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Berlin versus Shenzhen

While Trump, Putin and Xi were meeting in China, 44 delegations gathered in Berlin. Against the backdrop of Europe’s common position, those who failed to adopt it stand out particularly clearly.

Nov 22, 2026 18:47 37

Berlin versus Shenzhen - 1
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Nikolay YAKOVENKO, journalist, political analyst (Ukraine)

On 19 November 2026, the so-called “Coalition of the Willing” gathered at the Federal Chancellery of Germany in Berlin: 44 delegations, including 26 heads of state and government. Among them were German Chancellor Friedrich Merz himself, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as members of the leadership of the European Union (EU), NATO and representatives of the United States.

The meeting was convened within a matter of days as a response to the trilateral meeting in the Chinese city of Shenzhen – and the response was clear: the coalition agreed to continue its joint support for Ukraine next year as well – political, financial and military. Strengthening air defence, security guarantees, Moscow’s agreement to an energy ceasefire for the winter and the participation of “Team Europe” in any negotiations are all on the table. This was the seventeenth meeting in this format. Europe, which in 2014 was accused of being incapable of adopting a common position, developed one and has been upholding it for the fifth year of the full-scale war.

Against this backdrop, those who failed to join the common current stand out particularly clearly: European officials and people whom Europe itself had defended. Not agents of Moscow – but people with impeccable biographies who chose mediation where their institutions took sides.

The Mediator

In April 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) stripped the Russian delegation of its voting rights. The sanction lasted five years – until PACE Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland managed to secure its repeal. His argument, presented to the Assembly in January 2019, was as follows: the sanction had not returned Crimea and had not improved the human rights situation in the Russian Federation. But, on the other hand, it had created a crisis within the Organisation. He called the compromise with Moscow “a great gift to Europe” on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the Council of Europe (CoE). Moscow’s leverage was two years of unpaid contributions and a promise to repay around €75 million after being restored to “all rights”.

Kyiv made an additional contribution to the organisation’s budget in order to remove the argument about the money, but the secretary general, according to Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the CoE Dmytro Kuleba, blocked all such initiatives. In June 2019, the Assembly voted 116 in favour and 62 against. The delegations of Ukraine and Georgia left the session, while seven countries issued a joint protest.

In February 2022, Russia, now with its rights restored, launched a full-scale war against Ukraine. The same Council of Europe that Jagland had spent ten years persuading not to lose Moscow as a interlocutor expelled it within two weeks and without a single vote against. The dialogue for which he had fought proved unnecessary to everyone except Moscow itself.

Correspondence between the secretary general and the late American financier was discovered in the “Epstein” files published at the beginning of 2026: in 2013, Jagland undertook to arrange a meeting between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin. And in 2018, in response to a proposal from Jeffrey Epstein, he wrote that he would meet with an aide to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

In February 2026, Norwegian prosecutors charged Jagland with serious corruption during the years he headed the Council of Europe. He himself denies any wrongdoing, and the investigation is continuing. The CoE secretary general who publicly insisted on dialogue with Moscow appears to have also held discussions with the Russians of which Strasbourg was unaware.

The language of human rights through which the Council of Europe, during Jagland’s tenure, communicated with Moscow is now being used on Moscow’s behalf – in courts and on television.

The Representative

There are two Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) gained independence from Constantinople in 2019. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) historically remained part of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) – the same church whose head, Patriarch Kirill, blessed the invasion of Ukraine and calls Putin’s war “holy”. In May 2022, the UOC-MP announced a break with Moscow, but a state religious-studies examination at the beginning of 2023 established that its ties with the ROC had in fact never been severed. In August 2024, Ukraine adopted a law banning religious organisations linked to the ROC.

It is this church that has been represented since 2023 by American lawyer Robert Amsterdam, who had previously gained international prominence through his defence of Russian opposition businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky – an outspoken political opponent of Putin.

Lawyer Amsterdam built his campaign about the “persecution of Christians” around an interview with American right-wing political blogger Tucker Carlson in April 2024, entitled “Ukrainian Churches Are Being Burned, Priests Beaten”. The scandalous video included footage of “burning UOC churches” that in fact showed a Greek Catholic church in Canada burning in 2014. The same footage had been circulated for years by Russian state media. In a comment to the Ukrainian publication The Kyiv Independent, Amsterdam acknowledged that the video contained errors, saying that he had not been involved in its creation. PBS subsequently noted that he had repeatedly repeated false claims about churches being burned in Ukraine.

Since August 2025, Amsterdam has represented the Armenian Apostolic Church in Yerevan and acted as international lawyer for Samvel Karapetyan – a Russian citizen, owner of the Moscow-based Tashir holding company, ranked 44th on Forbes magazine’s list of the richest Russians with a fortune of $3.2 billion, and owner of Electric Networks of Armenia, who was arrested in June 2025 for publicly calling for the seizure of power. At the time, the Kremlin stressed that “Karapetyan is a Russian citizen” and that Moscow was “following his fate”. An investigation by the Russian-language investigative publication The Insider pointed to his links with the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Amsterdam represented Karapetyan’s political party, Strong Armenia, at its congress, calling the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan a “judicial dictatorship”. In response to the criticism, Amsterdam himself says that he has been banned from entering Russia since 2005 and has no sympathy whatsoever for Putin. The first claim is true. But the interests of his current clients – such as the church Kyiv considers part of the ROC, and a billionaire personally supported by Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov and Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova – continue to coincide with those of the regime in Moscow.

The Expert

There are also figures whom the European institutions themselves had defended. In 2015, the Council of Europe campaigned for the release of Azerbaijani conflict expert Arif Yunusov, who had been sentenced to seven years in prison in Baku. At the time, the president of PACE called his sentence “outrageous”, the commissioner for human rights joined the case before the Strasbourg Court, and Secretary General Jagland welcomed the release of the Yunusovs.

Ten years later, this supposed political prisoner with European support in his biography explained to the Russian-language publication Novaya Gazeta Europe (Riga, Latvia) that Putin could have chosen not to wage war. Because “the entire eastern part of Ukraine was his anyway”. And in the forum where he has been answering questions for years, he told readers that “half of Ukraine” had been pro-Russian: “After all, it was mainly Russians or Russian speakers who lived there.” He also said that the war “could easily have been avoided” if the authorities in Kyiv had acted like those in Minsk. The man whom Europe helped free from prison describes Ukraine in terms that Europe completely rejected at the meeting in Berlin.

Incidentally, to find yourself outside the common European current, you need neither talks with Moscow, nor clients from Moscow, nor a prison sentence. It is enough simply to remain on the sidelines.

The Observer

Andreas Gross is a Swiss social democrat and co-founder of the “Group for a Switzerland Without an Army”. He has observed elections in Russia and Ukraine more than twenty times and written reports for the Council of Europe – on Chechnya, the “Magnitsky” sanctions and Russia. The diagnoses were accurate, but the prescription was always the same. In his report on the “Magnitsky” sanctions, he mentioned personal sanctions only as a “last resort”.

In 2022, he told NZZ about Putin, of whom he had had a favourable impression for years as a representative of the Council of Europe: “I was wrong about him.” He also agreed that Ukraine deserved military support. But when asked the central question – whether Switzerland should stop being neutral – he answered in the negative: the country remained obliged to observe its neutrality, which simply had to be “legitimised anew”. Because Switzerland’s neutrality did not mean refusing to participate in European politics.

This is the same formula with which the authorities in Bern explained their refusals to their allies for nearly five years: since 2022, Switzerland, citing its neutrality, rejected requests from Germany, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic to re-export its ammunition to Ukraine. The easing of the rules adopted by parliament in December 2025 does not authorise direct deliveries to Ukraine and is subject to a referendum in Switzerland scheduled for 29 November 2026; according to polls, the outcome is unclear.

Gross acknowledged his mistake concerning the man – but not concerning the method. During those same years, Europe travelled the path from reports to decisions: from the observation missions in which he took part to packages of sanctions, frozen assets and a coalition of 44 delegations. Gross, however, remained where Europe had been in 2014.

What the Berlin meeting proved

Even ten years ago, each of these positions was regarded in Europe as a respectable form of engagement: Moscow had to be spoken to, its interests had to be taken into account, and one could refrain from making a direct choice. The meeting of European leaders in Berlin showed that this Europe no longer exists.

The coalition gathered not to seek some approach to Putin, but to formulate the conditions under which any conversation with him would be possible at all. And to declare that nothing would be decided in Shenzhen without Europe. The supposedly neutral place between the aggressor and his victim proved not to exist, and Europe acknowledged this – unlike those who had occupied that place for decades.

This is the main conclusion from the coalition’s seventeenth meeting: it is not only about the scale of aid to Ukraine, but also about the fact that the role of mediator, lawyer, expert or observer in this conflict is no longer considered honourable in Europe. This role is now considered rather outdated.