Will Borisov "resign" over Radev? This seems more than an interesting question. When the lead of nearly 20 percentage points that the sociological agencies predicted for Iliyana Yotova before the presidential elections melted to just 2.8 points, this is a clear signal that expectations have not been met. All agencies gave Yotova a significant lead because they assumed that the support that Rumen Radev's "Progressive Bulgaria" received in April with the promises of changing the model and taking a new political path would be transferred to her as well. But this did not happen to the expected extent.
When the choice is now reduced to two candidates who will face each other in the run-off, it is important to look not only at the candidates themselves, but also at the entire political scene. It is there that the answers to what can happen in the second round and what the political consequences of the result will be lie.
Out of fear or political calculation - we can argue which of the two prevailed - GERB and MRF did not nominate their own candidates for president. However, the results of the first round show that their voters could prove decisive. According to the data, 39% of GERB voters supported Andrey Gyurov against 22% for Iliyana Yotova. For MRF, the ratio is the opposite - 39% voted for Yotova, and 28% for Gyurov.
These numbers should be viewed with one important clarification: neither Boyko Borisov, as leader of GERB, nor Delyan Peevski called on their voters to support one or the other candidate.
Now, however, the situation is different.
In the runoff, it is their positions that may weigh in one direction or the other, although party leaders cannot automatically shift their voters to their chosen candidate.
The votes for Kostadin Kostadinov, Radostin Vassilev and Ivelin Mihaylov also give grounds for political claims. The result of “Vazrazhdane“ can be presented as a sign of the party's mobilization, and the same can be done by MECH and “Velichy“. Supporting their candidates does not necessarily mean that their voters will vote the same way in the second round. We have already heard from Kostadinov that he recognizes Yotova.
In this context, the political message that no party will support a candidate unless he explicitly seeks its support sounds almost Jesuitical. Simply put: first ask us, and then we will decide whether to help you. This may seem like a claim to political respect, but it is also a way for parties to retain their freedom to distance themselves from the eventual winner or to claim merit in his success.
If such a position is understandable for smaller formations, the question is what such an appeal to GERB and DPS would look like.
And whether Gyurov will seek their support at all.
With DPS, the situation is particularly interesting. If the party lets its voters vote according to their conscience, this may give Yotova some tolerance, as the data from the first round shows that among the MRF supporters who voted, she has a lead over Gyurov. But would such an approach be beneficial for Peevski's party against the backdrop of the actions of state institutions against mayors in municipalities where MRF has strong positions?
The explanations that these actions are the result of long-term work and were simply carried out at this moment do not negate the political question of why they are happening now. They were aimed at areas where MRF has significant influence, and were presented as part of the fight against the established model and the oligarchy. Therefore, the party's reaction and the behavior of its voters in the run-off will be indicative of its relations with the authorities and the extent to which these relations influence political choices.
No less interesting is Borisov's position. Will he give a clear signal to GERB supporters to vote for Gyurov, or will he continue to distance himself with the argument that it is better not to enter into a direct conflict with Radev? Such distancing may be convenient before the runoff, but it is unlikely to remain without a political price after it.
Here comes the memory of 2016.
Then, after GERB candidate Tsetska Tsacheva faced Rumen Radev, Borisov linked the loss of the presidential elections to the resignation of his government. Radev won the runoff, and in mid-November Borisov resigned. This is a fact that cannot be denied, regardless of the circumstances and political motives behind his decision.
It is precisely this precedent that could become an argument in the next political battle. If Iliyana Yotova loses, Borisov will have reason to remind Radev of his own behavior in 2016 and raise the question of political responsibility. The logic of such an argument would be that the presidential elections reflect the current state of political representation and that the loss of a candidate associated with the ruling party could be grounds for a reassessment of the government.
But there is one significant difference: in 2016, Borisov himself had tied his resignation to the outcome of the presidential elections.
This does not automatically mean that Radev should do the same in the event of Yotova's loss. Political analogy can be used as an argument, but it is not a legal or political obligation. However, Borisov could turn it into a means of putting pressure on Radev and his government.
If Yotova manages to maintain her lead and win the run-off, Borisov will probably have fewer reasons to insist on such a balance sheet. Then the most convenient position for him may be silence and continuation of the current line. But support for Gyurov also carries a risk for GERB. On the one hand, it would be logical given Borisov's stated Euro-Atlantic orientation. On the other, it would give Yotova the opportunity to present the run-off as a clash with a common front of the old political forces.
For Gyurov, this is a bet on his political future. For Yotova, after ten years in the presidential institution, the result will also be an assessment of her own political career. Therefore, the two enter the run-off with different risks and different expectations.
Gyurov has already made a strong move by challenging Yotova to a television debate. If it takes place, it could significantly influence the decision of wavering voters. It remains to be seen whether Yotova will accept and whether the campaign will turn into a real clash of positions, and not just an exchange of party accusations.
The close result of the first round does not mean an automatic change of power.
But it is enough to turn Yotova's expected victory into a crisis of confidence and open a new front of political opposition.
If Yotova loses, the question will not only be who will become president of Bulgaria. It will also be who will be able to turn this loss into an argument for the next big political battle. And Borisov may find himself in the unusual role of not just reminding Radev of what he did in 2016, but asking him if he is ready to bear the same political responsibility.
So it remains to be seen whether Borisov will literally throw his "resignation" at Radev, or use his own 2016 resignation as a weapon against him.