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A Recipe for Disaster in Taiwan

If Chinese leaders decide that U.S. commitment to Taiwan is weakening in both American parties, and that the country is not well prepared for military conflict, they may conclude that they have an opportunity to pressure Taiwan without provoking an American response

Nov 20, 2026 17:17 52

A Recipe for Disaster in Taiwan - 1
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Just a few years ago, U.S. President Joe Biden sparked a serious backlash when he publicly confirmed that his administration would defend Taiwan if the island were attacked by China. This was a departure from the traditional American policy of strategic ambiguity, under which Washington does not commit to specific actions. This is what Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper write for Foreign Affairs.

"In May, U.S. President Donald Trump provoked a wave of reactions with his differing position. In a television interview, he described Taiwan as a "very good bargaining chip" in relations with Beijing and noted that the island is close to China but far from the United States, thereby implying that American interests in Taiwan are insignificant. With his words, Trump appeared to confirm the concerns of many observers of the situation in Asia: that this American president would be willing to weaken the U.S. commitment to Taiwan in order to strengthen his relationship with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

A few days later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Trump's words were troubling, however, not least because they reflect a shift in Washington that extends beyond the Oval Office. Since 2025, politicians from both parties have increasingly avoided reaffirming the United States' longstanding support for Taiwan. Meanwhile, China is developing new strategies for pressuring the island without starting a war, and Beijing will be increasingly tempted to use them if it concludes that U.S. commitment to Taiwan is weakening among both politicians and the public.

Such a conclusion, however, would be a serious mistake on China's part. In fact, U.S. interests in Taiwan are growing, not diminishing. Regardless of Washington's current rhetoric, the United States will have to respond to any action by Beijing that threatens those interests, and the two countries would then face a great-power crisis. To prevent this dangerous situation, American leaders must immediately update the U.S. strategy toward Taiwan, so that it reflects the new reality.

A Growing Danger

Taiwan's unique international status has long complicated American policy. The Republic of China, known today as Taiwan, was a U.S. ally during World War II. After the People's Republic of China was established on the mainland in 1949, Republic of China President Chiang Kai-shek moved to Taiwan, while the United States maintained official diplomatic relations with his government rather than with the People's Republic of China. In 1954, as the Cold War in the Pacific reached its peak, the United States concluded a formal mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, partly to prevent increasingly aggressive artillery bombardments from the mainland. Nearly 20 years later, however, when President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger began preparing a diplomatic rapprochement with the government in Beijing, they knew it would come at a cost to Taiwan.

Partly because they understood that establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing would be painful for Taiwan and would provoke disputes in Congress, where Taipei had many supporters, Nixon and Kissinger deliberately slowed the process. Nixon's successor, President Gerald Ford, did the same. Ultimately, the change was carried out by President Jimmy Carter. On January 1, 1979, the United States ended its alliance with Taiwan and recognized the mainland government as the "sole legal government of China." Congress reacted angrily. Lawmakers from both parties quickly drafted the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which remains in force today. It requires Washington to provide Taipei with defensive weapons, thereby creating the basis for an alliance with Taiwan despite the unofficial nature of the relationship. In 1982, Ronald Reagan's administration assumed an additional set of commitments to Taiwan, known as the "Six Assurances." They included the confirmation that Washington does not support Beijing's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, and the promise that the United States would not use arms sales to the island as a bargaining chip.

Over the past 50 years, American policy toward Taiwan has been remarkably successful. Through its partnership with the island and arms sales, the United States has contributed to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, Taiwan has thrived as a democracy and an economy, while Washington has maintained relations with Beijing as well. Recently, however, U.S. commitments to Taiwan have come under increasing pressure. China is carrying out a massive military buildup intended to give Beijing the ability to seize Taiwan by force; it is using economic coercion, carrying out cyberattacks and interfering in elections to pressure Taipei; and it regularly conducts military exercises involving its army and coast guard to demonstrate its ability to blockade the island. All of this is heightening concerns throughout the Pacific region that the longstanding partnership with the United States may not be enough to guarantee peace in the Taiwan Strait.

In recent years, concerns have grown that China may try to retake Taiwan by force, possibly while Xi is still in power. Analysts often point to 2027 as the beginning of the period of greatest risk, citing a 2021 statement by Philip Davidson, former commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, regarding when the People's Liberation Army might be ready for an invasion. That deadline, however, was never definitive, and Xi's recent removal of more than 100 officers has probably delayed the military's preparations. U.S. intelligence assessments do not anticipate an invasion of Taiwan in the coming year, and most scholars believe that the Chinese government would resort to such a step only as a last resort, if unification could not be achieved by any other means.

The main danger now is that Xi will intensify a pressure campaign aimed at forcing Taiwan to negotiate a change in its status. Since 2025, Chinese leaders have used their diplomatic channels with the Trump administration, including the direct line of communication between Xi and Trump, to press for American concessions on Taiwan in exchange for progress in trade negotiations. In May, China succeeded in temporarily halting a planned $14 billion American arms sale to Taiwan, as well as other funding for the island's defense. Beijing may hope that further incremental steps will weaken Taiwanese confidence in the United States even more, and that such actions will be difficult for Trump or a future American president to reverse.

China is clearly preparing for more drastic forms of coercion as well. Beijing has several options: since 2022, the Chinese military has been training for blockades of Taiwan, while the coast guard has simulated quarantine closures of the island's main ports. Beijing could also use customs controls or other administrative measures to try to impose its jurisdiction over Taiwan while minimizing the likelihood that the United States would intervene to stop it. If Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who supports Taiwan's independence but has taken no steps in that direction during his term, is reelected in 2028 and Chinese leaders determine that the opportunities for peaceful unification are running out, Xi may consider using these tools against the island in late 2028 or early 2029, before the new American administration takes office. Given Trump's alienation of U.S. allies in Asia and Europe and Washington's limited ability to respond to a maritime blockade, Beijing may hope to carry out such a large-scale coercive campaign without provoking serious resistance.

The Indispensable Island

Taiwan's growing strategic importance makes Beijing's development of new coercive tools even more alarming. Washington now maintains its partnership with Taipei not because of a historic commitment or, as Beijing would have the world believe, to antagonize China. The boom in artificial intelligence has placed Taiwan at the center of the global economy. The island is a key supplier to the American technology industry, and the United States recognizes that it cannot be a leader in artificial intelligence without Taiwan.

The scale of U.S. economic dependence on Taiwan is striking. Taiwan is the country's fifth-largest trading partner. A Chinese blockade of the island would threaten more than $250 billion in trade and could reduce U.S. GDP by more than three percent within a year, according to a Bloomberg report. Up to 97% of the world's production or packaging of high-performance logic chips used in smartphones and other advanced electronics takes place in Taiwan. Losing access to Taiwanese chips could reduce global production of advanced electronics by 60%, as factories would be forced to rely on their existing chip inventories. American automakers and medical-device manufacturers could exhaust their supplies in just a few weeks. The American companies Amazon, Apple and Nvidia are among the ten largest customers of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Together, these ten customers have a combined market capitalization of more than $14 trillion. As the growth of artificial intelligence supports the American stock market and the economy as a whole, a crisis in Taiwan would trigger a crash potentially comparable in scale to the market collapse at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The economic consequences of China's attempt to economically strangle Taiwan would not be limited to the United States. The research firm Rhodium Group has conservatively estimated that a one-year blockade of the island could cost the global economy between $2 trillion and $3 trillion. A full-scale war would have far more severe consequences: according to a Bloomberg estimate, it would cause $10 trillion in economic losses and lead to a global recession. That is why the likelihood that the United States would be forced to act if Taiwan's supply chains were threatened is growing. The cost of inaction would simply be too high.

The Commitment Problem

Precisely when the United States should be doing everything possible to prevent a crisis, Washington's support for Taiwan appears hesitant. Trump's musings about Taiwan's geographical distance from the United States and his use of arms sales as a bargaining chip are the clearest examples, but they are not the only signs of a weakening American commitment. Political analysts argue that the United States should change its position and categorically oppose Taiwan's independence or even withdraw American troops from the military bases in Japan and the Philippines that are closest to the island.

American public opinion is changing as well. According to a July 2026 survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Americans' attitudes toward China have improved significantly over the past two years. A majority—57%—support friendly cooperation and engagement with China, while 40% support active efforts to contain the growth of Chinese power. The share of Americans who consider China's territorial ambitions a "critical threat" has declined by more than 10% since 2022, while support for using American troops if China invades Taiwan has fallen from 52% to just 38%.

In part, declining support for defending Taiwan reflects growing American caution regarding instability and conflicts. The feeling that the world is descending into chaos helped Trump win his campaign in 2024. As president, he intensified that feeling by taking decisive military action in places such as Iran and Venezuela. Americans are now bearing the economic consequences of nine months of war in the Middle East, further strengthening antiwar sentiment, as the midterm election results clearly show. In the past, candidates for public office competed to demonstrate a tough stance toward China, but now many shy away from declaring that the U.S. military should defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, judging that this is not the right time to be perceived as hawks.

Of course, public attitudes can change quickly during a crisis. If China actually commits aggression against Taiwan, Americans may begin supporting a more decisive U.S. response. And if there are American casualties in the early stages of a conflict or a Chinese attack on critical U.S. infrastructure, the American public could very well rally around the flag and demand decisive military intervention.

For now, however, China may believe that both the will and the ability of the United States to wage war are weakening. The war with Iran has significantly reduced U.S. military readiness for a potential conflict over Taiwan. The United States has expended a large portion of its air and missile defense stockpiles, including around 2/3 of its available Patriot interceptors, whose stocks had already been reduced by American aid to Ukraine, as well as up to 80% of THAAD interceptors while defending against Iranian drones and missiles. Even before the war with Iran, analysts warned that the U.S. military could exhaust its stocks of long-range precision-guided munitions in a conflict over Taiwan. Now the shortage of such munitions has become dangerously severe. In addition, the war diverted military resources from the Indo-Pacific region. In August, Washington withdrew its last U.S. aircraft carrier in Asia from the region—"George Washington." The United States also moved missile-defense systems to the Middle East, including Patriot and THAAD systems that had previously been deployed in South Korea.

The New Strategy

The result is an increased risk of dangerous miscalculations. If Chinese leaders decide that U.S. commitment to Taiwan is weakening in both American parties, and that the country is not well prepared for military conflict, they may conclude that they have an opportunity to pressure Taiwan without provoking an American response. But because U.S. interests in Taiwan are greater today than at any time in history, Beijing's calculation may prove wrong. China could declare a maritime quarantine of Taiwan or take another coercive measure, only to confront U.S. intervention that could potentially lead to a great-power confrontation.

To avoid such a clash, American leaders must recommit to deterrence. First, Washington must update the way it presents its positions. In their public statements, politicians should clearly state that the American economy's dependence on Taiwanese exports makes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait a vital U.S. interest. American political leaders should emphasize to Beijing that the United States has an obligation to prevent a crisis that would crash the American stock market, disrupt critical supply chains and deal a heavy blow to numerous domestic industries.

Clarifying American interests would not call into question 50 years of careful diplomacy with China, nor would it require a change in U.S. policy established by the Taiwan Relations Act, the "Six Assurances" and the series of joint U.S.-Chinese statements made between 1972 and 1982 and known as the "Three Communiqués." Instead, the updated statements would make clear to Chinese leaders that certain changes to the status quo on either side of the Taiwan Strait would be unacceptable to the United States even if Taiwan agreed to them under pressure. For example, Washington would support peaceful unification only if the process guaranteed the security of critical supply chains.

After clarifying its interests, the United States will have to back its words with a new strategy to deter Chinese actions that remain below the threshold of armed conflict. Beijing may already be in the early stages of imposing a quarantine on the island. Washington should not allow additional measures that obstruct trade and maritime traffic to and from Taiwan. To deter China from taking such steps, the next U.S. Congress should pass legislation clearly expressing unequivocal, bipartisan opposition to Chinese blockades, quarantine measures and other restrictions. Even if the White House continues to take a softer position, this would send a signal to Beijing that other political forces could compel the president to change course. Congress should also insist that the administration prepare diplomatic and financial sanctions to be imposed in the event of escalating Chinese quarantine measures against Taiwan. By planning these responses well before any coercive measures are taken, Washington would make clear that a campaign of maritime pressure would carry a clear cost for Beijing and entail the risk of escalation.

The United States must also strengthen military deterrence. The next Congress should pressure the Trump administration to approve the blocked $14 billion arms-sales package for Taiwan, as well as the other security assistance whose provision the administration is delaying. Congress has a legal obligation to do so under the Taiwan Relations Act. Suspending security assistance contradicts American policy, and allowing Trump's team to make this concession as part of a probably futile attempt at rapprochement with Xi only weakens Washington's position.

Washington should not—and must not—take these steps alone. American allies such as Germany, Japan and South Korea would suffer almost as much as the United States if China took control of Taiwan's semiconductor industry. These countries have an interest in cooperating discreetly to deter Chinese coercion and develop joint responses, while working to diversify their chip supply chains and increase their resilience. In the United States, this work must not wait for a new president to be elected. Congress can send delegations and use other diplomatic opportunities to begin developing plans jointly with its parliamentary partners abroad.

Moreover, as the 2028 U.S. presidential election approaches, candidates from both parties should speak clearly about the country's strong economic interests in Taiwan and their commitment to deterrence. This does not require taking bellicose positions, but presidential candidates must state unequivocally that any attempt by Beijing to disrupt vital supply chains would harm American interests and require a response from the United States. Consistent messaging would show Chinese leaders that they should not expect a future administration to be bound by the concessions in Trump's policy. It would also signal to allies that in 2029 the United States will once again be a reliable partner in opposing Chinese economic aggression.

The United States must update its policy toward Taiwan, but the retreat undertaken by Trump only makes the balance on both sides of the Taiwan Strait more unstable. Unlike other policies dating from the Cold War, the importance of preventing Chinese aggression against Taiwan is growing, not diminishing, over time. U.S. interests in Taiwan are clearer and easier to explain than ever before. Only by stating these interests clearly and backing its words with action can the United States continue to prevent a crisis or conflict that would have devastating consequences for everyone".

Source: news.bg