When our country finds itself between a new leadership in Belgrade, which announces that it is halting deliveries of 155 mm artillery shells to Ukraine via the Czech Republic, freezing military-technical cooperation with Israel because of Gaza, and raising the slogans “Kosovo is Serbia,” and a 90-million-strong neighboring country that sentences Istanbul’s former mayor, İmamoğlu, to more than 2 years in prison for “alleged irregularities” and accepts into the ranks of the ruling Justice and Development Party, AKP, İzmir Mayor Tugay, elected on the ticket of the opposition CHP, the Republican People’s Party, do we know how to respond and whether we should? Erdoğan personally pins a badge on Tugay for the “political transfer,” because the CHP has won local elections in İzmir for 24 years, and now, without elections, the ruling AKP is securing control over this million-inhabitant city. A new era for İzmir has been declared, and “we will remove anyone who gets in our way.” Does this smell of snap elections, or is it simply a message prompted by the investigations related to the major scandal in Turkey involving capital-market funds? It is worth being at least informed, because these are processes shaking our neighbors and are important for predictability in our relations. Regardless of whatever else is being suggested or whatever trivial issues we are being distracted with.
As early as November 19, “Bloomberg” wrote that “the fund scandal is costing the AKP many votes.” Ways are being sought to limit the political consequences. Because 131 investment funds have been liquidated, there is a $20 billion shortfall, and 455,000 investors have no access to their savings. Turkey’s financial architecture has been shaken. This goes beyond the local financial upheavals of the late 1990s. Resignations are pouring in from banking and stock-market regulators. Administrative explanations are not working. In practice, what has occurred is a classic market manipulation that has left nearly half a million small and medium-sized investors unable to use their accounts. Prices are collapsing “vertically,” while portfolios “turned out to be full of illiquid, uncovered securities.” Those in power usually defend their people, but now the detention of more than 120 people has become necessary, because citizens and the opposition alike are going through a period of anger and accusations of incompetence and corruption. Internal tensions are growing among the ruling AKP itself. Displays of impunity within the AKP are being disproved by the arrests of people close even to Erdoğan. Such as the arrest of AKP deputy chair Fatma Kaya, senior officials of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, and others. The aim is to convince the enraged public that there are no untouchable people in the state and no deference to party lists. But these processes are taking place amid macroeconomic instability. Forecasts point to lower GDP growth this year and next year. There is talk of chronic impoverishment, expensive loans, a falling Turkish lira, export problems, frozen working capital, and so on. Erdoğan sounds defensive. Even when he calls on young Turks not to lose hope amid serious democratic deficits, uncertainty about their future and prospects, problems in education, and so on. Even attracting opposition mayors into his party in order to halt legal proceedings against them is clearly not working at this stage.
And here, the strengthening of the opposition’s voice stands out clearly, especially that of the New Party, which has now separated from the CHP. Not without Erdoğan’s active assistance through court rulings in favor of the party’s former leader, Kılıçdaroğlu. A convenient rival to Erdoğan in a presidential election. Surprisingly to some, the October opinion polls show that the New Party, led by Özel, has already taken first place in the preferences of Turkish citizens, with 30.29% support in the event of elections. The AKP has 28.21%. Undecided voters account for 23%. A difference of 2.08% is not fatal for those in power, but it is a signal that the opposition is gaining strength. Especially against the backdrop of the stock-market crisis. Özel says that “the government has strayed from the path of democracy” and that the government faces two major problems—the economy and justice. One is choking the people, while the other is choking their conscience. Change is being demanded, and immediately. Because the economic crisis has continued for years and can no longer be prevented. Investment in production is stagnant, the economy is struggling in a spiral of interest rates, and the fund scandal has added fuel to the fire. Hunger and poverty are constantly growing, while rising deflation cannot be stopped. Özel says that “people on low incomes, workers, wage earners, and pensioners cannot make ends meet.” Income distribution is deteriorating. “A minority lives in luxury, while millions cannot afford bread” is the addition. It sounds familiar. The point has been reached where the Turkish Statistical Institute is unable to distort the figures. And an old Chinese proverb is recalled: “Short words are good, but they can never replace the bitter truth.” And that truth apparently really is making the rich richer and the poor even poorer. The Turkish people do not deserve this. This is how one speaks when in opposition, but the problems are certainly worrying. Justice, like the economy, is also in the midst of a major crisis. The state is being weakened. The courts have been turned into instruments for suppressing the government’s rivals. They have lost their independence. There is no legal certainty. Repression is expanding the spiral of silence. The New Party must open a new horizon, cultivate new hope, make society feel that there is an alternative, meet the people, and embrace them.
At the same time, “Bloomberg,” which wrote that “the stock-market scandal has become a strategic problem for Erdoğan because it affects senior figures from the ruling party,” confidently claims that rumors are growing in Ankara that Turkey’s president will undertake a radical reshuffle—a sweeping cabinet change and the calling of early parliamentary and presidential elections. The regular vote is scheduled for April 2028. If Erdoğan wants a new term, and is not constitutionally entitled to one because he has been elected twice, he will have to seek a vote in the Grand National Assembly /parliament/ on a decision to hold early elections, requiring a qualified three-fifths majority, i.e. at least 360 of the 600 deputies. They do not have that number on their own, including with the votes of their coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party, led by Bahçeli. Clearly, reliance will have to be placed either on a split within the parliamentary groups or on a deal with the opposition. Erdoğan has proven that he masters these mechanisms to perfection. But going to early elections in the midst of 31% inflation, high interest rates, and a stock-market crisis is a risk. Waiting until 2028 is also a risk, because nothing guarantees that internal party scandals and new crises will not lead to the collapse of the governing model built over more than 20 years.
That is probably why it is being discussed, and “Bloomberg” hints at it, that voices are growing in Ankara calling for “a controlled handover of the baton within the ruling establishment itself.” This is grist to the mill for Hakan Fidan, the foreign minister. And the former head of MIT, the intelligence service, for 13 years. There is no doubt that he is a consensus figure who has directed Turkey’s policies and actions in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus and knows how to talk at a high level with Washington, Moscow, Brussels, as well as Tehran and the Gulf. He has not been involved in financial schemes, as they are called in the Balkans, and has no connection to the stock-market crisis. Loyal to Erdoğan so far, but without the charisma to enchant the squares. He does not know how to sing to his supporters. And whether he can take control of electoral practices and party affairs is a question for the future. For now, he is helping to obscure domestic problems through activity abroad. For example, through relations with Israel because of Gaza. This is a cause that Turkish citizens support and understand. Whether foreign-policy rhetoric will compensate for domestic problems and empty baskets will soon become clear. It is a matter of time—and of Erdoğan’s decision—whether there will be early elections. For now, there is a stock-market crisis and dissatisfied citizens. Erdoğan has dealt with problems like these before.
All that remains for us is to be active observers of our neighbors, both to the west and to the southeast. And to draw appropriate conclusions.