Last news in Fakti

The Dictator Kim Who Turned Global Division into His Strategic Advantage

How the young dictator navigates global politics

Nov 22, 2026 20:26 47

The Dictator Kim Who Turned Global Division into His Strategic Advantage - 1
FAKTI.BG publishes opinions with a wide range of perspectives to encourage constructive debates.

From the great famine of the 1990s to nuclear deterrence, from the alliance with Russia to the rejection of unification with South Korea, the history of this country has looked almost the same for decades: poor, closed off, yet somehow increasingly significant in international politics.

North Korea most often appears in the news through tests of ballistic missiles, military parades, threats against its neighbours and fragmentary details about the life of its ruling dynasty. This image, however, overshadows a question that deserves attention. How does a country with such limited resources, under sanctions and only three decades after a catastrophic famine, manage to become a factor among the great powers? The answer cannot be reduced solely to the personality of Kim Jong-un. We must trace the longer path of the North Korean state.

During his rule, Pyongyang expanded its nuclear arsenal, developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, restored military cooperation with Russia and sought new ways to benefit from rivalry among the great powers. The country, however, has not escaped its economic constraints. Food shortages continue, as do serious human rights violations. Hence the paradox: one of the most closed countries in the world is becoming more internationally significant. Somehow, this seems less mysterious if we look back.

From Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-un: Socialism the Korean Way

To understand today’s North Korean policy, we must return to the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948. After liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was divided into a Soviet and an American occupation zone. Separate states gradually took shape in the two parts, and their confrontation led to the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. In the north, power was consolidated around Kim Il-sung, who initially relied on the support of the Soviet Union. Over time, however, he built a system that increasingly differed from both the Soviet and Chinese models.

This system rests on the Juche ideology, a concept that emphasises political independence, economic self-reliance and the state’s ability to defend itself through its own efforts. There are similarities with the ideas of Mao Zedong. Both doctrines view socialism as something that must be adapted to national characteristics. Both attach importance to mass mobilisation, ideological education and the role of the party. Their development, however, gradually diverged. Under Mao, revolutionary struggle remained a fundamental principle of political life. In North Korea, the unity of society around the supreme leader, known as the suryong, became increasingly important. Thus, an unusual mixture emerged of socialist ideology, Korean nationalism, Confucian notions of hierarchy and hereditary rule.

After Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994, power passed to his son Kim Jong-il, and in 2011 to his grandson Kim Jong-un. North Korea became the only state created by a communist revolution in which supreme power was passed successively among three generations of one family. This continuity is highly significant for understanding the regime’s political resilience. The family is not presented merely as a group of state leaders. It is portrayed as the bearer of the historical legitimacy of the state itself.

The Catastrophe That Changed Everything

In the 1990s, the system faced its most severe test since the Korean War. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Pyongyang of preferential trade, cheap energy and a significant share of the economic assistance on which the North Korean economy depended. Industrial production fell sharply. Agriculture, dependent on fuel, electricity, machinery and chemical fertilisers, plunged into a severe crisis. Floods in 1995 and 1996 made the situation even worse. Natural disasters, however, were neither the only nor the main cause of what happened. The centralised food-distribution system proved incapable of feeding the population. The authorities responded slowly, while restrictions on international humanitarian activity made assistance more difficult. Thus came the famine, known in official North Korean terminology as the "Arduous March".

The exact number of victims is unknown. Researchers Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland examine estimates according to which up to one million people may have died from starvation and related diseases. There are lower estimates as well, but all speak of an enormous humanitarian catastrophe.

The consequences were not limited to demographic losses. When the state ceased to provide what was necessary, people began looking for other ways to survive. Informal markets appeared, small-scale trade expanded and households increasingly relied on their own initiative. Here lies one of the greatest contradictions in the history of North Korean socialism. A system built on the idea of self-sufficiency and centralised distribution survived in part thanks to international food aid and market relations that emerged outside the original state model.

The famine left a lasting legacy. North Korea became dependent on external supplies, while relations with China, international humanitarian organisations and South Korea acquired vital importance. This memory is necessary to understand why the current leadership attaches such great importance to controlling external dependencies.

The Young Heir Who Knew the West

When Kim Jong-un took power after his father’s death in December 2011, he was relatively young and had limited publicly known governing experience. Unlike his grandfather and father, he spent part of his childhood and adolescence in Switzerland.

He is known to have studied in the Bern area under an assumed identity. The precise details of his education remain the subject of differing accounts, but his stay in Western Europe is widely documented. The stay itself proves neither exceptional governing abilities nor a propensity for reform. It does show, however, that the future North Korean leader had direct contact with a society significantly different from the one he would later lead.

The first years of his rule were marked by the consolidation of personal power. There were changes in the top leadership and harsh purges, including the 2013 execution of his influential uncle by marriage, Jang Song-thaek. At the same time, Kim began building a policy in which economic development and the nuclear programme were regarded as equal priorities. Over time, nuclear weapons became the main instrument with which Pyongyang sought to alter its position in the international system.

The Nuclear Programme: From a Means of Survival to a Diplomatic Tool

North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, under Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un, therefore, is not the creator of the programme. His contribution is more closely connected with expanding the arsenal and improving delivery systems. In the following years, Pyongyang carried out additional nuclear tests, developed ballistic missiles with different ranges and demonstrated systems designed to reach targets at intercontinental distances. This changed the calculations of its opponents. A state capable of launching a nuclear retaliatory strike places an attacker at risk incomparable with that of a conventional conflict.

An important clarification must be made here. North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, but it is not recognised as a nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its programme continues to violate UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the actual reliability of individual missile systems, their ability to penetrate missile defence and the readiness of North Korea’s nuclear forces cannot be fully established from publicly available data. Despite these limitations, nuclear deterrence is now an unavoidable factor in any discussion of security on the Korean Peninsula.

For Pyongyang, it also has a political dimension. The leadership seeks to negotiate with the United States not as a country asking for protection, but as a state capable of inflicting unacceptable losses in an armed conflict. The meetings between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019 showed that the North Korean leader could gain direct access to the American president without having previously given up his nuclear weapons. The talks did not lead to a nuclear-disarmament agreement, but their very format represented a diplomatic change.

Russia: The War in Ukraine Opened New Opportunities

The most significant change in North Korea’s international position in recent years has been connected with the war between Russia and Ukraine. After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Moscow gradually expanded military cooperation with Pyongyang. Russia needed large quantities of artillery ammunition and other military materials. North Korea has production facilities and significant stocks of weapons compatible with some Russian systems. In 2023, Kim Jong-un visited Russia and met Vladimir Putin. In June 2024, the two signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in Pyongyang. The document provides for mutual military assistance under certain circumstances related to an armed attack against either party.

Subsequently, North Korea provided Russia with ammunition and ballistic missiles, while North Korean service members took part in combat operations against Ukrainian forces, including in Russia’s Kursk region. According to studies and estimates cited by the US Congressional Research Service in September 2026, the value of North Korean support for Russia’s war effort may amount to billions of dollars. The precise financial dimensions remain uncertain, as much of the exchange is unofficial.

For Pyongyang, the cooperation offers several possible benefits. The first is financial revenue and access to energy resources, food and materials. The second is diplomatic support from a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The third is the opportunity for military-technical cooperation and the acquisition of practical combat experience. It should not, however, automatically be assumed that Russia is providing North Korea with every technology it seeks. Some reports of specific transfers are based on intelligence assessments rather than publicly confirmed agreements.

The cost is also significant. North Korean service members took part in a war far from their own country and suffered losses, while military cooperation deepened the confrontation with Ukraine and its partners. Nevertheless, relations with Moscow now give Pyongyang opportunities that would have been difficult to attain a decade ago.

China: The Indispensable Neighbour That Is No Longer the Only Support

To understand North Korea’s new foreign policy, we must also look at its relations with China. Beijing has long been decisive for the DPRK’s economic survival. According to the OECD’s 2026 economic survey of South Korea, in 2024 China accounted for around 98% of North Korea’s officially reported foreign trade. This statistic does not cover unofficial operations or military cooperation with Russia, but it clearly shows how strong the country’s dependence on the Chinese market is.

North Korea also has particular geostrategic importance for China itself. The peninsula directly borders China’s northeastern provinces. If the North Korean state collapsed, this could trigger a refugee crisis, military instability and difficult-to-predict changes in the regional balance. Beijing also has an interest in preventing a sudden change in the political map from bringing a US military presence closer to the Chinese border. China’s support, however, is not unconditional. Pyongyang’s nuclear tests and missile programmes create problems for Beijing as well, partly because they strengthen military cooperation among the United States, South Korea and Japan.

For decades, North Korean leaders have tried to preserve a degree of independence between Moscow and Beijing. Under Kim Jong-un, this tradition has acquired new meaning. Closer ties with Russia reduce the exclusive dependence on China. Pyongyang, however, has no reason to sever relations with its largest trading partner. Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea in June 2026 showed that Chinese-North Korean ties remain important.

Thus, something resembling a strategic triangle is taking shape. Russia needs North Korean military support. China is interested in stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea seeks to use its relations with both countries to expand its room for independent action. It is not necessary to assume that this development was planned in advance in Pyongyang. It is enough to establish that North Korea’s leadership is adapting to the changed international environment and extracting benefits from it.

Why Pyongyang No Longer Seeks Reconciliation with Seoul

For a long time, relations with South Korea were among the most important instruments of North Korean foreign policy. In the 1990s and the early 21st century, South Korean assistance was highly significant for the North’s economy. During the policy of rapprochement known as the "Sunshine Policy", Seoul provided humanitarian aid and supported joint economic projects. The best-known was the Kaesong Industrial Complex, where South Korean companies employed North Korean workers. The project provided jobs and revenue, but was terminated in 2016. At that time, rapprochement with Seoul brought Pyongyang both economic and diplomatic benefits.

Today, the conditions are different. North Korea has an expanded nuclear arsenal, new opportunities through cooperation with Russia and continued reliance on China. This reduces the need for economic arrangements with South Korea, particularly if they involve restrictions on the nuclear programme or political concessions. The change, however, is not only economic.

At the end of 2023, Kim Jong-un began rejecting the traditional idea that the two Koreas are parts of one nation, which should be reunified. In 2024, North Korean authorities abolished institutions associated with reunification policy and began viewing South Korea as a separate, hostile state. Constitutional changes in 2026 removed earlier formulations concerning national reunification and introduced a definition of North Korean territory that does not include South Korea. This represents a historic break with Kim Il-sung’s policy. For decades, both Pyongyang and Seoul maintained the idea that the peninsula should be reunited, although they held incompatible views on how this should happen. Now North Korea is effectively abandoning that goal.

One possible explanation is that the North Korean leadership no longer sees sufficient benefit in economic rapprochement with Seoul. Another is that contact with the far wealthier South Korean society is perceived as a risk to ideological control. A third explanation is connected with nuclear strategy: Pyongyang prefers to negotiate security issues directly with Washington rather than accept Seoul as a necessary intermediary. These motives are not mutually exclusive. It is important to note that abandoning reunification does not necessarily mean preparations for war. It can also be understood as an attempt to institutionalise permanently the division between the two states.

How Isolated Is North Korea Really?

North Korea is often described as the "hermit state". This creates the impression of a country that has almost no relations with the outside world. In reality, the DPRK maintains diplomatic relations with a large number of countries, has been a member of the UN since 1991 and has diplomatic missions in Asia, Europe and other parts of the world. Bulgaria also has diplomatic relations with North Korea. Pyongyang maintains contacts not only with Russia and China, but also with countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Historically, these ties have included trade, military cooperation, technical assistance and diplomatic support.

We must therefore distinguish among three different phenomena. The first is international diplomatic isolation, which in North Korea’s case is far from complete. The second is economic isolation, largely driven by international sanctions, limited financial links and decisions by the North Korean leadership itself. The third is the population’s isolation from the outside world, which is particularly strict. North Korean citizens have no free access to the global internet, foreign travel is heavily restricted and the distribution of foreign information is subject to tight control.

Thus another paradox emerges. The North Korean state seeks to maintain relations with the outside world, but does not want those relations to lead to a free exchange of information and ideas within society. In this sense, isolation is not merely something imposed from outside. It is also an instrument of domestic policy. This does not mean that all restrictions are voluntary. International sanctions have real economic consequences and severely narrow the opportunities for legal trade, investment and technological exchange.

Women in the Kim Dynasty: The Possible End of Male Succession?

One of the most interesting changes under Kim Jong-un has been the growing public role of women from the ruling family. North Korean society combines the socialist idea of formal gender equality with enduring patriarchal traditions.

As early as 1946, North Korean authorities adopted a law on equality between men and women that provided for political, labour and family rights. This did not eliminate the traditional hierarchy in society, but it created an ideological basis in which women’s participation in political life was not fundamentally excluded.

There is already such a precedent within the ruling family. Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s sister, held influential party positions. Today, Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, is an especially important figure. She actively participates in the regime’s political communications and often expresses official positions on relations with the United States and South Korea.

Even greater attention, however, is focused on the North Korean leader’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, who is 13–14 years old. Recently, she has increasingly accompanied her father at military events, inspections and official ceremonies. In February 2026, South Korean intelligence reported that, in its assessment, Pyongyang was taking steps that could indicate preparations for the girl to inherit power. There has been no official confirmation from North Korea, however. If Kim Ju-ae is indeed designated as heir, it would be the first transfer of supreme power to a woman in the history of the dynasty.

Such a development would not necessarily contradict North Korean ideology. In the DPRK system, membership in the Kim family carries particular political weight, and dynastic origin may prove more important than traditional ideas about the leader’s gender. Here another contradiction of the North Korean model becomes visible. A state officially based on socialist equality could arrive at its first woman leader not through democratisation, but through the continuation of hereditary rule.

What Is the Cost of the New International Position?

North Korea’s expanded foreign-policy opportunities do not mean that the country has overcome its economic and social problems. Publicly available information about the population’s condition remains limited. Access for independent international observers is difficult, and official statistics do not allow a complete assessment of income, nutrition and health indicators. There is insufficient basis to claim that North Korea is currently experiencing famine on the scale of the catastrophe of the 1990s. This does not mean, however, that food insecurity has been overcome. The economy remains vulnerable to poor harvests, energy shortages, restrictions on foreign trade and decisions by the political leadership.

Military programmes consume significant resources, the exact scale of which is not publicly known. Cooperation with Russia also creates new dependencies. If the international situation changes or Russian military needs decline, some of Pyongyang’s current economic opportunities may shrink. Relations with China remain asymmetrical. Beijing has incomparably greater economic weight and can influence the terms of bilateral trade. Nuclear deterrence, for its part, does not eliminate the risk of conflict. It may reduce the likelihood of certain forms of external attack, but at the same time increases the danger that any serious military crisis could acquire catastrophic proportions.

Therefore, Pyongyang’s strategic gains should not be confused with an improvement in the living standards of North Korean citizens. These are two different criteria for assessing governance.

Three Kims, Three Different Historical Tasks

The history of North Korea can also be viewed as a succession of three different periods. Kim Il-sung built the state under the conditions of the Cold War. His main task was to establish and strengthen his own political model, using the support of the Soviet Union and China without allowing complete subordination to either centre.

Kim Jong-il inherited a state whose traditional economic foundations were collapsing. His rule passed through famine, international isolation and the first nuclear test. The main challenge was preserving the political system amid a deep crisis.

Kim Jong-un governs amid a new intensification of rivalry among the great powers. The expansion of the nuclear programme and military cooperation with Russia have changed Pyongyang’s capabilities. China remains interested in the stability of the North Korean state, while the United States must take its nuclear potential into account. This does not prove that Kim Jong-un has achieved all his goals. Even less does it allow conclusions about the population’s welfare to be drawn solely from foreign-policy results. But it shows that North Korea’s international role has changed. Three decades ago, the country was forced to seek international food aid to overcome a catastrophic famine. Today, it supplies weapons and military support to one of the world’s largest nuclear powers.

This comparison does not mean that North Korea has become economically self-sufficient or that its dependence on external partners has disappeared. Rather, the nature of some of these dependencies has changed. Pyongyang possesses resources that other countries need and seeks to use them as an instrument of influence.

Here we see the central paradox of North Korean history. The state that turned self-reliance into an official ideology has never ceased to depend on the international environment. But its leaders have consistently sought to use that environment without allowing it to alter the foundations of the domestic political system.

North Korea remains poor, authoritarian and highly closed off. But it can no longer be viewed merely as an isolated remnant of the Cold War. Amid the new international confrontation, Pyongyang is becoming an actor whose decisions matter far beyond the Korean Peninsula. How sustainable this position will be depends not only on Kim Jong-un, but also on the future of the war in Ukraine, relations between Moscow and Beijing, Washington’s policy and the ability of the North Korean economy to provide for its own population. This is also the great unresolved question facing the fourth generation of the Kim dynasty: whether the state will manage to turn its increased international importance into lasting economic resilience, or whether it will continue to rely above all on its military power and on contradictions among the other states.

Source: news.bg