s accession. For EU Member States, including Bulgaria, enlargement policy is often shaped by a combination of domestic political considerations, bilateral relations and different visions of the future of the Union.
The same logic applies to regional and global players. It is sometimes argued that powers such as Russia could benefit from a slower or more unstable process of European integration in the Western Balkans, but such claims should be supported by concrete evidence and should not be accepted as a universal explanation for complex political processes.
Finally, an often overlooked aspect is the perspective of the European Union itself. Enlargement depends not only on the readiness of the candidate countries, but also on the political will of the existing Member States and on what benefits or risks they see in further integration. It is this domestic dimension that is essential for understanding the pace and direction of the process, but is rarely discussed openly in the public debate.
– To what extent does the issue of the inclusion of Bulgarians in the Constitution of North Macedonia remain the key test of Skopje's political will to continue on the European path?
- The inclusion of Bulgarians in the Constitution of North Macedonia should not in itself be understood as a formal requirement imposed by the European Union. The EU does not prescribe the specific content of national constitutions. Its interest is not whether a constitution has a certain form - written or unwritten - but whether the domestic legal order as a whole complies with European standards, especially with regard to the protection of fundamental rights and minorities.
From this perspective, it is important for the EU that no national minority is subjected to discrimination and that effective legal guarantees exist for its protection.
How a state chooses to organize these guarantees - through the constitution or through legislation - in principle remains within its sovereign choice.
However, the issue has acquired political significance, as it was raised by Bulgaria as part of the framework of the accession process. In practice, this makes it a condition that influences the progress of the negotiations not because it stems directly from EU law, but because enlargement ultimately depends on the unanimity of the Member States. The constitutional change can therefore be presented as a “test of political will”, but this definition reflects political dynamics between the states rather than a strict legal requirement of the Union. It shows once again the dual nature of the accession process – formally based on rules, but at the same time influenced by intergovernmental negotiations and national interests.
– Do you think that after this decision of the European Parliament Bulgaria is in a stronger diplomatic position within the EU on the subject of North Macedonia?
- It can hardly be argued that a report by the European Parliament in itself significantly strengthens Bulgaria's diplomatic position within the EU on this issue. Parliament does not participate in the decision-making on enlargement; its resolutions are political signals, not an instrument for influencing intergovernmental negotiations.
In practice, the decisive arena remains the Council of the EU, where member states act unanimously. Bulgaria does indeed have the ability to block progress, like any other member state. But this ability is not unique and does not automatically translate into broader diplomatic power. Bulgaria has a veto right, but this does not mean a stronger position in the EU towards North Macedonia.
Decision-making in the EU is based on reciprocity and balance.
The ability of a state to use its veto right in one context must always be assessed against the ability of other member states to use a similar instrument in other negotiations. For this reason, blocking power does not always mean strategic advantage, as it can also carry political costs and compromises.
Therefore, rather than showing a significant strengthening of the position, the current situation rather illustrates the limits of unilateral influence in the EU system, where real impact ultimately depends on coalition building and the ability to link national priorities to a broader European consensus.
– How do you assess the policy of the current leadership in Skopje? Is it seeking a real solution to the disputes with Sofia, or is it rather using the conflict for internal political mobilization?
- The current leadership in Skopje should not be reduced to a single political motive. On the one hand, there are real political forces in North Macedonia that continue to see membership in the European Union as the best path to strengthening democracy, the rule of law and institutional reforms. On the other hand, the government operates in a highly polarized environment, in which the dispute with Sofia may also serve domestic political purposes.
The real question is therefore not whether Skopje is “serious“ or “manipulative“ in an absolute sense, but rather which political factors dominate at a given moment.
Some clearly support EU accession because they see it as the best framework for reforms, others may accept continued candidate status because it carries fewer immediate commitments while retaining access to the benefits of EU engagement, and still others remain committed to more nationalist or more exclusive political narratives.
For this reason, I would avoid presenting the issue as a choice between two extremes. The more accurate answer is that the political leadership of North Macedonia includes or is influenced by several different political logics, and the challenge is to distinguish them, rather than assuming that there is a single and coherent strategy.
– If the current confrontational rhetoric between Sofia and Skopje continues, how do you imagine the relations between the two countries in a few years? Do you expect a breakthrough towards European integration, or is it more likely that we will witness a new freeze in the process?
- If the current confrontational rhetoric between Sofia and Skopje continues, I would expect relations between the two countries to remain tense and the accession process to remain politically fragile. A breakthrough is only possible if the issue ceases to be seen as a purely bilateral dispute and if a stronger collective will emerges among EU member states to resolve it. For now, however, such a broader political will does not seem to exist. Therefore, in the short and medium term, a new freeze on the process seems more likely than a real breakthrough. Bulgaria has already shown that it can use its veto right, but the crucial question is whether the other member states are prepared to invest political capital to overcome the dispute. So far, they seem more inclined to let the current impasse continue.
This means that the process may formally continue, but in essence remain blocked, with North Macedonia retaining its candidate status for an extended period until the balance of political interests within the European Union changes.