"This year’s opinion pieces and magazine articles evoke a sense of déjà vu. It was believed that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would clear the way for a new, democratic Middle East. The 2006 war in Lebanon was described by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as the "birth pangs" of a new Middle East. The Arab Spring in 2009 was presented as its dawn. It was claimed that Hamas’s attack on Israel in 2023 would usher in a new Middle East". This is what Stephen Simon writes for Foreign Policy. He is a distinguished fellow and visiting professor at Dartmouth College, as well as the author of the book "The Great Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East". He spent 20 years in the US government, holding senior positions at the State Department and the National Security Council.
"It is now being claimed that American strikes against Iran and the struggle for the Strait of Hormuz are creating yet another new Middle East. According to US President Donald Trump, "The Middle East will be transformed and the future of this region has never — at least in my opinion — looked brighter".
Bloody and chaotic events such as the war with Iran give rise to fantasies of sweeping change, but reality continues to fall short of these expectations. As Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the US House of Representatives in an earlier era, observed: "Any jackass can kick down a barn, but it takes a carpenter to build it". Decisive change for the better — according to America’s vision — requires genuine military superiority on the part of US forces and the ability to turn that power into lasting political arrangements. The United States has imagined that it possesses both, without actually having either.
Using force thousands of miles from home requires political leaders to prove that the stakes justify the costs and risks. This means that military objectives are formulated through exaggerated promises that ultimately prove detached from everyday reality.
On the other side, however, are adversaries who also have their own will and ability to act. They are not passive objects of America’s projection of power, nor material onto which Washington can project its fantasies. Ironically, the weakness and fragmentation of the region’s states make imposing the will of an outside power more difficult, not easier.
When the war ends — and sooner or later it will — Iran will still be a poor, militarized oil exporter with two good friends — China and Russia — and close relations with Iraq. In short, it will not differ significantly from the country it was before the war.
Iraq will look much as it does now — a state with a hybrid army trying to withstand pressure both from Iran, with which it shares a long border, and from the United States, which controls its finances.
Syria will look as it did on the day before the US and Israel struck Iran. It will remain poor, devastated by a 13-year civil war and an even longer period of sanctions, ruled by a sectarian clique subject to the influence of outside powers — from Turkey to Israel and Saudi Arabia — and still torn apart by ethnic and religious rivalries.
Lebanon will continue to live with the consequences of the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the country’s civil war by redistributing power among its religious communities and calling on all militias to disarm. Under Syrian supervision, all militias complied with this requirement except Hezbollah, which kept its weapons in the name of "resistance". This, in turn, inadvertently but predictably cemented Hezbollah’s status as the state’s armed rival and as an instigator of senseless conflicts with its far more powerful southern neighbor. The country will also continue its Sisyphean task of satisfying the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while parliament remains unwilling to decide who will bear the losses of the banking system.
Egypt, whose economy suffered heavily when the Houthis shelled ships in the Red Sea two years ago, will remain the same authoritarian state it was on the day before the war — supported by generous financial aid from the Gulf states and occupied with large-scale infrastructure projects.
Jordan, which inevitably has to be cautious because of the chaos along its borders with Israel, Syria and Iraq, will look exactly as it did before the war. The same applies to Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Sudan — all of them will be what they were last year and the year before.
It is true that there are some individual winners. The little-recognized state of Somaliland has reaped strategic dividends from the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States, becoming a geographic counterweight to the Houthis’ dominance over the Bab el-Mandeb strait. But one breakaway enclave does not make a new Middle East.
And what about the Arab states of the Persian Gulf? Each of them was targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. The economies of all Gulf states except Oman will contract this year. The IMF forecasts a decline of 16.7% for Kuwait, 15.6% for Qatar, 11.3% for Bahrain and smaller contractions for the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The IMF expects a sharp recovery next year, but only under the generous assumption that shipping through the strait will normalize in 2027. Crude oil export volumes have already reached pre-war levels, although transporting it remains difficult.
Most of these states are discussing major new pipeline and transport projects — for example, from Abqaiq to Yanbu, from Habshan to Fujairah, or from Basra to Baniyas. The aim is to make their export routes independent of the Strait of Hormuz and therefore more resilient to attacks by Iran or the Houthis. Such plans are not new for these countries, and most will probably never be implemented. All of them will rush to rebuild their own air defenses after the United States demonstrated that it is relatively ineffective as a participant in military conflicts, while continuing to willingly sell weapons, provide intelligence and act as a partner in the defense industry. This will not have a substantial impact on their armed forces, which — with the exception of those of the UAE — are not designed for operations outside their own territory. But it will increase their resilience in the face of future attacks by Iran and the Houthis.
How will this war end? One possibility is for the Trump administration to sign a truce involving concessions that would restore normal shipping through the strait and free up US naval forces for redeployment to other areas. A Democratic majority in the US Congress could accelerate this decision. It would not, however, immediately end the war, since Trump would veto a resolution limiting his war powers, while Democrats would probably not have enough votes to override the veto.
The dispute over funding would nevertheless make it more difficult to continue the war, while also placing Trump in a winning position regardless of the possible outcome. Instead of going down in history as the president who lost the war he himself started, he could shift the blame for defeat onto the Democrats. The Gulf states, meanwhile, would return to their traditional cautious strategy of balancing among the various powers. They would conclude separate agreements with Iran for the full reopening of the strait, while seeking to retain as much as possible of American intelligence, technology, weapons and expertise — even if the US Fifth Fleet were no longer based in Bahrain.
This would closely resemble the strategy of an offshore presence, under which the United States keeps its forces just outside the region — primarily at sea and at a few access points — and relies on pre-positioned equipment and rights to use military bases so that it can intervene quickly in a crisis, rather than deploying large contingents on land. This approach served a strategy of offshore balancing that kept the United States out of the day-to-day affairs of a given region and provided for intervention only when one power threatened to establish dominance over an area deemed vital.
The other possibility is that the war will not end — at least not in the near future. This appears to be the outcome preferred by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. And according to their own criteria, the strategy is delivering results. Satellite images presented by Bessent show not a single tanker on Kharg Island, while crude oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, transported under US naval escort, are leaving the region in volumes equal to or higher than before the war.
Why, then, reach an agreement? Because Iran also has a say. The strategy of economic attrition gives Tehran every reason to show that the cost of this attrition for Washington will be higher than it is prepared to pay. That is the purpose of the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia, the attacks in Dhahran and Dammam, and the threats against US bases. Following the midterm elections, the president is signaling that he does not want an escalation before the outcome of negotiations with Iran becomes clear, while insisting that the blockade continue. This, in turn, will leave Iran with the opportunity to attack shipping — actions that could trigger the escalation Trump is trying to avoid. A third carrier strike group is already en route, ensuring that he will have the necessary firepower to carry out his threats.
If the war drags on, something will nevertheless change, although not in the way the prophets of the new Middle East imagine. When the aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt" arrives in the Arabian Sea, 3/4 of the US Navy’s currently deployed aircraft carriers will be engaged in the war. With the arrival of the "Roosevelt" in the Andaman Sea, there will no longer be a single American aircraft carrier in the western Pacific. A region that absorbs such a large share of American military power changes the United States’ position in Asia. The Middle East is changing American strategy, not the other way around.
The other major participant is Israel. For years, observers have noted the shift of Israeli policy to the right, the disintegration of the left-wing parties, the increasingly militarized approach to the region, strained relations with the United States, growing opposition to a two-state solution and the development of long-range strike capabilities designed to neutralize Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and, as it turned out, eliminate many of its leaders. This trend would probably have led to war sooner or later. But it was the late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar who pulled the trigger.
The result was catastrophic for the residents of Gaza and for Palestinians as a whole. It led to Israeli forces entering Syrian and Lebanese territory and created the widespread impression that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had drawn Trump into the war. These events accelerated the deterioration of public opinion in the United States toward Israel and of relations between the two countries in a way that had been anticipated a decade earlier — particularly the narrowing of political support for those relations and their transformation into an instrument of partisan confrontation. All of this happened even before the start of the current war in the Persian Gulf.
This latest senseless war has demonstrated both America’s enduring desire for a new Middle East and the United States’ inability to create one. The US elections of 2016 and 2024 were partly a referendum on American interventions in the region. Trump appeared to understand this and made it part of his campaign message: "I will not start wars," he said in 2024. "I will end wars".
But restraint has never been his guiding principle, as long as others pay the bill and he can behave like a warlord. This is tragic for the Iranian schoolgirls who were killed, the American soldiers, and their families back home struggling with inflation caused by the war.
As for a new Middle East, let alone a better one, the experiment that needs to be conducted is not another test of whether military intervention makes the region a better place — the answer to that question is already known. The question is whether less intervention would produce such an outcome.
This experiment will probably be conducted by the next American administration, which will have to contend with a public that views the war with Iran as a mistake — an unnecessary return to the military adventurism rejected by voters in 2008. The enormous national debt and pressure to increase the cost of living for ordinary people will constrain the defense budget. Whether for better or worse, Congress will focus first on security in the western Pacific and Europe. The Middle East has already experienced plenty of American "help". It may also experience less of it".
* The original title of the article is "There"s Never a New Middle East" (There"s Never a New Middle East)
Source: news.bg