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Xi Jinping knows what kind of successor he is looking for, but he is not rushing his choice

Naming a successor prematurely could create a second power center outside Xi himself

Nov 20, 2026 18:10 34

Xi Jinping knows what kind of successor he is looking for, but he is not rushing his choice - 1
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Ever since Xi Jinping broke with established norms and made it clear that he would not comply with the two-term limit on serving as China’s head of state and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), interest in who might succeed him has been exceptionally high. Xi has removed several potential successors, but he himself is also growing older and, even if he tries to remain in power as long as possible, he may eventually have to name his preferred candidate to succeed him. This is what Deng Yuwen, a Chinese writer and scholar, writes for Foreign Policy.

"Although there is still no generally recognized successor candidate and it is unlikely that one will emerge before the CCP’s 21st Congress at the end of next year, if it happens at all by then, the intensified personnel reshuffles in provincial leadership on the eve of the Fifth Plenum may offer some clues.

On September 4, Zhu Junmin, born in 1972, was promoted from deputy secretary of the Shanghai party organization to acting mayor, taking charge of the government of China’s largest city. For some time, many observers regarded this appointment as evidence that Beijing was deliberately preparing Zhu to become Xi’s future successor.

Things, however, are not that simple. In the meantime, personnel changes in the provinces accelerated. On September 23, the provinces of Anhui, Henan and Fujian received new party secretaries. Li Lecheng and Zhou Zuyi, both born in 1965, took charge of Anhui and Henan respectively, while Zhao Long, born in 1967, was promoted from governor of Fujian to provincial party secretary. (In China’s system, the party secretary holds a more important position than the governor).

Then, on October 24, two days before the start of the Fifth Plenum, the pace of change accelerated even further. Wang Jinzhu, born in 1965, became party secretary of Hunan province, while Mo Gaoyi, born in 1964, took charge of Yunnan. At the same time, younger officials were placed in positions preparing them for gubernatorial posts: Guo Ningning, born in 1970, in Fujian; Zhuge Yujie, born in 1971, in Qinghai; and Xie Weijian, born in 1973, in Hunan.

This reveals a clearly pronounced generational change. Provincial party secretary posts are increasingly being filled by officials born between 1964 and 1969, while gubernatorial positions are opening up to cadres born in the 1970s.

This trend becomes even more obvious if we look at officials who have already reached full provincial or ministerial rank. Zhejiang Governor Liu Jie, Jiangsu Governor Liu Xiaotao and Guangxi Chairman Wei Tao were born in 1970. Shanxi Governor Lu Dongliang was born in 1973. Zhu, Guo, Zhuge and Xie have now joined this group.

At the central level, Minister of Emergency Management Zhang Guocheng, Chairman of China’s state body overseeing state-owned assets Chen Fubo and First Secretary of the Communist Youth League A Dong were also born in 1970.

Just a few years ago, officials born in the 1970s were still young enough to be described as "young cadres." Now they are beginning to enter the very core of the senior party leadership in large numbers.

A group of potential candidates is gradually taking shape, but the real question is what kind of person Xi wants to succeed him.

Xi’s criteria for government and party officials in general are well known: political loyalty comes first; cadres must be faithful, honest and ready to take responsibility. They must also possess professional competence, problem-solving skills and the ability to deal with serious risks. Choosing a general secretary, however, involves additional considerations that do not apply to ordinary appointments of senior leaders.

Discussions about Xi’s successor often fall into two extremes. One assumes that loyalty is the only thing that matters to him. The other looks for the candidate with the greatest abilities and the richest professional background.

Both qualities matter, but for a leader who has ruled for more than a decade and has tied his own name, theory and political line so closely to an entire historical era, the most important criterion is the preservation of his political legacy.

The successor must be politically reliable, but that does not simply mean being personally close to Xi. Xi must be convinced that once this person takes power, he will not renounce Xi’s legacy.

He cannot be someone who, like Nikita Khrushchev after Joseph Stalin, bowed before his predecessor during his lifetime but condemned him after his death. Nor can he be someone who, like Deng Xiaoping after Mao Zedong, preserves his predecessor’s official status while fundamentally changing the system and political ideology he inherited.

The second criterion is political predictability.

An official who obeys Xi today may not behave the same way after becoming general secretary. Supreme power changes political behavior. Xi understands this better than most people. When he was designated as a successor, he was moderate and inclined to cooperate with others. Only after gaining power did he quickly build a political order centered around his own person.

This creates a dilemma. A genuinely capable and decisive successor may ultimately develop his own judgment and power base instead of remaining an executor of the will of the retiring predecessor. Xi probably wants both: a successor strong enough to control the system, but politically predictable at the same time.

The third criterion is governing ability.

China’s leader in the 2030s will not simply have to manage economic growth. He will have to deal with complex economic and social problems, long-term technological and geopolitical competition with the United States, possible military and security-related risks around Taiwan, as well as a party-state system comprising more than 100 million CCP members, a vast bureaucracy, complex local interests and a large state-run economy.

A successor who is loyal but incompetent may ultimately prove unable to preserve Xi’s political legacy. On the other hand, someone with too much power and independence may at some point escape his influence and usher in his own political era.

Therefore, the future successor will have to follow an exceptionally narrow path.

This requires experience in sensitive and responsible positions. If Xi has enough time to assess potential successors, he will probably place the most promising candidates in various kinds of difficult leadership posts.

That is precisely why Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang are so important. Some of these regions are economic centers, others have exceptional political importance, while others combine both characteristics. Governing these provinces is a serious test, particularly when it comes to the cadres’ ability to deal with crises.

Ultimately, routine work matters less than how an official performs during an economic downturn, a major accident, public dissatisfaction or a confrontation with a foreign power.

Another question also affects the pool of potential candidates: when does Xi intend to step down from power?

For several years, I have maintained that Xi will probably remain in power for another two terms—roughly from 2027 to 2037. If this forecast is correct, he has no need to choose a specific successor now.

Naming a successor prematurely would bring few benefits and could create a second power center outside Xi himself. Party cadres would begin aligning themselves with this person, while his status as the future leader would give him influence far exceeding his official position.

For a leader like Xi, who places such great importance on centralized party leadership and his own dominant role, such a situation would be undesirable.

Therefore, at this stage it is more likely that Xi will not choose a specific person, but will build a group of potential successors. All other things being roughly equal, the most realistic group deserving attention appears to be officials born between 1967 and 1975.

If Xi hands over power around 2037, these people will be between 65 and 70 years old—a perfectly plausible age for the senior leadership, although older than the age at which Xi himself or predecessors such as Hu Jintao took power.

This could be an advantage for Xi, since an older leader would be less inclined to depart from his political legacy.

I expect the center of gravity in terms of age on the 21st Central Committee to shift clearly toward people born between 1964 and 1974. With the exception of Xi and a small number of other senior leaders, officials born in the 1950s will largely disappear from the composition of the Central Committee.

Those born in the late 1960s will become the backbone of its full membership, while the number of cadres born in the 1970s will increase significantly.

If figures such as Zhao Long, Beijing Mayor Yin Li and Shanxi Governor Zhao Gang, born between 1967 and 1969, begin entering the leadership in significant numbers, they will naturally become important participants in the pool of potential candidates for senior posts in the 2030s.

If cadres born after 1970, such as Zhu, Lu Dongliang, Liu Jie or Liu Xiaotao, enter the Politburo at the party’s 21st Congress, that would be an even stronger signal.

Whatever happens, however, I do not believe that the 21st Party Congress will give the outside world a clear answer as to who Xi’s successor will be. At most, it may show which candidates have reached the final stage of the race".

* The original title of the article is "Who Will Succeed Xi Jinping?"

Source: news.bg