A series of decisions over a period of 17 minutes preceded the collision between a “Renfe“ AVE train and a stopped Iryo train near Urda, Toledo province. At least 68 people died in the crash. The AVE was carrying 397 people, while the Iryo was carrying 147.
According to the timeline restored by the Spanish government, the LZB safety system failed at around 8:30 a.m. due to a communication problem between computers. This automatically stopped about six trains on the section. After the failure, control is passed to the people in the control center.
Permission to move despite the stopped train
At around 8:36 a.m., the operator orders the six trains to resume their movement “normally”. At that time, his screen shows that the Iryo has stopped about 25 kilometers from the AVE. There is also a red signal at the checkpoint where the train is.
One of the trains reminds that in the event of a system failure, the protocol requires movement “in sight” - at such a speed that the driver can stop in front of an obstacle, but no more than 40 km/h. However, this warning was not transmitted to the AVE driver.
“A rear-end collision on the Spanish network is truly incredible”, said Transport Minister Oscar Puente. He described the decision to resume traffic as “inexplicable“ and suggested human error by an “Adif“ operator after the main signaling failure.
The last five minutes
At 8:41 a.m., Iryo was instructed to continue “normally“. Seven minutes later, its driver contacted the control center and reported that the train could not restart the system and remained stopped. However, this warning did not reach the AVE team.
Between 8:36 a.m. and around 8:53 a.m., the AVE covered the 25 kilometers to Iryo. The exact speed at the time of the impact has not yet been established, but in this section, trains can travel at up to 200 km/h. After the collision, several wagons fell over the embankment.
The controller was assisted by another employee and worked under the supervision of a superior. He was questioned by the Civil Guard and received psychological and legal assistance. Puente said that he did not speak to him personally, as the operator preferred to speak through his lawyer and in front of investigators.
All conversations and orders were recorded audio and in writing. These materials are being reviewed to restore the sequence of actions in the control center. At the moment, the reason for the LZB's refusal is indicated as a technical problem, and the possible responsibility for the authorized movement remains the subject of an investigation.
Sources: elpais.com, rtve.es